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MISCONCEPTIONS IN RATIONAL NUMBERS, PROBABILITY, ALGEBRA, AND
GEOMETRY
Christopher R. Rakes
March 25, 2010
Abstract
In this study, the author examined the relationship of probability misconceptions
to algebra, geometry, and rational number misconceptions and investigated the potential
of probability instruction as an intervention to address misconceptions in all 4 content
areas. Through a review of literature, 5 fundamental concepts were identified that, if
misunderstood, create persistent difficulties across content areas: rational number
meaning, additive/multiplicative structures, absolute/relative comparison, variable
meaning, and spatial reasoning misconceptions. Probability instruction naturally provides
concrete, authentic experiences that engage students with abstract mathematical concepts,
establish relationships between mathematical topics, and connect inter-related problem
solving strategies. The intervention consisted of five probability lessons about counting
principles, randomness, independent and dependent event probability, and probability
distributions. The unit lasted approximately two weeks.
This study used mixed methodology to analyze data from a randomly assigned
sample of students from an untreated control group design with a switching replication.
Document analysis was used to examine patterns in student responses to items on the
mathematics knowledge test. Multiple imputation was used to account for missing data.
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Structural equation modeling was used to examine the causal structure of content area
misconceptions. Item response theory was used to compute item difficulty, item
discrimination, and item guessing coefficients. Generalized hierarchical linear modeling
was used to explore the impact of item, student, and classroom characteristics on
incorrect responses due to misconceptions.
These analyses resulted in 7 key findings. (1) Content area is not the most
effective way to classify mathematics misconceptions; instead, five underlying
misconceptions affect all four content areas. (2) Mathematics misconception errors often
appear as procedural errors. (3) A classroom environment that fosters enjoyment of
mathematics and value of mathematics are associated with reduced misconception errors.
(4) Higher mathematics self confidence and motivation to learn mathematics is associated
with reduced misconception errors. (5) Probability misconceptions do not have a causal
effect on rational numbers, algebra, or geometry misconceptions. (6) Rational number
misconceptions do not have a causal effect on probability, algebra, or geometry
misconceptions. (7) Probability instruction may not affect misconceptions directly, but it
may help students develop skills needed to bypass misconceptions when solving difficult
problems.

vii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
Abstract ......................................................................................................................
List of Tables ........................................................................................................................
List of Figures.............................................................................................................
List of Equations .........................................................................................................
Chapter 1: Introduction ................................................................................................
Purpose Statement and Research Questions .......................................................
Background ....................................................................................................
Significance of the Study .................................................................................
Hypotheses .....................................................................................................
Error Responses due to Misconceptions ................................................
Probability Instruction as the Intervention .............................................
Structure of Mathematical Misconceptions............................................
Assumptions ...................................................................................................
Epistemology ......................................................................................
Axiology ............................................................................................
Ontology ............................................................................................
Are Mathematical Concepts Part of a “Singular, Verifiable
Reality and Truth” or the Result of Multiple Socially
Constructed Realities? .............................................................
How do People Know Mathematics? ........................................
How Should Mathematics be Studied? ......................................
What Mathematics is Worth Knowing?.....................................
Limitations .....................................................................................................
Organization of the Remaining Chapters ...........................................................
Chapter 2: Literature Review .......................................................................................
Defining Misconceptions .................................................................................
Misconceptions versus Reasoning Errors in Secondary Mathematics ..................
Critical Misconceptions Specific to Learning Rational Numbers.........................
Rational Number Meaning ...................................................................
Probability Connections to Rational Number Meaning ...........................
Linear Proportions...............................................................................
Probability Connections to Linear Proportions ......................................
Uniformity, Equality, and Change ........................................................
Critical Misconceptions Specific to Learning Algebra........................................

viii

vi
xiii
xvi
xvii
001
001
002
005
005
005
006
006
008
008
010
012
013
013
014
015
016
017
019
019
021
023
023
029
031
032
038
044

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
Function Relationships.........................................................................
Probability and Rational Number Assumptions Influence How Students
Understand Non-Linear Functions ........................................................
Probability and Rational Number Assumptions Influence How Students
Understand Linear Functions ................................................................
Variables and Variation .......................................................................
Variable Interpretation .............................................................
Probability Quantities are also Affected by Static Comparisons ..
Tying Algebra, Probability, and Rational Numbers Together through
Error Patterns ......................................................................................
Critical Misconceptions Specific to Learning Geometry .....................................
Spatial Reasoning ................................................................................
Proportionality and Geometric Learning................................................
Teaching Probability to Correct Foundational Mathematical Misunderstandings..
A Conceptual Framework to Model Mathematics Learning ................................
Difficulties Inherent to Addressing Mathematical Misconceptions
Directly ..............................................................................................
Mathematical Task Characteristics .......................................................
Student Thought Processes Influencing Mathematical Misconceptions ...
Discernment ...........................................................................
Orientation Toward Mathematics .............................................
Individual Context...................................................................
Environmental Context ............................................................
Putting the Model Together..................................................................
Summary and Research Questions ....................................................................
Chapter 3: Methodology ..............................................................................................
Research Design .............................................................................................
Subjects ..............................................................................................
Design Description ..............................................................................
Probability Instruction Intervention .................................................................
Instrumentation ...............................................................................................
Mathematics Knowledge Instrument .....................................................
Mathematics Attitudes Inventory ..........................................................
MetaCognition Inventory .....................................................................
Missing Data...................................................................................................
Unit and Item Non-Response......................................................................
Imputation of Missing Data ........................................................................
Attrition.......................................................................................................
Statistical Power .........................................................................................
Data Analysis..................................................................................................
Qualitative Analysis ............................................................................
Quantitative Analysis ..........................................................................
Structural Analysis of Content Area Misconceptions....................

ix

048
049
050
051
051
056
061
062
062
065
067
072
073
074
075
075
078
080
083
087
090
092
093
093
093
094
095
095
102
103
104
104
105
113
116
117
117
119
119

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
Model Identification ......................................................................
Analysis of Contextual Factors ......................................................
Summary of Methodology .......................................................................................
Chapter 4 Results ..................................................................................................................
Identifying Misconception Patterns .........................................................................
Misconceptions on Algebra Content Knowledge Items .............................
Item 5 Response Patterns ...............................................................
Item 6 Response Patterns ...............................................................
Item 7 Response Patterns ...............................................................
Item 8 Response Patterns ...............................................................
Item 16 Response Patterns .............................................................
Misconceptions on Geometry Content Knowledge Items ..........................
Item 9 Response Patterns ...............................................................
Item 10 Response Patterns .............................................................
Item 11 Response Patterns .............................................................
Misconceptions on Probability Content Knowledge Items ........................
Item 1 Response Patterns ...............................................................
Item 2 Response Patterns ...............................................................
Item 3 Response Patterns ...............................................................
Item 4 Response Patterns ...............................................................
Item 17 Response Patterns .............................................................
Misconceptions on Rational Number Content Knowledge Items...............
Item 12 Response Patterns .............................................................
Item 13 Response Patterns .............................................................
Item 14 Response Patterns .............................................................
Item 15 Response Patterns .............................................................
Implications of Item Response Patterns......................................................
Structure of Content Area Misconceptions ..............................................................
Calibration of Hypothesized Structural Models .........................................
Analysis of Model A ...................................................................................
Calibration .....................................................................................
Validation of Model A2 .................................................................
Analysis of Model B ...................................................................................
Calibration .....................................................................................
Validation of Model B3 .................................................................
Analysis of Model C ...................................................................................
Finding a Structurally Stable Model C ..........................................
Calibration of Model C3 ................................................................
Calibration of Model C3A .............................................................
Validation of Model C3Aiii ...........................................................
Calibration of Model C3B .............................................................
Validation of Model C3Bii ............................................................

x

121
126
129
131
131
132
132
135
136
137
138
139
139
139
140
141
141
142
143
144
145
146
146
147
148
149
149
150
150
151
151
154
155
155
159
160
160
163
164
167
167
170

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
Analysis of Model D ...................................................................................
Calibration .....................................................................................
Validation of Model D3 .................................................................
Analysis of Model E ...................................................................................
Calibration .....................................................................................
Validation of Model E7 .................................................................
Analysis of Model F ...................................................................................
Calibration .....................................................................................
Validation of Model F ...................................................................
Summary of Structural Model Analysis .....................................................
Impact of Contextual Factors on Item Misconception Responses ...........................
Implementation of Intervention ...............................................................................
Two Level Model .......................................................................................
Descriptive Statistics .....................................................................
Unconditional Null Model .............................................................
Student Model................................................................................
Contextual Model ..........................................................................
Final Model....................................................................................
Three Level Bernoulli Model .....................................................................
Descriptive Statistics .....................................................................
Unconditional Null Model .............................................................
Item Level 1 Model .......................................................................
Student Level 2 Model...................................................................
Class Level 3 Model ......................................................................
Summary of Results .................................................................................................
Chapter 5 Discussion ............................................................................................................
Analysis 1: Misconception Error Analysis ..............................................................
Two Key Findings .......................................................................................
Detecting Mathematics Misconceptions .....................................................
Analysis 2: Content Area Misconceptions ...............................................................
Two Key Findings ......................................................................................
Model Stability ...........................................................................................
Goodness of Fit Statistics ...........................................................................
Conclusions.................................................................................................
Implications for Curriculum Development .................................................
Analysis 3: Factors Influencing Misconception Errors ...........................................
Three Key Findings ....................................................................................
Implications for Teaching Mathematics .....................................................
Final Thoughts: Pedagogy and Mathematics Misconceptions.................................
References ..................................................................................................................
Appendix A: Algebra Lesson 1 — Statistical Structure .................................................
Appendix B: Algebra Lesson 1 — Student Worksheet ...................................................

xi

170
170
175
176
176
184
185
185
187
188
189
189
190
190
191
191
193
195
202
202
203
205
209
211
216
218
219
219
220
222
222
222
224
224
229
230
230
231
233
236
282
289

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
Appendix C: Algebra Lesson 2 — Randomness Lesson Plan..........................................
Appendix D: Algebra Lesson 2 — Station Prompts .......................................................
Appendix E: Algebra Lesson 3/Geometry Lesson 1 — Counting Principles ....................
Appendix F: Algebra Lesson 3/Geometry Lesson 1 — Task Rotation Prompts ..................
Appendix G: Algebra Lesson 4/Geometry Lesson 2 — Event Probability ..........................
Appendix H: Algebra Lesson 4 — Station Prompts .......................................................
Appendix I: Geometry Lesson 2 — Station Prompts ......................................................
Appendix J: Algebra Lesson 5/Geometry Lesson 3 — Probability Distributions ................
Appendix K: Algebra Lesson 5 — Student Worksheet ........................................................
Appendix L: Geometry Lesson 3 — Student Worksheet .....................................................
Appendix M: NAEP Mathematics Knowledge Instrument ..................................................
Appendix N: Attitudes Toward Mathematics Inventory (Tapia & Marsh, 2004).................
Appendix O: Metacognitive Awareness Inventory (Schraw & Dennison, 1994) .................
Curriculum Vitae ..................................................................................................................

xii

294
297
302
307
309
312
316
323
325
327
328
336
337
339

LIST OF TABLES
TABLE
1. Misconception Hypotheses for each NAEP Item ......................................................
2. Two-Way Half Table .............................................................................................
3. 100% Row Table ...................................................................................................
4. 100% Column Table ..............................................................................................
5. Conditional Probability Equations ..........................................................................
6. Hierarchical Levels of Variable Interpretation .........................................................
7. Alignment of Keirsey Personality Framework with Silver-Strong Learning Styles .....
8. Reported NAEP Item Performance ........................................................................
9. Stability Correlations Between the Pre- and Post-Test Data for each Item .......
10. IRT Coefficients for NAEP Items ...........................................................................
11. Internal Consistency Reliability for ATMI ........................................................
12. Internal Consistency Reliability for MAI .................................................................
13. Sources of Missing Data ........................................................................................
14. Means and Standard Error for Pretest and Survey Data Set .......................................
15. Means and Standard Error for Posttest Data Set .......................................................
16. Degrees of Freedom for Models in Figure 24 ...........................................................
17. Declaration of Variables in Equations 15 – 19 .........................................................
18. Summary of Observed Misconception Responses ....................................................
19. Model A Goodness of Fit Indices from Calibration Samples .....................................
20. Model A Maximum Modification Indices from Calibration Samples .........................
21. Model A2 Goodness of Fit Indices, Covary Item 5 and 15 Errors ..............................
22. Model A2 Maximum Modification Indices ..............................................................
23. Model A3 Goodness of Fit Indices, Covary Item 7 and 12 Errors ..............................
24. Model A2 Goodness of Fit Indices from Validation Samples ....................................
25. Model A2 Comparison of Calibration and Validation Sample Fit Indices ..................
26. Model B Goodness of Fit Indices from Calibration Samples .....................................
27. Model B Maximum Modification Indices from Calibration Samples .........................
28. Model B2a Goodness of Fit Indices, Regress Algebra Misconceptions on Geometry
Misconceptions .....................................................................................................
29. Model B2b Goodness of Fit Indices, Regress Item 5 on Rational Number
Misconceptions .....................................................................................................
30. Model B2b Maximum Modification Indices ............................................................
31. Model B3 Goodness of Fit Indices, Covary Item 9 and 10 Errors ..............................
32. Model B3 Maximum Modification Indices ..............................................................
33. Model B3 Goodness of Fit Indices from Validation Samples ....................................
34. Model B3 Comparison of Calibration and Validation Sample Fit Indices...................
35. Model C Goodness of Fit Indices from Calibration Samples .....................................
36. Model C2a Calibration Samples Goodness of Fit Indices..........................................
37. Model C2b Calibration Samples Goodness of Fit Indices .........................................
38. Model C3a Fit Indices, Remove Rational Number to Algebra and Probability to
Geometry Regression Paths ....................................................................................

xiii

PAGE
005
027
028
028
041
052
082
097
098
100
102
104
105
107
112
122
127
150
151
152
152
152
153
154
154
155
155
156
157
158
158
159
160
160
161
161
162
162

LIST OF TABLES
TABLE
39. Model C3b Fit Indices, Remove Rational Number to Geometry and Probability to
Algebra Regression Paths.......................................................................................
40. Model C3 Maximum Modification Indices from Calibration Samples .......................
41. Model C3Aii Goodness of Fit Indices, Covary Item 5 and 15 Errors .........................
42. Model C3Aii Maximum Modification Indices .........................................................
43. Model C3Aiii Goodness of Fit Indices, Covary Item 9 and 10 Errors ........................
44. Model C3Aiii Maximum Modification Indices ........................................................
45. Model C3Aiii Goodness of Fit Indices from Validation Samples ..............................
46. Model C3Aiii Comparison of Calibration and Validation Sample Fit Indices .............
47. Model C3Bii Goodness of Fit Indices, Covary Item 5 and 15 Errors..........................
48. Model C3Bii Maximum Modification Indices .........................................................
49. Model C3Biii Goodness of Fit Indices, Covary Item 13 and 14 Errors .......................
50. Model C3Bii Goodness of Fit Indices from Validation Samples ................................
51. Model C3Bii Comparison of Calibration and Validation Sample Fit Indices ..............
52. Model D Goodness of Fit Indices from Calibration Samples .....................................
53. Model D Maximum Modification Indices from Calibration Samples .........................
54. Model D2 Goodness of Fit Indices, Covary Item 5and 15 Errors ...............................
55. Model D2 Maximum Modification Indices from Calibration Samples .......................
56. Model D3 Goodness of Fit Indices, Covary Item 9 and 10 Errors ..............................
57. Model D3 Maximum Modification Indices from Calibration Samples .......................
58. Model D4 Goodness of Fit Indices, Covary Item 13 and 14 Errors ............................
59. Model D3 Goodness of Fit Indices from Validation Samples ....................................
60. Model D3 Comparison of Calibration and Validation Sample Fit Indices ..................
61. Model E Goodness of Fit Indices from Calibration Samples .....................................
62. Model E Maximum Modification Indices from Calibration Samples .........................
63. Model E2 Goodness of Fit Indices from Calibration Samples, Covary Item 6 and 12
Errors ...................................................................................................................
64. Model E2 Maximum Modification Indices from Calibration Samples .......................
65. Model E3 Goodness of Fit Indices from Calibration Samples, Covary Item 6 and 7
Errors ...................................................................................................................
66. Model E3 Maximum Modification Indices from Calibration Samples .......................
67. Model E4 Goodness of Fit Indices from Calibration Samples, Covary Item 5 and 15
Errors ...................................................................................................................
68. Model E4 Maximum Modification Indices from Calibration Samples .......................
69. Model E5 Goodness of Fit Indices from Calibration Samples, Covary Item 5 and 6
Errors ...................................................................................................................
70. Model E5 Maximum Modification Indices from Calibration Samples .......................
71. Model E6 Goodness of Fit Indices from Calibration Samples, Covary Item 9 and 10
Errors ...................................................................................................................
72. Model E6 Maximum Modification Indices from Calibration Samples .......................
73. Model E7 Goodness of Fit Indices from Calibration Samples, Covary Item 6 and 8
Errors ...................................................................................................................
74. Model E7 Maximum Modification Indices from Calibration Samples .......................
75. Model E8 Goodness of Fit Indices from Calibration Samples, Covary Item 13 and 14
Errors ...................................................................................................................
76. Model E8ii Goodness of Fit Indices from Calibration Samples, Covary Item 6 and 16
Error .....................................................................................................................

xiv

PAGE
163
164
164
165
165
166
167
167
168
168
169
170
170
171
171
172
172
173
173
174
175
175
176
176
177
177
178
178
179
179
180
180
181
181
182
182
183
184

LIST OF TABLES
TABLE
77. Model E7 Goodness of Fit Indices from Validation Samples ....................................
78. Model E7 Comparison of Calibration and Validation Sample Fit Indices ...................
79. Model F Goodness of Fit Indices from Calibration Samples .....................................
80. Model F Maximum Modification Indices from Calibration Samples .........................
81. Model F2 Goodness of Fit Indices from Calibration Samples....................................
82. Model F Goodness of Fit Indices from Validation Sample ........................................
83. Model F Comparison of Calibration and Validation Sample Fit Indices .....................
84. Summary of Fit Indices for Final Calibration of Each Model ....................................
85. Observation Statistics for Fidelity of Implementation Checks ...................................
86. Descriptive Statistics for Two-Level HLM Model ...................................................
87. Unconditional Two Level Model Fixed and Random Coefficients ............................
88. Student Characteristics Model Fixed and Random Effects .......................................
89. Initial Contextual Model Fixed and Random Effects ...............................................
90. Final Contextual Model Fixed and Random Effects ................................................
91. Post Hoc Model of Interaction Effects of Class Value of Mathematics and
Knowledge of Cognition .......................................................................................
92. Predicted Value 1 for Two Level HLM Model ........................................................
93. Predicted Value 2 for Two Level HLM Model ........................................................
94. Predicted Value 3 for Two Level HLM Model ........................................................
95. Predicted Value 4 for Two Level HLM Model ........................................................
96. Predicted Value 5 for Two Level HLM Model ........................................................
97. Descriptive Statistics for Three-Level HLM ............................................................
98. Unconditional Three Level Model Fixed and Random Coefficients ...........................
99. Item Model of Mathematics Misconception Errors ...................................................
100. Selected Predicted Values for Final Item Model .....................................................
101. Final Student Model Fixed and Random Coefficients .............................................
102. Selected Predicted Values for Final Student Model ................................................
103. Final Class Model Fixed and Random Coefficients ................................................
104. Selected Predicted Values for Final Class Model ....................................................
105. Pooled Intercorrelations Between Content Area Misconception Scores ....................
106. Goodness of Fit Indices for Second Order Post Hoc Hypothesized Model ................

xv

PAGE
185
185
185
186
186
187
188
188
189
190
191
192
194
195
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
207
208
209
210
212
213
225
227

LIST OF FIGURES
FIGURE
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

PAGE

Six Hypothesized Structures of Mathematical Misconceptions...............................
Part-Whole and Part-Part Comparison using Pie Chart (Schield, 2002, p. 2) ...........
Number of Potential Birthday Matches for Groups of 2 – 100 people .....................
Probability Distribution for a Birthday Match for Groups of 2 – 100 people ...........
Textbook description of linear functions (Larson, Boswell, Kanold, & Stiff, 2010,
p. 75) .................................................................................................................
Representations provided in the Trapezoid Table problem (Moss et al., 2008, p.
157). ..................................................................................................................
Strategies Used in the Student Professor Problem (Clement, 1982, p. 21) ...............
The Candy Problem (Watson and Shaughnessy, 2004, p. 107) ...............................
NCTM (2000) Mathematics Strands for Grades K – 12 (p. 30). .............................
Pathways of Mathematical Learning ....................................................................
Item Characteristic Curves for NAEP Mathematics Knowledge Instrument ............
Comparison of Item Curves for Items 6 and 7 .......................................................
Pretest Percent Correct Data Distributions ............................................................
Pretest Percent Misconception Data Distributions .................................................
ATMI Enjoyment of Mathematics Data Distributions ...........................................
ATMI Mathematics Motivation Data Distributions ...............................................
ATMI Mathematics Self Confidence Data Distributions ........................................
ATMI Value of Mathematics Data Distributions ...................................................
MAI Knowledge of Cognition Data Distributions .................................................
MAI Regulation of Cognition Data Distributions ..................................................
Posttest Percent Correct Data Distributions ..........................................................
Posttest Percent Misconception Data Distributions................................................
Power Curve for Cluster Randomized Trials .........................................................
Hypothesized Structural Equation Models ............................................................
Final Structural Model A2 ...................................................................................
Final Structural Model B3 ...................................................................................
Final Structural Model C3Aiii .............................................................................
Final Structural Model C3Bii ..............................................................................
Final Structural Model D3 ...................................................................................
Final Structural Model E7 ...................................................................................
Final Structural Model F .....................................................................................
Post Hoc Hypothesized Structural Parameters for Models A and B (Figure 24) ......
Possible Second Order Factor Model to Explain Content Area Misconception
Multicollinearity .................................................................................................
Hypothetical Structure for Underlying Mathematical Misconceptions ....................
NCTM (2000) Modified Content Emphases Including Fundamental Mathematics
Concepts ............................................................................................................

xvi

007
026
035
037
047
050
055
059
068
089
100
101
108
108
109
109
110
110
111
111
112
113
117
121
154
159
166
169
175
184
187
223
226
228
229

LIST OF EQUATIONS
EQUATION
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

PAGE

Sum of an Arithmetic Series ..................................................................................
Sum of an Arithmetic Series with (n – 1) Terms .....................................................
Number of Possible Ways to Choose Two Objects from a Group of n Objects ..........
Probability of No Birthday Matches for a Group of Four People ..............................
Probability of a Birthday Match for a Group of 23 People .......................................
Probability of a Birthday Match for a Group of 50 People .......................................
Bayes’ Theorem
Bayes’ Theorem Applied to the Three Prisoner Problem for Dick ............................
Probability of Dick Being Freed ............................................................................
Bayes’ Theorem Applied to the Three Prisoner Problem for Tom ............................
Probability of Tom Being Freed ............................................................................
Bayes’ Theorem in the Three Prisoner Problem with Unequal Prior Distributions .....
Binomial Probability of De Méré Dice Rolling Problem ..........................................
Shadish, Cook, & Campbell (2002) Research Design for the Present Study ..............
Hypothesized Level 1 HGLM Probability Equation (Item) ......................................
Hypothesized Level 1 HGLM Logit Equation (Item)...............................................
Hypothesized Level 1 HGLM Linearized Equation (Item) .......................................
Hypothesized Level 2 HGLM Equation (Student) ...................................................
Hypothesized Level 3 HGLM Equation (Class) ......................................................
Null Model Level 1 HLM Equations (Student) .......................................................
Null Model Level 2 HLM Equation (Class) ............................................................
Student Model Level 1 Equation for Two-Level HLM Analysis ..............................
Student Model Level 2 Equation for Two-Level HLM Analysis ..............................
Class Model Level 1 Equation for Two-Level HLM Analysis ..................................
Class Model Level 2 Equation for Two-Level HLM Analysis ..................................
Final Model Level 1 Equation for Two-Level HLM Analysis ..................................
Final Model Level 2 Equation for Two-Level HLM Analysis ..................................
Post Hoc Model Level 1 Equation for Two-Level HLM Analysis ............................
Post Hoc Model Level 2 Equation for Two-Level HLM Analysis ............................
Unconditional Model Level 1 Equation for Three-Level HGLM Analysis ................
Unconditional Model Level 2 Equation for Three-Level HGLM Analysis ................
Unconditional Model Level 3 Equation for Three-Level HGLM Analysis ................
Formula for Converting Logits to Odds Ratio .........................................................
Formula for Converting Logits to Probability .........................................................
Final Item Model Level 1 Equation for Three-Level HGLM Analysis ......................
Final Item Model Level 2 Equation for Three-Level HGLM Analysis ......................
Final Item Model Level 3 Equation for Three-Level HGLM Analysis ......................

xvii

034
034
034
036
036
036
042
042
042
042
043
044
050
093
126
126
126
126
127
191
191
192
192
194
194
195
195
196
196
204
204
204
205
205
206
206
206

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Purpose Statement and Research Questions
Probability patterns often run counter to human intuition (Engel, 1970). As a
result, students tend to develop misconceptions about those patterns and the mathematical
concepts related to them. Some of these misconceptions fundamentally shape student
understanding of mathematical patterns beyond probability (e.g., rational numbers,
variables, linearity). Several researchers have proposed that probability instruction may
hold the key to reducing these common misconceptions because of the abundance of
concrete applications found within probability (e.g., Agnoli, 1987; Agnoli & Krantz,
1989; Bar-Hillel & Falk, 1982; Falk, 1992; Falk & Lann, 2008; Freudenthal, 1970, 1973,
1983; Shaughnessy, 1992; Shaughnessy & Bergman, 1993; Watson & Shaughnessy,
2004). Clarifying and implementing instructional tasks that are built upon the
foundational nature of probability to address critical mathematical concepts in core
mathematics topics offers a radical shift in how we view probability and mathematics
instruction. Such a shift may create a bridge between abstract concepts and concrete
applications (Freudenthal, 1983; Stone et al., 2008). The purpose of this study was to
investigate the role of probability instruction as an intervention for critical
misconceptions common to rational numbers, probability, algebra, and geometry by
examining four research questions through a mixed methodology design:
1

1) Do probability misconceptions have a causal influence on algebra, geometry,
and rational number misconceptions?
2) Does probability instruction reduce critical misconceptions in probability,
rational numbers, algebra, or geometry?
3) Do student attitudes toward mathematics influence the emergence of errors
due to misconceptions on mathematical tasks?
4) Does student metacognition influence the emergence of errors due to
misconceptions on mathematical tasks?
Qualitative analysis of student responses formed the initial foundation for this
study, through the analysis of error responses in order to differentiate between errors due
to misunderstandings of mathematical concepts versus faulty reasoning processes. The
results from this analysis were then used to code responses as indicative of
misconceptions to use in the quantitative analyses.
Structural equation modeling was used to examine the causal relationship among
content area misconceptions (i.e., Research Question 1). Hierarchical generalized linear
modeling was used to examine the efficacy of probability instruction as an intervention
for reducing misconceptions in rational numbers, algebra, geometry, and probability (i.e.,
Research Question 2). It was also used to analyze the impact of contextual factors on the
emergence of errors due to misconceptions (i.e., Research Questions 3 and 4).
Background
Students enter high school at a time when their physical and cognitive
development is at a transition point, and mathematics produces particularly strong
feelings for many of these students. Students often bring preconceived notions about
2

what it means to learn mathematics: They often have a low sense of efficacy, a great deal
of anxiety, and a deep sense that much of what they learn in mathematics is irrelevant to
their lives (Schumacker, Young, & Bembry, 1995). By contrast, evidence suggests that a
strong command of mathematics in high school influences college success and the
accessibility of many rewarding and lucrative career opportunities (National Sciences
Foundation, Mathematical Sciences Education Board, 1995). Mathematics teachers in
command of the nature of learning and teaching mathematics are uniquely situated to
support student development (Schumacker, Young, & Bembry, 1995).
Unfortunately, evidence suggests that mathematics teaching practices have
changed little to meet the needs of students in the last three decades (Hiebert, 2003).
Consider the following description of traditional teaching practice:
First, answers were given for the previous day’s assignment. A
brief explanation, sometimes none at all, was given of the new material,
and problems were assigned for the next day. The remainder of the class
was devoted to students working independently on the homework while
the teacher moved about the room answering questions. The most
noticeable thing about math classes was the repetition of this routine
(Welch, 1978, p. 6).
The most striking feature of this description is its familiarity with current
mathematics classrooms. Compare Welch’s (1978) description with that of a more recent
mathematics classroom:
The typical eighth-grade mathematics lesson in the U. S. is
organized around two phases: an acquisition phase and an application
3

phase. In the acquisition phase, the teacher demonstrates or leads a
discussion on how to solve a sample problem. The aim is to clarify the
steps in the procedure so that students will be able to execute the same
procedure on their own. In the application phase, students practice using
the procedure by solving problems similar to the sample problem (Stigler
& Hiebert, 1997, p. 18).
These two descriptions were echoed yet again by Manoucheri and Goodman
(2001). Insufficient support (Tankersley, Landrum, & Cook, 2004) and minimal
opportunities for professional development (Hiebert, 2003) may explain much of the
inability of teachers to change their instructional practice: “Unless such opportunities are
provided, teachers are asked to do the impossible – teach in new ways without having had
a chance to learn them” (Hiebert, 2003, p. 18). One new way to teach that has
demonstrated efficacy for helping students learn mathematics concepts is through
exploratory problem solving (e.g., Mathews, 1997; Wilkins, 1993). Probability concepts
inherently offer multiple opportunities for students to problem solve and explore
conceptual relationships in an authentic setting (Shaughnessy & Bergman, 1993). Yet the
potential of probability to meet student needs has not been realized as a result of at least
two issues. First, both the intended curriculum (i.e., curriculum standards) and the
enacted curriculum (i.e., what is actually taught) downplay the importance of probability
relative to algebra and geometry (Mitchell, 1990; Shaughnessy, 2006; Smith, 2003).
Second, teachers are less comfortable with probability due to their own lack of training
and experience (Jendraszek, 2008; Shaughnessy, 1992; Swenson, 1998).
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Significance of the Study
The present study responds to multiple calls for increased research about student
understanding of probability concepts (e.g., Shaughnessy, 1992, 2003, 2006;
Shaughnessy & Bergman, 1993; Sierpinska & Kilpatrick, 1998) and about mathematical
misconceptions related to probabilistic thinking (e.g., Van Dooren, De Bock, Depaepe,
Janssens, & Verschaffel, 2003) The results of this study may have direct implications for
how educators view mathematical instruction.
Hypotheses
Error Responses due to Misconceptions
The mathematics knowledge instrument used in this study (Appendix M),
composed of 17 released items from the National Education Assessment Program
(NAEP), consisted of questions measuring algebra, geometry, rational number, and
probability content. I hypothesized the types of misconceptions that might influence item
responses and which distracters might indicate those misconceptions (Table 1).
Table 1
Misconception Hypotheses for each NAEP Item
Correct
Item
Underlying Misconception Hypothesis
Response
1
A
Absolute & Relative Comparison
2
A
Meaning of Rational Numbers: Confusion of Part-Part vs. Part-Whole
3
B
Rational Number Meaning
4
A
Spatial Reasoning – Interpreting arrow vs. Region
5
D
Rational Number Meaning
6
A
Additive vs. Multiplicative Structure
7
E
Additive vs. Multiplicative Structure
8
D
Reversal Error – Meaning of Variables
9
A
Spatial Reasoning: Student may choose “yes” because figure has 4 sides.
10
B
Spatial Reasoning: Meaning of Area – Counting Sides instead of regions.
11
E
Meaning of Variable – Unit Confusion, Partial Conversions
12
C
Additive vs. Multiplicative Structure/Coefficient Reversal
13
B
Rational Number Meaning
14
A
Confusion of Absolute & Relative Comparison
15
B
Rational Number Meaning: Part-Part vs. Part-Whole
16
B
Meaning of Variable
17
D
Absolute & Relative Comparison
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Associated
Responses
C, E
B, C, D, E
A
C,D
A, B, C
D, E
A, B, C, D
B
B
D
A
D
D, E
B
D
A
C, E

Qualitative analysis of student explanations for each response was used to test these
hypotheses and adjust the coding of misconception responses accordingly.
Probability Instruction as the Intervention
I conjectured that probability instruction may reduce misconceptions in rational
numbers, algebra, and geometry. This hypothesis was tested using hierarchical
generalized linear modeling.
Structure of Mathematical Misconceptions
Studies have indicated that rational number misconceptions and/or probability
instruction hold a primary, predictive position relative to algebra and geometry
misconceptions (e.g., Fuson et al., 2005; Kilpatrick et al., 2001; Lamon, 2007; Moss,
2005). A synthesis of that research, however, did not suggest which supersedes the other,
nor did it demonstrate conclusively that either rational number or probability
misconceptions are causal predictors of algebra and geometry misconceptions. Because
probability content is inundated with rational number concepts, isolating their
misconceptions is problematic without special attention to explanations of reasoning that
accompany incorrect responses. Probability concepts have an advantage over rational
number concepts: They naturally include concrete investigations (e.g., rolling a die,
flipping a coin, examining lottery outcomes, random walks) that may help students
construct meaning for abstract mathematical ideas (e.g., randomness, variation, counting
principles). Based on these connections, I hypothesized that probability misconceptions
act as a gatekeeper for addressing misconceptions in the other three content areas. To test
this hypothesis, I compared six alternative structures (Figure 1).
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Figure 1A models a relationship among content area misconceptions in which
rational number misconceptions hold a primary position while probability
misconceptions act as a filter on algebra and geometry misconceptions. Figure 1B
reverses the relationship between rational number and probability misconceptions from
Figure 1A. Figure 1C models rational number and probability misconceptions as covarying while simultaneously exerting a causal influence on the development of algebra
and geometry misconceptions. Figure 1D models the possibility that rational number
misconceptions impact algebra, geometry, and probability misconceptions causally.
Figure 1E reverses the role of probability and rational numbers in Figure 1D. Figure 1F
models a non-causal relationship among all four content area misconceptions. I
conjectured that Figure 1B or 1E would be the best fitting model.
Assumptions
Educational research is founded on beliefs about the best ways to help students
learn to their fullest potential. In fact, approaches to teaching and learning cannot be
separated from the underlying philosophical assumptions (Stein, Connell, & Gardner,
2008). These assumptions directly and indirectly influence the quality of learning that can
take place. The three major categories of philosophical assumptions addressed in this
study are epistemology, axiology, and ontology as described by Creswell, (2005) and
Patton (2002).
Epistemology
Epistemology describes relationships between teachers and students, teachers and
content, or students and content. Traditional views of these relationships in mathematics
education consider the teacher to be an authoritative conveyer of knowledge while the
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students are blank slates to be filled. With very little personal interaction, traditional
mathematics teaching follows a rote pattern of providing answers to homework; a brief, if
any, explanation of new materials; and then students work on the assignment quietly at
their desks while the teacher roams the room to answer questions (Fey, 1979), harkening
back to the philosophies of Locke (Adamson, 1922) and Rousseau (1979). This
traditional view considers the student and content to be completely separate, noninteracting entities. The results of this view of mathematics teaching has produced
students who can inconsistently carry out mathematical procedures, have a superficial
understanding of the concepts at the heart of mathematical procedures, and are unable to
conduct mathematical problem solving in unfamiliar contexts (Hiebert, 2003).
In contrast, numerous researchers have suggested that students and content must
interact if learning is to occur, leading to student-centered instructional approaches (e.g.,
Freudenthal, 1973; Hiebert & Carpenter, 1992; Hiebert & Grouws, 2007; Von
Glasersfeld, 1987). Studies have found that the student-centered approach has more
benefits to student learning than the traditional approach (e.g., Ford, 1977; Gregg, 1995;
Hoffman & Caniglia, 2009; McMahon, 1979). Mastery learning (as in Coppen, 1976;
Haver, 1978; Tenenbaum, 1986) is one example of student-centered learning: Students
are tested and tutored on each topic until they achieve successful scores before
proceeding to the next unit of instruction. Cooperative learning (as in Freeman, 1997;
Slavin & Karweit, 1982) is another example of student-centered learning: students work
in groups to facilitate peer tutoring and problem solving.
Problem solving strategies (as in Mathews, 1997; Wilkins, 1993) also provide
students the opportunity to struggle with non-routine mathematical situations (as
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recommended by Hiebert & Grouws, 2007). Watson and Shaughnessy (2004) posited that
the purposeful use of probability problem solving explorations may benefit students by
providing fascinating, unique situations. The present study will not investigate the
differences between teacher-centered and student-centered approaches; rather, both
treatment and control groups will engage in student-centered, exploratory problem
solving activities, and teacher effects will be minimized by having teachers in the study
teach both a treatment and control group.
Axiology
For the present study, axiology will refer to the role of values in learning. The
ability for students to learn a subject in a particular classroom from a particular teacher is
greatly influenced by the alignment between student and teacher values and preferences,
and learning styles (Gardner, 1987, 1989; Gardner & Hatch, 1989; Goldman & Gardner,
1989; Hatch & Gardner, 1986; Silver, Strong, & Perini, 1997). Furthermore, the valueladen nature of education constrains educators to consider the overt and covert messages
being conveyed to students. Gardner (2009) identified a framework of five mental states
for considering the impact on students of the transmission of values: the disciplined mind,
the synthesizing mind, the creating mind, the respectful mind, and the ethical mind.
These states of mind are not hierarchical; all are important. And although they may
interact, these mental states do not necessarily have a causal relationship. The disciplined
mind refers to multi-disciplinary and interdisciplinary modes of understanding, and the
ability to put that intelligence into action. The synthesizing mind identifies the ability to
pull from multiple sources and types of sources of information and combine them into a
new, integrated whole. This mental frame is especially important because of the
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explosion of information available and the pace at which information is expanding. The
creating mind looks beyond information and processes and innovates new processes – in
the U.S., Gardner stated that the primary role of schools in relation to the creative mind is
one of protection rather than cultivation. The respectful mind learns to value the
differences in others. Although much of the cultivation of the respectful mind takes place
at home, Gardner maintained that for many children, schools present the only model for
respectful thinking. Therefore, he submitted that teachers must take this modeling role
into account with every behavior. Children develop the ethical mind as they engage with
questions of the type of person they want to be in the world and their place in relation to
the rest of the world. These ethical thoughts, Gardner claimed, require abstract thinking
that does not fully develop until adolescence. Schools play an important role in the
development of this ethical frame of mind:
Within schools, students do not literally have an occupation or a
citizen’s card. But for most young people, schools are the first substantial
institution in which they are involved. And so it is a permissible extension
to think of the vocational role of the young person as student and the
citizenship role of the young person as a member of the school
community. The habits of mind developed as student worker and student
citizen may well help determine the ethical (or nonethical) stand of the
future adult (Gardner, 2009, p. 19).
In mathematics, student values are often ignored. Students tend to value practical
applicability and authentic experiences in mathematics, and the widespread absence of
those qualities has resulted in motivational issues:
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Research has shown that disengagement or lack of interest is a
factor in low student achievement (NCTM, 2000). Students may
disengage from math because of difficulty with the subject, lack of
support, or simply boredom. Students may disengage while still attending
class. Many of these students believe that the math that they learn in
school is not relevant to life after high school (Stone, Alfeld, & Pearson,
2008, p. 769).
The value students place on relevance is often overlooked in mathematics
education in three ways: (1) Mathematics instruction often trades reasoning for rules and
procedures, having the effect of separating problem solving from meaning making; (2) It
emphasizes procedural understanding over conceptual understanding; and, as a result of
the first two, (3) It inhibits meta-cognitive skills from being used in mathematics (Fuson,
Kalchman, and Bransford, 2005). Fuson et al. (2005) proposed that the reversing of these
trends will include the development of productive disposition (i.e., considering
mathematics to be sensible and useful combined with a sense of self efficacy, as in
Kilpatrick, Swafford, & Findell, 2001). The present study does not test these assertions.
Instead, it builds on the assumption that practical applicability appeals to student values.
Ontology
Ontology describes the nature of reality. Ontological assumptions influence the
meaningfulness and interpretability of research results (Patton, 2002). The ontological
assumptions of the present study will be organized by responding to four questions: (1)
Are mathematical concepts part of a “singular, verifiable reality and truth” or the result of
multiple socially constructed realities; (2) How do people know mathematics; (3) How
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should mathematics be studied; and, (4) What mathematics is worth knowing?
Are mathematical concepts part of a “singular, verifiable reality and truth” or
the result of multiple socially constructed realities? The present study proceeds from the
basis that a single, objective reality exists for mathematics, but understanding such a
reality requires students to filter it through social constructs. As a result, the nature of
mathematical reality as it is understood from person to person varies. This assumption is
closely tied in with how people know mathematics.
How do people know mathematics? Kant (1786/1901) proposed the importance of
intuition (described as the only way human knowledge can relate to an object) to learning
mathematics. “All human cognition begins with intuitions, proceeds from thence to
conceptions, and ends with ideas” (p. 516). He divided intuition into two categories:
empirical and pure. He defined empirical intuition as the intuition of the senses, and any
object of empirical intuition as a phenomenon. He defined sensation, then, as the “effect
of an object upon the faculty of representation” (p. 63). Empirical intution can only exist
after experience, or as posterior intuition (p. 63). Pure intuition, by contrast, refers to the
organization of objects prior to sensation. Pure intuition is therefore independent of
experience: The stripping away of properties such as “substance, force, divisibility,
impenetrability, hardness, color, etc.” leaves two characteristics that belong to the form of
the object: extension and shape (p. 64). Developing these concepts further, he defined the
two objects of pure intuition, which must exist a priori and external to experience, as
space and time. Mathematical conceptions proceed from intuitions: “Mathematical
cognition is cognition by means of the construction of conceptions. The construction of a
conception is the presentation a priori of the intuition which corresponds to the
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conception” (p. 522). In the present study, intuition will be used to refer to the way
mathematical objects are understood. Although these intuitions are independent of
training and, to a certain degree, experience, the present study assumes that natural
intuition can be modified through experiences that provide cognitive dissonance
(Festinger, 1957).
How should mathematics be studied? Hiebert and Grouws (2007) described two
fundamental characteristics of a mathematics classroom that focuses on conceptual
knowledge and relational understanding. First, explicit attention to concepts supports the
development of conceptual understanding. The effect of conceptual focus has been
demonstrated across research designs, teaching styles, and classroom environments.
Second, teachers allow students to struggle with important concepts. By use of the term
struggle,
We do not mean needless frustration or extreme levels of challenge
created by nonsensical or overly difficult problems. We do not mean the
feelings of despair that some students can experience when little of the
material makes sense. The struggle we have in mind comes from solving
problems that are within reach and grappling with key mathematical ideas
that are comprehendible but not yet well formed (p. 387).
Although skill efficiency and conceptual struggle are not mutually exclusive, each
mode of teaching relies on a different features within the classroom. However, Hiebert
and Grouws (2007) noted that studies in their review found high skill levels in a variety
of class types that focused on conceptual understanding (e.g., teacher-centered versus
student-centered). Learning skills in a conceptual environment versus a procedural one
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seems to afford students increased ability to adapt their knowledge to new situations. In
the present study, the importance of conceptual focus will not be examined. Instead, both
treatment and control groups will receive conceptually-based instruction.
What mathematics is worth knowing? A curriculum is generally set in place to
delineate the important topics to be studied. How the term is understood varies between
groups. Teachers usually consider curriculum to refer to goals or objectives, textbooks,
standards documents, printed materials, lesson plans, study sheets, or tests;
administrators, on the other hand, may be more interested in the material taught by
teachers or commercial programs (Sinclair & Ghory, 1979). Parents may consider
curriculum to mean the types of courses offered by a school. Reys and Lappan (2007)
described all of these notions of expressed curriculum as the intended curriculum (p.
676). Sinclair and Ghory (1979) identified three other dimensions to the meaning of
curriculum: expressed, implied, and emergent.
The expressed curriculum refers to “learning objectives, learning opportunities,
sequence of content, and evaluation procedures” (p. 5). The expressed curriculum carries
the teacher’s interpretation of the intended curriculum into the classroom. The infusion of
ever-increasing content demands and pressure from standardized testing has resulted in
the “mile wide, inch deep” curriculum (Schmidt, Houang, & Cogan, 2002, p. 3). Reys
and Lappan (2007) found that content emphases in mathematics vary widely between
states. They suggested that future revisions of state documents should include
collaboration between states with a great deal of national direction.
The implied curriculum is the expression of unspoken messages through
classroom policies and procedures and school culture. The implied curriculum holds
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special importance for the present study by its reference to “unintended learning that
results because of what is included or omitted in the content that is taught” (Sinclair &
Ghory, 1979, p. 6). In many classrooms, authentic mathematical experiences are omitted
from the curriculum in order to move students through content more quickly (Hiebert &
Grouws, 2007). Sometimes, content is deleted or minimized due to teachers’ lack of
familiarity or comfort level with the content, as is often the case with probability
(Shaughnessy & Bergman, 1993).
The emergent curriculum represents a response from the teacher based on
formative assessment, resulting in adjustments to the expressed curriculum as needed to
fill in gaps between learners and content (Sinclair & Ghory, 1979). The emergent
curriculum can be considered a tool that is especially important for teachers to reduce
mathematical misconceptions.
Little consensus exists in the United States about critical issues such as how to
rate the importance of specific topics within a curriculum, the role of accountability
testing, or the appropriate time to introduce important concepts. The present study did not
attempt to resolve these issues; instead, it proceeds from the assumption that each school
and teacher addresses curriculum issues differently. As a result, the random assignment
was stratified to divide the effects of these differences across both treatment conditions.
Limitations
Several teachers replaced the researcher-provided conceptually-based
instructional materials with procedurally-based materials for the probability intervention
unit. These teachers cited several reasons for doing so (e.g., not believing that their
students could handle the provided materials and discomfort with the probability
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material). While teacher effects were controlled across treatment and control groups, the
observed magnitude of intervention effects may be reduced from a more homogenous
conceptually-based intervention. Therefore, the analysis was limited to relative
comparison of effects.
The testing instrument for mathematics knowledge may have also limited the
analysis of the study. The literature review identified an underlying set of foundational
misconceptions that were unable to be measured discretely from the distractor responses.
As a result, subsequent hypotheses about the structure of these fundamental
misconceptions could not be tested with these data.
Organization of the Remaining Chapters
The following chapters provide a rationale for the investigation of probability
misconceptions along with the methodology, results, and conclusions of the study.
Chapter 2 examines the research foundations for the present study. A synthesis of this
review allowed for the development of a conceptual framework for how students learn
and misunderstand mathematical ideas.
Chapter 3 provides a rationale for the research design and methodology decisions
made throughout the study. These decisions included how to recruit subjects, how to
assign classes to treatment groups, determination of sample sizes needed to have
adequate power, appropriate analytic techniques for each research question, and how to
handle missing data to maximize power while minimizing threats to validity. This chapter
also includes a description of the treatment, treatment procedures, and assessment
instruments.
Chapter 4 begins with descriptive statistics of the sample and the results of each

17

test. The chapter goes on to report the results of the qualitative analysis of student
responses to each item in the mathematics knowledge test and how that analysis informed
the coding of error responses. The chapter then provides the statistics from the analysis of
the structure of misconceptions. The chapter ends by presenting the results of the
contextual factor analysis.
Chapter 5 begins by discussing how the structural analysis underscores the
inadequacy of organizing misconceptions by content areas. It continues by discussing
how the qualitative and structural analyses taken together suggest the need for the
development of a new instrument to specifically measure misconceptions. The chapter
concludes by discussing the contextual factors that influenced the production of errors
due to misconceptions for each task and the effectiveness of the probability unit
intervention.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
As students develop mathematical thinking and reasoning, several key stumbling
blocks prevent deep conceptual learning (e.g., the transition from whole numbers to
rational numbers in elementary and middle school as in Moss, 2005). These problems
often persist throughout high school, adding to the difficulties of transitioning from
arithmetic to algebra (Kilpatrick, Swafford, & Findell, 2001). Throughout these transition
periods, students may attempt to incorporate new information into their current
knowledge base without having sufficient understanding to successfully bridge the ideas
(MacGregor and Stacey, 1997). Errors resulting from these misunderstandings may
indicate a common set of misconceptions that affect the learning of every mathematics
content area.
Defining Misconceptions
The term misconception has been used in research to refer to a wide range of
issues, and its use has evolved through two phases (Confrey, 1987). The first phase, from
the early 1970’s to the early 1980’s, laid the foundation for examining misconceptions as
ideas that emerge from students examining problem solving situations intuitively, making
decisions that appear rational yet lead to errors (Clement, 1982; Confrey, 1987). These
errors often surprise educators, are difficult to eradicate, and affect a large portion of
people.
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In the second phase of misconceptions research, mathematics educators focused
on errors rather than misunderstandings. Slip, bugs, and repair theory concentrated on
procedural errors (e.g., VanLehn, 1980; 1983) while systematic errors focused more on
conceptual errors.
Systematic errors include the systematic (and inappropriate)
application of familiar fragments of arguments, algorithms and definitions
without any attempt to integrate across representational systems. They are
common across students, and permit accurate predictions of what answers
students will give to a set of well-defined problems (Confrey & Lipton,
1985, p. 40).
A recent study in Kentucky shed light on the comparative strengths of focusing on
conceptual errors instead of procedural errors (McGatha, Bush, & Rakes, 2009). The
study compared student achievement resulting from observed teacher assessment
behavior, including addressing procedural errors and conceptual errors. Teachers who
focused on deep reasoning (7th grade: a non-testing year in Kentucky) saw the highest
gains in student achievement. Teachers who focused on procedural errors (8th grade: a
testing year in Kentucky) obtained the least amount of growth in student achievement.
Another study examining instructional strategies in algebra found that teaching methods
focused on helping students develop connections between ideas produced larger and
more consistent effect sizes than interventions that targeted procedural fluency (Rakes,
Valentine, & McGatha, 2010).
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Misconceptions versus Reasoning Errors in Secondary Mathematics
The symptomatic features of mathematical misconceptions are often discussed in
literature simultaneously with reasoning errors (e.g., Falk, 1992; Kahneman & Tversky,
1972, 1973a, 1973b; Küchemann, 1978). For the purposes of this study, the following
discussion does not present an exhaustive list of reasoning error types. Three types of
reasoning errors appear to be related or confused with misconceptions. Some reasoning
errors result from misunderstandings about ideas and connections among ideas, in which
case they may indicate an underlying misconception (e.g., Clements, 1982). Other
reasoning errors emerge from misunderstandings about mathematical procedures (e.g.,
Walker & Singer, 2007). In such cases, the present study does not consider such
reasoning errors to represent misconceptions. A third type of reasoning error may arise
from a combination of conceptual and procedural misunderstandings (e.g., De Bock,
Verschaffel, & Janssens, 1998, 2002). In such cases, misconceptions are often difficult to
parse out from these other types of error patterns. The present analysis attempts to do so
by discussing error patterns as they appear in the literature in enough detail to separate
heuristic reasoning errors from conceptual reasoning errors. Understanding the source of
errors carries important consequences for how teachers address misconceptions:
There is a tendency for teachers when confronted with a statement
from a student that is apparently incorrect to inform the student of the
error and perhaps state the correct point of view…The view that these
statements are, however, not isolated beliefs that the student holds but are
reflections of a more general conceptual framework leads one to be
skeptical about the effectiveness of these types of local interventions; they
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do not get at the heart of the problem. An analogous situation would
involve correcting the assertion that a ship would fall off the earth if it
ventured too far from shore by negating the assertion or citing evidence to
the contrary rather than focusing on the apparent underlying belief in a flat
rather than spherical planet (Konold, 1988, p. 18).
If an error within a task occurs because of a fundamental misconception of a
mathematical idea or the relationship between ideas, then directing the student’s attention
to a procedure-based correction within the task may be insufficient. Such an attempt to
fix the error may appear successful for a specific type of task, but when students face a
new, unfamiliar situation, the misconception will often reassert itself on student
reasoning (Hiebert & Grouws, 2007). The same situation can occur when the
misunderstandings are a combination of meaning and procedures (e.g., Fisher, 1988;
Phillippe, 1992). Instead, interventions that are effective in the long term will address the
lack of understanding about the meaning of the important mathematical ideas (Hiebert &
Grouws, 2007).
If an error in reasoning occurs despite conceptual understanding, then addressing
the error by focusing on the procedures may be effective. Focusing on the underlying
meaning and reviewing how procedures relate to that meaning will, however, reinforce
understanding of the structure and relationships of the mathematical ideas (Kieran, 1989,
1992, 2007). So regardless of the source of the error, focusing on the underlying meaning
and connections of mathematical ideas appears to offer the longest lasting benefits for
students (Skemp, 1976/2006).
These connections may be especially important for reinforcing student struggle
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with the specific hurdles of learning rational numbers, algebra, and geometry; conversely,
the difficulties in one area often influence student ability to handle the difficulties in
another area. Rational numbers, for example, may play a fundamental role in students’
ability to solve algebraic and geometric problems. Misunderstandings about the
connections between variable symbols and the meaning of variation may influence
student capacity to understand probability concepts such as randomness.
Several key concepts from algebra, geometry, and rational numbers also appear to
influence multiple facets of probability. The relationship between these misconceptions
may suggest a connection between probability and these other three content areas. Such a
connection may indicate that probability instruction may offer a unique inroad into
addressing misconceptions about each of these areas by developing the meaning of
fundamental concepts important to each topic.
Critical Misconceptions Specific to Learning Rational Numbers
Rational Number Meaning
Rational number concepts confound student mathematical understanding more
than whole numbers, in part because of the multiple representations and uses of rational
numbers and the major conceptual shift that is required of students when learning rational
numbers (Fuson et al., 2005; Kilpatrick et al., 2001; Lamon, 2007; Moss, 2005).
When fractions are treated as numbers in the beginning of the
journey – too early on – learners often assume that the greater the
denominator the greater the amount –

1

8

>

1

7

because 8 > 7. Even when

they begin to understand that the denominator is a divisor, and therefore
the greater the number of pieces, the smaller the amount, the relationship
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of the numerator to the denominator escapes them (Fosnot & Dolk, 2002,
p. 56).
Two of the most common rational number relationships have been described as
“part/part” and “part/whole” (e.g., Baturo, 1994; Behr, Harel, Post, & Lesh, 1992).
Part/part relationships occur when a quantity within one unit is compared to a quantity
within another unit (Lamon, 1999). For example, a male/female ratio represents a
part/part relationship: neither quantity represents the total number of people in the class.
Part/whole relationships, on the other hand, represent the relationship between a part and
a whole. For example, the male percentage of a class represents a part/whole relationship.
Negotiating between part/whole and part/part relationships and the quantities represented
by each may be critical to overcoming the rational number hurdle (Fosnot & Dolk, 2002):
One third of one strip of paper is not equivalent to one third of
another, shorter strip of paper. It is this relational thinking that makes
fractions so difficult for children. The parts must be equivalent, but they
must also be equivalent in relation to the whole (p. 56).
Behr et al. (1992) agreed with Fosnot and Dolk’s connection between difficulties
with fractional meaning and equivalence, elaborating on the multiplicative structure of
rational number relationships:
Fundamentally, the question of whether two rational numbers are
equivalent or which is less is a question of invariance or variation of a
multiplicative relation…Two rational numbers a/b and c/d, can be
compared in terms of equivalence or nonequivalence by investigating
whether there is a transformation of a/b to c/d, defined as changes from a
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to c and from b to d, under which the multiplicative relationship between a
and b is or is not invariant (p. 316).
The part/whole relationship is a necessary step in understanding rational numbers,
but it may not be sufficient to developing meaning. Wu (2005) described the importance
of rational numbers to mathematical understanding and the insufficiency of the
part/whole relationship.
The subject of fractions (which is the term I will use for
nonnegative rational numbers) is known to be a main source of
mathphobia. If this is not reason enough for us to teach fractions better, let
me cite another one: understanding fractions is the most critical step in the
understanding of rational numbers because fractions are students’ first
serious excursion into abstraction. Whereas their intuition of whole
numbers can be grounded on the counting of fingers, learning fractions
requires first of all a mental substitute for their fingers. They need to be
clearly told what a fraction is. A fraction has to be a number, and so the
definition of a fraction as “parts-of-a-whole” simply doesn’t cut it.
Students have to be shown that fractions are the natural extension of whole
numbers so that the arithmetic operations +, ─, x, and ÷ on whole numbers
can smoothly transition to those on fractions (p. 2).
The fundamental concept of relative versus absolute size interacts with students’
ability to interpret the part-whole relationship correctly. Students in elementary grades
tend to mix these two comparative techniques up; this confusion persists into the high
school years (Green, 1983b; Watson & Shaughnessy, 2004). Steen (2007) described
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interpretation as a more fundamental problem for students than the computation of
rational numbers. For example, students have difficulty approximating rational number
values, such as the sum of 19/20 and 23/25. Given the choices of 1, 2, 42, or 45, most
eighth grade students in the U. S. chose either 42 or 45, indicating difficulties in ascribing
meaning to the relationship between each part of a rational number. He observed that
computers and calculators can help with many of the computational difficulties, but these
tools are unable to bridge gaps in meaning. Schield (2006) found that these difficulties
extend to percentage representations of rational numbers as well. Consider an example
from the Schield Statistical Literacy Survey (Schield, 2002, p. 2):
Do you think the following statements accurately describe the data shown
in [Figure 2]?
[Question] 9.0 20% of smokers are Catholic
[Question] 10. Protestants (40%) are twice as likely to be smokers as are
Catholics (20%).
Catholics, 20%

Other, 40%

Protestants, 40%

Figure 2. Part-Whole and Part-Part Comparison using Pie Chart (Schield, 2002, p. 2).

Question 9 asks students to interpret a relationship between a part (i.e., Catholics)
and the given whole (i.e., Smokers). Schield (2006) reported that only 19% of the college
students in his sample analyzed this relationship incorrectly. By contrast, 62% missed
Question 10. This question digs deeper into student understanding of the part-whole
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identities. Since 20% of smokers are Catholic and 40% of smokers are Protestant,
students (correctly) conclude that the number of Protestant smokers is twice that of
Catholics for this sample. Question 10 reverses the logic of Question 9. Although 20% of
smokers are Catholic, the graph does not indicate the converse: 20% of Catholics are not
necessarily smokers, nor are 40% of Protestants (based on the chart). The difficulties
students exhibited on Question 10 indicate that they have a limited understanding of the
nature of part-whole relationships. Schield (2006) also found that tables reporting
percentages present a similar difficulty for students, as in the following example:
Do you think the following statements accurately describe the 20% circled [in
Table 2]?
Q30. 20% of runners are female smokers.
Q31. 20% of females are runners who smoke.
Q32. 20% of female smokers are runners.
Q33. 20% of smokers are females who run (Schield, 2002, p. 6).
Table 2
Two-Way Half Table
PERCENTAGE WHO ARE RUNNERS
Non-smoker
Smoker
Total
Female
50%
20%
40%
Male
25%
10%
20%
Total
37%
15%
30%
Note. From Schield, 2002, p. 6.
In Table 2, each percentage represents a part-whole ratio: the numerator (the part)
represents the quantity of runners while the denominator (the whole) represents the
intersection of the row and column quantities. One of the primary clues for reading this
table is the lack of any 100%’s in any cell of the table: These missing values should be
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interpreted as meaning that each percentage represents a portion of a different quantity
from the others. So, runners comprise only 50% of female non-smokers while they make
up 25% of male non-smokers. The circled 20% thus represents the statement that runners
include 20% of female smokers. Schield (2006) reported high error rates among college
students on all four questions above: 55%, 53%, 62%, and 42% respectively. Each
question examines student understanding of part/whole relationships from a different
perspective. Question 30 reverses the role of the whole (i.e., female smokers) and the part
(i.e., runners). Question 31 confuses smokers as part of the whole along with runners
while Question 33 confuses females as part of the whole. Question 32 correctly identifies
the role of each quantity.
In contrast to a two-way half table, 100% row tables and column tables must be
interpreted differently.
Table 3
100% Row Table
SEX
Male
Female
Black
75%
25%
White
50%
50%
Other
40%
60%
Total
50%
50%
Note. From Schield, 2002, p. 6.

Total
100%
100%
100%
100%

Table 4
100% Column Table
College Students
Major
Male
Female
Business
60%
20%
Economics
10%
50%
Miscellaneous
30%
30%
Total
100%
100%
Note. From Schield, 2005, p. 1
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Total
40%
30%
30%
100%

In Table 3, the 100%’s in the row marginal cells indicate that each cell percentage
represents a portion of the row quantity. So, females make up 25% of the Black sample
while they account for 50% of the White sample. In Table 4, the column quantities now
represent the whole. So, business majors account for 60% of the male sample while they
account for only 20% of the female sample. Schield (2005, 2006) considered these errors
to represent fundamental misunderstanding about the meaning of rational numbers and
the connection between different representations of rational numbers. The table format of
the questions may also have contributed to student errors, which would not necessarily
represent underlying mathematical misconceptions. His analysis, however, suggested that
sufficient evidence indicated mathematical misconceptions unique from difficulties with
table formats.
Probability Connections to Rational Number Meaning
Rational number difficulties instill a sense of frustration and anxiety about
mathematics (Gresham, Sloan, & Vinson, 1997); on the other hand, probability
applications of rational numbers may provide the concrete examples students need to be
able to derive meaning from these number relationships thereby reducing that anxiety.
Probability applications regularly expose students to part/whole relationships,
readily providing concrete substitutes for fingers. These applications go beyond simply
counting outcomes: They also ask students to examine which quantities to count for each
part of the probability ratio, how to count them, and how to compare those values.
Green’s (1982) counter problem provides an example of how rational number
relationships can be examined in a probability context (p. 20):
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6 (e) Two other bags have black and white counters.
Bag J: 3 black and 1 white
Bag K: 6 black and 2 white
Which bag gives a better chance of picking a black counter?
(A) Same Chance

(B) Bag J

(C) Bag K

(D) Don’t Know

Why?
Sixty-two percent chose C, citing the larger number of black counters as the
reason for their choice. This error highlighted an underlying misconception about rational
number equivalence: Students failed to recognize that the number of black marbles was
not being compared, but the relationship of the number of black marbles to the whole in
each bag.
In addition to interpreting the meaning of a single rational number relationship,
students are often asked while studying probability to compare whether two sets of
rational number relationships are equivalent, i.e., the linear proportion. Linear
proportions are highly useful for solving a wide array of mathematical problems (Van
Dooren et al., 2003). Linear patterns are also highly intuitive because of their simplicity
(Rouche, 2003). However, Freudenthal (1983) recognized a potential misconception
regarding linearity: “Linearity is such a suggestive property of relations that one readily
yields to the seduction to deal with each numerical relation as though it were linear” (p.
267).

30

Linear Proportions
Van Dooren et al. (2003) determined that many misconceptions about numerical
relationships can be traced from the overgeneralization of linearity or proportionality.
They described several types of situations in which students tend to apply linear
proportions although the situation actually contained an additive structure. For example,
“Sue and Julie were running equally fast around a track. Sue started first. When she had
run 9 laps, Julie had run 3 laps. When Julie completed 15 laps, how many laps had Sue
run?” (p. 114). In their study, the subjects were elementary education teachers rather than
students, yet they reported that 97% of their sample solved the problem using a
proportion, 9/3 = x/15 (computing x = 45), instead of x + 6, for a correct answer of 21.
Their study revealed a striking pattern: Subjects tenaciously held to their faulty
reasoning, some through four interviews focused on correcting the misunderstanding.
Their study revealed some of the difficulties students have modeling quantities within a
rational number relationship: Students who opted for a straight linear proportion
indicated through their interviews that they believed the relationship between Julie and
Sue is proportional (i.e., multiplicative), rather than additive.
Lamon (1999) offered an example of similar errors related to interpreting
mathematical quantities. This example suggested that the errors are not simply overusing
linearity, as Van Dooren et al. (2003) later suggested. Instead, Lamon noted that students
do not only overuse proportions; they also use addition when proportions would have
been appropriate. Lamon suggested that such errors stem from fundamental
misapplication of meaning — students attempting to connect two mathematical
relationships without truly understanding the meaning of either. Consider her example of
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snake growth:
Jo has two snakes, String Bean and Slim. Right now, String Bean
is 4 feet long and Slim is 5 feet long. Jo knows that two years from now,
both snakes will be fully grown...At her full length, String Bean will be 7
feet long, while Slim’s length when he is fully grown will be 8 feet. Over
the next two years, will both snakes grow the same amount? (Lamon,
1999, p. 12).
Using an additive structure to compare the absolute growth rates, one can
consider that both snakes will grow the same amount, three feet. On the other hand,
comparing the relative growth rates requires considering the amount of growth in relation
to the original size through a multiplicative structure. String Bean’s additional three feet
will be an additional 3/4 or her original length, while Slim’s additional growth will only
be an additional 3/5 of his original length. So, the additive comparison reveals the same
amount of growth, but the multiplicative comparison reveals a different rate of growth.
Each interpretation is correct within the context of answering a particular question, and
both result in erroneous solutions if their meanings are confused. Such errors of meaning
resulting in faulty reasoning get at the heart of mathematical misconceptions.
Probability Connections to Linear Proportions
These errors of meaning emerging from confusion about the nature of linear
proportions also appear in probability. The Birthday Paradox provides a well-known
example of this connection:
If in a gathering of 50 people one asks how probable it is that there
are two people with the same birthday in the room, it is nearly always the
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case that this probability is grossly underestimated. The mathematician
who stages this can count on a success such as only magicians can boast
of, if several pairs, maybe even a triple, can be found with the same
birthdays (Freudenthal, 1973, p. 587).
Several interpretations have been offered to explain students’ difficulties with this
issue. Kahneman and Tversky (1982) suggested that the underlying misconceptions result
from the misuse of the linear proportion arising from reliance on the representativeness
heuristic:
Most students are surprised to learn that in a group of as few as 23
people, the probability that at least two of them have the same birthday
(i.e., same day and month) exceeds .5. Clearly, with 23 people the
expected birthdays per day is less than

1
15

. Thus a day with two birthdays,

in the presence of 343 “empty” days, is highly non-representative, and the
event in question, therefore, appears unlikely (p. 37).
The expected ratio of

1
15

emerges from the expectation of equivalency:

23

365

is

approximately 115 , or 7%. However, counting only 23 possible matches only accounts for
the potential matches of one person to the other 22. The other 22 could each have
matches as well. A simple example may clarify the appropriate counting techniques:
Suppose we randomly choose four people, and their birthdays are labeled A, B, C, & D.
The possible matches in this scenario are A = B, A = C, A = D, B = C, B = D, and C = D.
To count these matches, we see that there are three potential matches for A, two for B,
and only one distinct match left for C, or 3 + 2 + 1 = 6 potential matches. If we were to
add a fifth person E, the counts for A, B, and C would increase by 1, and D would now
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have a unique possible match with E. Thus, the general formula for counting the number
of possible matches for n randomly chosen people is 1 + 2 + 3 + … + (n – 1), an
arithmetic series with a constant increase of one unit per term. The formula for the sum Sn
of an arithmetic series is given in Equation 1.

Sn =

n(t1 + tn )
2

(1)

In this series, the “nth” term is actually the “(n – 1)th” term, and the first term has
a value of one, so the formula after substitution becomes Equation 2.

Sn−1 =

(n −1)(1+ n −1) = n(n −1) = 1 n2 − 1 n
2

2

2

(2)

2

Another way to arrive at Equation 2 begins by using the formula for combinations
to compute the number of ways to choose any two people from a group of size n, or nC2.
Using substitution, we arrive at Equation 3, which simplifies to Equation 2 by canceling
out the (n – 2)! term.
n

C2 =

n!
n • (n − 1) • (n − 2 )!
=
2!(n − 2 )!
2 • (n − 2 )!

Rather than being linear, the pattern of counting potential matches follows a
quadratic pattern (Figure 3).
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Figure 3. Number of Potential Birthday Matches for Groups of 2 – 100 people.

Returning to the original examples discussed by Freudenthal (1973) and
Kahneman and Tversky (1982), we can readily compute that 50 people have 50*49/2 =
1225 possible matches, and 23 people have 23*22/2 = 253 possible matches. These
numbers cannot be used as either the numerator or denominator of the desired
probability: 1225 is larger than 365, and probabilities larger than one are impossible.
Using 253/365 is tempting, however, to do so assumes once again that the change in
probability is linear, which eventually would lead to probabilities larger than one. To
examine this problem closer, we turn to the Fundamental counting principle. Since only
one day out of each year can provide a successful match for any randomly chosen person,
we can conclude that the probability of no matches is 364 days out of 365 and that each
potential match is independent of the others. The Fundamental counting principle
stipulates that the probabilities should be multiplied together. Equation 4 demonstrates
this calculation for four people (six potential matches) while Equation 5 shows the
computation for 23 people (253 potential matches).
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P(No Matc hes) = P( A ≠ B ) • P( A ≠ C ) • P( A ≠ D ) • P(B ≠ C ) • P(B ≠ D ) • P(C ≠ D )
⎛ 364 ⎞
=⎜
⎟
⎝ 365 ⎠
⎛ 364 ⎞
=⎜
⎟
⎝ 365 ⎠
= 0.982

⎛ 364 ⎞
•⎜
⎟
⎝ 365 ⎠

⎛ 364 ⎞
⎛ 364 ⎞
•⎜
⎟ •⎜
⎟
⎝ 365 ⎠
⎝ 365 ⎠

(4)

⎛ 364 ⎞
⎛ 364 ⎞
• ⎜
⎟ • ⎜
⎟
⎝ 365 ⎠
⎝ 365 ⎠

6

Since the probability of success and failure have a sum of one, the probability of
finding a birthday match in a group of four randomly chosen people can be computed as
1 – 0.982 = 0.018, or 1.8%. Extending the same logic to a randomly chosen group of 23
people, we can compute that the probability of a birthday match is
⎛ 364 ⎞
1− ⎜
⎟
⎝ 365 ⎠

253

= 0.5005,

(5)

or approximately 50.1%. For 50 people, the probability of a birthday match is
⎛ 364 ⎞
1− ⎜
⎟
⎝ 365 ⎠

1225

= 0.9653,

(6)

or approximately 96.5%.
From these computations, we see that neither the number of potential matches nor
the probability distribution follows a linear pattern. Instead, the pattern of potential
matches is quadratic while the probability distribution is geometric (Figure 4).
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Figure 4. Probability Distribution for a Birthday Match for Groups of 2 – 100 people.

Van Dooren et al. (2003) elaborated on the linearity misconception that leads
students to believe that the probability of a birthday match in a group of 23 people is
23/365:
In that case, you would indeed need 183 people to get a probability
for a birthday match exceeding 0.50…We would argue that people
applying this strategy would also believe that – compared to a group of 23
– the probability of getting a birthday match in a group of 46 people is
doubled, in a group of 69 it is tripled, etcetera (p. 118).
In at least three places throughout the Birthday Problem, intuition typically leads
to the application of a linear relationship, sometimes through the modeling of the
part/whole relationships that comprise the probability ratio, at others through reverting to
linear proportions to analyze the probability space.
These studies seem to indicate that reasoning errors involving rational numbers
may be heuristic in nature, but they also may indicate deeply embedded, fundamental
misunderstandings about the meaning and relationships of the part whole relationship and
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how to compare these quantities. Probability, on the other hand, appears to include
contextual situations that present students with the opportunity to engage with both the
heuristic and meaning difficulties of rational number meaning and the appropriate
application of the linear proportion (i.e., discernment between additive and multiplicative
relationships) This intertwining of rational number meaning and relationships among
rational number quantities with probability contexts can be seen again in the rational
number concepts of uniformity, equality, and change
Uniformity, Equality, and Change
Intuitive beliefs about uniformity are highly associated with rational number
reasoning. As Fosnot and Dolk (2002) pointed out, wholes must be divided into equal
parts in order for a rational number relationship to make sense. Proportionality requires
uniformity as well. When this belief is used as a problem solving technique, it is referred
to as the uniformity heuristic (Falk, 1992, p. 205). In probability, theoretical probabilities
are based on the assumption of uniformity, and probability spaces are often assumed to
be distributed equally across outcomes. Problems involving conditional probability run
counter to uniformity and equality beliefs. Confusion about the meaning of conditional
situations and their effect on resultant probabilities (consisting of several rational number
quantities) leads to misconceptions about the nature of conditional probability and the
effect of increased information on possible outcomes. In the absence of training, students
often fall back on the uniformity heuristic, resulting in overgeneralization errors. The
Three Prisoner Problem, which is mathematically identical to Vos Savant’s (1990) Monty
Hall Problem, illustrates the issues surrounding the interpretation of conditional
information based on assumptions of uniformity. The problem as described by Bar-Hillel
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and Falk (1982) and Falk (1992) is as follows:
Tom, Dick, and Harry are awaiting execution while imprisoned in
separate cells in some remote country. The monarch of that country
arbitrarily decides to pardon one of the three. The decision who is the
lucky one has been determined by a fair draw. He will be freed; but his
name is not immediately announced, and the warden is forbidden to
inform any of the prisoners of his fate. Dick argues that he already knows
that at least one of Tom and Harry must be executed, thus convincing the
compassionate warden that by naming one of them he will not be violating
his instructions. The warden names Harry. Thereupon Dick cheers up,
reasoning: “Before, my chances of a pardon were 1/3; now only Tom and
myself are candidates for a pardon, and since we are both equally likely to
receive it, my chance of being feed has increased to 1/2” (Falk, 1992, p.
198).
Students often believe, like Dick, that the probability of his being freed has
increased from 1/3 to 1/2 because the probabilities must remain equal across the available
outcomes. However, such a belief requires the assumption that the choice of a name is
randomly chosen, which does not hold in this situation. Instead, the warden, like Monty
in the Monty Hall problem, is choosing to disclose one of the outcomes based on
information to which he is privy (Falk, 1992). Therefore, the probability of any one of the
prisoners being freed is conditional on the warden’s information and requires considering
the situation from a conditional probability standpoint.
Conditional probability focuses primarily on how quantities represented by
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rational numbers change as a result of new information being added to a context. The
new information alters the assumptions on which the original quantities are based,
thereby changing the meaning of the new quantities as well. For such a situation, Bayes’
Theorem is especially helpful. Bayes’ Theorem defined probability as “the ratio between
the value at which an expectation depending on the happening of the event ought to be
computed, and the value of the thing expected upon its happening” (Bayes, 1763, p. 376).
These two values became known as the prior distribution (value based on expectation)
and the posterior distribution (value based on an experiment). Although the probability
for each of the three prisoners is described as uniform in the problem itself, this
description referred only to the prior distribution:
In the case of an event concerning the probability of which we
absolutely know nothing antecedently to any trials made concerning it,
seems to appear from the following consideration; viz. that concerning
such an event I have no reason to think that, in a certain number of trials, it
should rather happen any one possible number of times than another. For,
on this account, I may justly reason concerning it as if its probability had
been at first unfixed, and then determined in such a manner as to give me
no reason to think that in a certain number of trials, it should happen any
one possible number of times than another (Bayes, 1763, p. 393).
Uniformity in the prior distribution means that P(T) = P(D) = P(H) = 1/3, where
the events T, D, and H represent the event of each person being chosen for freedom.
Assuming that the guard has no reason to lie and no bias, we can compute the likelihood
that he would name either Harry or Tom to not be freed, given that he knows which
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prisoner will be freed and cannot name Dick (Table 5).
Table 5
Conditional Probability Equations (from Falk, 1992, p. 201)
Probability Equation
Description
P (h | T) = 1
Probability that Harry is named if Tom is to be freed.
P (h | D) = ½
Probability that Harry is named if Dick is to be freed.
P (h | H) = 0
Probability that Harry is named if Harry is to be freed.
P (t | T) = 0
Probability that Tom is named if Tom is to be freed.
P (t | D) = ½
Probability that Tom is named if Dick is to be freed.
P (t | H) = 1
Probability that Tom is named if Harry is to be freed.
Dick arrived at the probabilities in Table 5 under the assumption that he
cannot be named. His probabilities also consider the likelihood of each prisoner
being freed to be equal. So, if Harry is to be freed, and the warden cannot name
the prisoner to be freed, and he cannot name Dick, then only Tom can be named,
so P (t | H) = 1. Likewise, if Dick is to be freed, then the warden can name either
Tom or Harry, so P (h | D) = P (t | D) = ½. In Bayesian terms, these probabilities
represent the prior distribution (in this case, the distribution prior to the warden
naming a prisoner). These probabilities, however, do not represent the probability
distribution after the warden names the prisoner — the posterior distribution.
Bayes’ Theorem provides a formula for computing posterior distribution
probabilities based on the prior distribution probabilities (Equation 7).
P( B | A) =

P( A | B) P( B)
,
P( A | B) P( B) + P( A | B ) P( B )

The denominator of this formula represents the total probability of an
outcome while the numerator represents the probability of an outcome (Event B)
under the condition A. Applying this formula to the prisoner problem, we can
compute the posterior probability that Dick will be freed given that Harry was
named using Equation 8 (Falk, 1992, p. 201).
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(7)

P ( D | h) =

P(h | D) • P( D)
P(h | D) • P( D) + P(h | T ) • P(T ) + P(h | H ) • P( H )

(8)

The denominator of Equation 8 represents the total probability of any
prisoner being freed if Harry is named by the warden. The numerator represents
the probability of Dick being freed if the warden names Harry. Substituting the
prior distribution probabilities from Table 5 produces Equation 9.

P ( D | h) =

( 12 )(13 )
1
=
1 1
1
1
( 2 )( 3 ) + (1)( 3 ) + (0)( 3 ) 3

(9)

So, the disclosure of the warden’s information does not change Dick’s
probability of being freed from the original 1/3. The examination of this outcome
brought to light a belief related to the uniformity belief, the no news, no change
belief (Falk, 1992). While Falk described both of these beliefs as heuristics
because subjects used them to solve problems, they are not beliefs about
procedures, but of meaning under the context of change. Subjects who believed
the no-news-no-change perspective believed that Dick already knew that one of
the other two would not be freed, so revealing the name added no new substantive
information. Unlike the uniformity heuristic, the no news, no change heuristic
correctly computes the solution as 1/3. However, Falk provided two illustrations
to demonstrate the erroneous nature of this belief.
First, the no-news-no-change pattern does not hold for Tom. Using
Equation 10 and the values from Table 5, we can compute the probability for Tom
now that Dick has been told that Harry will not be freed.
P(T | h) =

P(h | T ) • P(T )
P(h | D) • P( D) + P (h | T ) • P(T ) + P(h | H ) • P( H )
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(10)

Using substitution, we compute Tom’s posterior probability (Equation 11).

P(T | h) =

(1)(13 )
2
=
1 1
1
1
( 2 )( 3 ) + (1)( 3 ) + (0)( 3 ) 3

So, although Dick’s chances did not change by the warden’s information,
Tom’s chances of being freed have doubled ⎯ the warden’s information was not
completely irrelevant to the probabilities. So, if Dick could choose, switching
places with Tom would double his chances of being freed. This outcome is
isomorphic with the Monty Hall problem: Switching doors also doubles a
contestant’s chances of winning the prize. The Monty Hall problem attracted a
great deal of attention in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s as mathematicians and
mathematics educators vehemently opposed Vos Savant’s (1990) claim that the
choice of switching doors made a difference in the probability of winning. This
opposition to the switching claim adds further evidence to Van Dooren et al.’s
(2003) conclusions about the pervasiveness and persistence of mathematical
misunderstandings about meaning and relationships: Such errors are evidently not
limited to novice learners.
Falk’s second argument against the no-news-no-change belief related the
belief back to uniformity; specifically, she showed that this belief also relied on
an assumption of uniformity. Falk (1992) related a variation of the prisoner
problem in which Tom is favored by the monarch, and so he gets two votes for
freedom while Dick and Harry each receive only one. The prior probabilities
become P(T) = 1/2, P(H) = P(D) = 1/4, a non-uniform distribution. The
assumptions about the decision making process for the warden remain unchanged
(i.e., no bias or reason to lie). Using Bayes’ Theorem again, the posterior
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(11)

probability for Dick getting his freedom changes, as shown in Equation 12.

P ( D | h) =

( 12 )( 14 )
1
=
1 1
1
1
( 2 )( 4 ) + (1)( 2 ) + (0)( 4 ) 5

(12)

When the assumption of uniformity does not hold true for a situation, assumptions
about change and the meaning of rational number quantities under conditions of change
become untenable. The ability to discern the applicability of any particular assumption
about rational number quantities for a specific problem requires understanding of which
units to count, how to count them, and how those quantities interact with other
information from a particular problem (i.e., relational understanding, as in Skemp,
1976/2006). Freudenthal (1970) summarized the unique role of probability in connecting
these abstract mathematical concepts to concrete examples:
Probability applies in everyday situations…There is no part of
mathematics that is as universally applied except, of course, elementary
arithmetic…In no mathematical domain is blind faith in techniques more
often denounced than in probability; in no domain is critical thought more
often required (p. 167).
These studies suggest that probability instruction may play a unique role in
challenging deeply-held assumptions about the meaning and relationships of rational
number quantities within a contextual situation.
Critical Misconceptions Specific to Learning Algebra
Students beginning the study of algebra face learning barriers from several
sources. First, algebra is often the first course in which students are asked to engage in
abstract reasoning and problem solving (Vogel, 2008). Researchers have demonstrated
that the abstract nature of algebra increases its difficulty over arithmetic (Carraher &
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Schliemann, 2007; Howe, 2005; Kieran, 1989). The impediment of abstractness to the
construction of meaning directly affects the ability of students to construct multiple
representations of algebraic objects (Kieran, 1992; Vogel, 2008).
Second, the learning of algebra requires students to learn a language of
mathematical symbols that is completely foreign to their previous experiences (Kilpatrick
et al., 2001). The multiple ways in which this language is described and used during
instruction often prevents students from connecting algebraic symbols to their intended
meaning (Blanco & Garrote, 2007; Socas Robayna, 1997). In some cases, students are
completely unaware that any meaning was intended for the symbols (Küchemann, 1978).
In other cases, they may know that meaning exists, but limited understanding prevents
them from ascribing meaning to the symbols, or they may assign erroneous meaning to
the symbols (Küchemann, 1978). For example, as students study topics such as functions
and graphs, they begin to understand and interpret one set of algebraic objects in terms of
another (e.g., a function equation with its graph, a data set by its equation, a data set by
its graph, as in Leinhardt, Zaslavski, & Stein, 1990). McDermott, Rosenquist, and Van
Zee (1987) found that students are generally able to plot points and equations; however,
in spite of this procedural fluency, students still lack the ability to extract meaning from
graphical representations. They concluded that the difficulty lay in the connection of a
graph to the construct it represents. Specifically, students are readily capable of
demonstrating procedural fluency, but memory and procedural understanding is unable to
guide students through problems involving interpretation (Skemp, 1976/2006).
Kieran (1992), Howe (2005), and Carraher and Schliemann (2007) recognized
that learning the structural characteristics of algebra creates a third obstacle faced by
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students.
The difficulty that students experience with understanding the
structure of algebra, even its most elementary aspects such as are found in
high school textbooks, was exemplified by their early attempts to convert
expressions into equations in order to have a representation that includes a
result, the unsystematic and strategic errors they committed while
simplifying expressions, their resistance to operating on an equation as an
object as shown by their not using the solving procedure of “doing the
same thing to both sides,” their not treating the equal sign as a symbol of
symmetry…their difficulty in seeing the “hidden” structure of equations,
[and] their non-use of algebra as a tool for proving numerical relations
(Kieran, 1992, p. 412).
The abstract, structural, and language barriers interact within algebra. For
example, consider the expression a + b: How students interpret the meaning of each
variable depends on how well they can handle the abstract nature of the symbols. Further,
students must recognize that the expression a + b represents the total number of items
from a set of a and b items (Kieran, 1992).
The teaching methods used to convey content often create a fourth barrier to
learning algebra. Sfard (1991) highlighted a difficulty of expectation as one problem with
teaching methods:
More often than not, both students and teachers fail to
acknowledge the fact which is one of the most important implications of
our three-phase schema: Insight cannot always be expected as an
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immediate reward for a person’s direct attempts to fathom a new idea. The
reification, which brings relational understanding, is difficult to achieve, it
requires much effort, and it may come when least expected … [it] may
occur after a period of intensive work followed by days of rest (p. 33).
Kieran (1992) concluded from Sfard’s (1991) study that a great deal of time must
be spent connecting algebra to arithmetic before proceeding to the structural ideas of
algebra. Furthermore, the lack of materials designed to facilitate the transition from
arithmetic to algebra forces teachers to either create materials themselves or conduct
time-intensive searches (Kieran, 1992). Instead, teachers often rely on whatever sequence
is outlined by a textbook.
Such a choice is highly problematic: Kieran (1992) proposed that textbook
explanations are often insufficient for helping students understand the abstract, structural
concepts necessary in algebra. Consider the following explanation of linear functions
from an algebra textbook (Figure 5):

Figure 5. Textbook description of linear functions (Larson, Boswell, Kanold, & Stiff, 2010, p. 75)
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Function Relationships
Notice that the definition of linear functions as described in this example relies on
recognizing a prescription: If a function can be written in slope intercept form, it is linear.
While not incorrect, this explanation is insufficient for situations that call for alternate
forms of linear functions (such as the standard form or point-slope form). Notice also that
the definition of function notation is mixed with the definition for linear functions.
Students often fail to recognize that function notation is a general form intended for all
functions rather than just linear (Chang, 2002). As a result, students may develop a
misconception that functions are supposed to be linear (Chang, 2002; Kalchman &
Koedinger, 2005). Socas Robayna (1997) offered another example: Students may
continue trying to simplify an expression until they reduce it to a single number. Baroudi
(2006) noted similar difficulties with the meaning of the equal sign, and found that
additional time spent with numerical equations may not be sufficient for learning the
structure of algebraic equations. Instead, he suggested the importance of intermediate
representations to bridge the gap between arithmetic and algebraic structures.
Skemp (1976/2006) considered the underlying foundations of mathematical
misconceptions as emerging from an instrumental understanding of mathematics that
forces students to rely on memorization. Kieran (2007) agreed with Skemp’s viewpoint
of the limiting nature of instrumental mathematics. Even the manipulation of symbols,
once considered primarily an algorithmic process, has become recognized as emergent
from concepts (Kieran, 2007). Skemp gave the analogy of a person trying to navigate
through a new city. A person with an instrumental understanding of the city may have a
number of ways to get from point A to point B. The difficulty with this understanding
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arises when the person deviates from the original course. In such a case, the person gets
lost. Instrumental understanding of algebra produces similar results. For instance,
students may learn a set of prescriptions for solving equations of the form ax + b = c;
when they encounter equations of the form ax + b = cx + d, their prescriptions are unable
to accommodate the new form.
Probability and rational number assumptions influence how students understand
non-linear functions. Student understanding of rational number and probability concepts
may also influence their understanding of algebraic structures (Falk, 1992).A famous
examples of this misuse of the rule of three took place as a result of a bad bet:
De Méré knew that it was advantageous to bet on the occurrence of
at least one six in a series of four tosses of a die – maybe this was an old
experience. He argued it must be as advantageous to bet on the occurrence
of at least one double-six in a 24 toss series with a pair of dice. As Fortune
disappointed him, he complained to his friend Pascal about preposterous
mathematics which had deceived him (Freudenthal, 1970, p. 151).
De Méré made two erroneous assumptions about the probability and rational
number structures in this situation. First, he assumed the one die probability to be 4/6,
computed by adding the probability of 1/6 four times (i.e., an additive, linear
accumulation of probabilities). Second, he inferred that the probability of rolling at least a
double six with two dice should be proportional, or 24/36. Both situations are binomial
rather than linear. For the one-die scenario, P(Success) = 1/6 while P(Failure) = 5/6. The
binomial theorem where n = 4 and k ≥ 1yields Equation 13.
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4
3
2
2
3
⎛ 4 ⎞⎛ 1 ⎞ ⎛ 4 ⎞⎛ 1 ⎞ ⎛ 5 ⎞ ⎛ 4 ⎞⎛ 1 ⎞ ⎛ 5 ⎞ ⎛ 4 ⎞⎛ 1 ⎞⎛ 5 ⎞
29
P( X ≥ 1) = ⎜⎜ ⎟⎟⎜ ⎟ + ⎜⎜ ⎟⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ + ⎜⎜ ⎟⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ + ⎜⎜ ⎟⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ =
or 0.517
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⎝ 4 ⎠⎝ 6 ⎠ ⎝ 3 ⎠⎝ 6 ⎠ ⎝ 6 ⎠ ⎝ 2 ⎠⎝ 6 ⎠ ⎝ 6 ⎠ ⎝ 1 ⎠⎝ 6 ⎠⎝ 6 ⎠

(13)

So, rather than having a 67% probability, the original probability should have
been 51.7%. In the two-dice scenario, P(Success) = 1/36 while P(Failure) = 35/36. The
binomial theorem where n = 36 and k ≥ 1 can be computed similarly to produce the
probability of rolling at least one double six in 24 rolls to be 0.491 or 49.1%. The
binomial formula, a non-linear algebraic equation, applies to many situations where
linear relationships do not hold for the quantities of interest. The De Méré problem
illustrates how these underlying assumptions about probability and rational number
structures influence understanding of the functional relationship that is so critical to
algebraic thinking and reasoning when that relationship is not linear (Freudenthal, 1983;
Kalchman & Koedinger, 2005; Kaput & Hegedus, 2004; Thorpe, 1989).
Probability and rational number assumptions influence how students understand
linear functions. Even algebraic problems that do require a linear function cause students
tremendous difficulties (Moss, Beatty, Barkin, & Shillolo, 2008). Moss et al. attributed
these difficulties to student misconceptions about additive versus multiplicative
structures. For example, the Trapezoid Table Problem presents a series of trapezoidal
tables joined with seats placed around the table. Students are also provided with a table of
values as in Figure 6.

Figure 6. Representations provided in the Trapezoid Table problem (Moss et al., 2008, p. 157).
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For pattern problems such as the Trapezoid Table, Warren (2000) found that
students struggling with linear patterns tended to revert to a recursive pattern (i.e.,
repeatedly adding three to the previous y value, yn = yn-1 + 3) rather than developing a
functional relationship between the number of tables and number of chairs (i.e.,
recognizing that the three acts as a slope ratio of change, a multiplicative operand, yn = 3n
+ 2). Stacey (1989) identified the same tendency with similar problems (e.g., the
Christmas Tree Problem, Ladders). The problem with such thinking is not that the
recursive pattern is incorrect, but that it does not describe the relationship between x and
y as students often believe it should (Warren, 2000).
Non-linear functions offer a similar challenge for algebra students; specifically,
students continue to apply this additive feature to numerical relationships, confusing it for
functionality. If the additive feature is present, as in the Trapezoid Table problem, then
students recognize the sequence as a function. If, on the other hand, an additive pattern
cannot be found, the relationship is discarded as non-functional (Chang, 2002; Kalchman
& Koedinger, 2005). More generally, Clement (2001) noted that students often rely on
the presence of a formula do determine if a relationship is a function:
Students may erroneously consider ± x 2 − 3 a function, since it is
an algebraic formula; whereas they might not consider the correspondence
that Mary owes $6, John owes $3, and Sue owes $2 to be a function, since
no formula “fits it” (p. 746).
Variables and Variation
Variable interpretation. The notion of variability is especially important in
algebra (Briggs, Demana, & Osborne, 1986; Edwards, 2000; Graham & Thomas, 2000;
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Kalchman & Koedinger, 2005). MacGregor and Stacey (1997) found that students have
difficulty assigning meaning to variables, failing to recognize the systemic consistency in
the multiple uses of variables. Research efforts in algebra have long focused on how well
students could discriminate between the uses of variables (Kieran, 2008). Küchemann
(1978) developed a test for variable understanding which matched Piagetian sub-stages
with item complexity: The results indicated that students interpret variables six ways
(Table 6).
Table 6
Hierarchical Levels of Variable Interpretation
Level Piagetian Sub-Scale
Description
1
Concrete Operations
Evaluating the variable using trial and error.
2
Ignoring the variable.
3
Variable represents an object or label.
4
Formal Operations
Variable represents a specific unknown.
5
Variable represents a generalized number.
6
Variable represents a functional relationship.
Gray, Loud, and Sokolowski (2005) examined student responses to questions
examining student interpretation of variables using Küchemann’s hierarchy as a
framework. For the question, “Small apples cost 8 cents each and small pears cost 6 cents
each. If a stands for the number apples bought and p stands for the number of pears
bought, what does 8a + 6p stand for?” 81% of students in basic algebra, 76% in college
algebra, and 50% in calculus answered incorrectly (Gray et al., 2005, p. 4). Gray et al.
identified the most common error as substituting the price of the fruit for the letters and
giving the resultant solution, 100. Students who gave this solution appeared to interpret a
and p as specific unknowns (Küchemann’s Level 4). The next common error resulted
from interpreting the letters as labels for the objects (Küchemann’s Level 3) rather than
the price of the objects, “8 apples and 6 pears” (p. 5). Their findings agreed with those
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found by Küchemann (1981) for high school students: “Children have relatively little
difficulty with items…where the letters can be thought of as objects or names of
objects…they find it much more difficult when the letters necessarily represent numbers,
especially numbers of objects” (p. 307).
Similarly, Torigoe and Gladding (2006) compared student ability to solve sets of
parallel problems, one involving numerical values and the other providing variables. In
one problem, students were asked to determine the minimum acceleration necessary for
police to catch a bank robber fleeing the scene of a crime. In one version, the prompt
provides specific numerical quantities while the second version provided symbols to
represent the quantities.
The percentage of correct responses for the symbolic version (57%) was
significantly lower than for the numerical version (94%) for a sample of 894 college
students. Their study suggested that, holding all other task characteristics constant, the
meaning of variables and the quantities they represent causes significant difficulties for
students in algebra. Thorpe (1989) suggested that one possible reason for such difficulty
is in the fragmentation of instruction. He encouraged the elimination of the concept of
expressions from the algebra curriculum entirely:
Asking students in an algebra course to manipulate expressions is
analogous to asking students in a writing course to manipulate phrases
rather than sentences. Expressions are not important in themselves. They
are important only when they are implicitly or explicitly part of an
equation. The expression 2x + 1, by itself, is incomplete. To have
meaning, it must be imbedded in an equation, such as f(x) = 2x + 1, or 2x +
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1 = 0. The equation provides meaning for the expression, as well as a
context for x. (Is x a variable or does x represent a member of a solution
set?) Just as we teach students of writing to speak in sentences, let us teach
students of algebra to speak in sentences! (p. 18).
From Thorpe’s point of view, understanding the nature of a variable is intertwined
with the meaning of equations in a particular context. However, placing variables in the
context of an equation may not be sufficient to advance student understanding of
variables.
Operating at Küchemann’s (1978) Level 4, many students can readily find the
solution of 3 for a problem such as 5x – 4 = 11. However, in solving for such an
unknown, students may not recognize the varying nature of x; that is, that as x takes on
different values, the value on the right hand side of the equation (i.e., the 11) changes as
well. Furthermore, the same letter may be used in multiple problems. Suppose instead
that 5x – 4 = 20. In this problem, we find that the same letter x now represents a value of
3.2. Students rarely recognize or value such subtleties of change, instead relying on rote
procedures (Fuson et al., 2005; Kalchman & Koedinger, 2005), nor do they recognize the
connection to a two variable equation, such as y = 5x – 4 (Kieran, 2008). Students will
often look for an “answer,” not recognizing that multiple solution sets can exist within a
single problem or that multiple equations can be related. This lack of meaning may also
be due to fragmented instruction (Thorpe, 1989; Kieran, 1989, 2007) and an instructional
focus on procedures rather than concepts and connections between ideas (Hiebert &
Carpenter, 1992; Hiebert & Grouws, 2007).Probability instruction can be used to focus
the concept of variable directly on the changing values within a quantity, thereby helping
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students avoid or alleviate this confusion.
The reversal error presented by Kaput and Clement’s (1979) Student Professor
Problem (i.e., Write an equation to represent the phrase, ‘There are six times as many
students as professors at this university’) may demonstrate underlying misconceptions in
the meaning of variables and equality. Clement (1982) attempted to eliminate the reversal
error by warning students of the potential reversal while Rosnick and Clement (1980)
tutored students specifically about the reversal error, hoping that cognitive awareness
alone could assist students. Fisher (1988) and Phillippe (1992) substituted used letters
other than S and P, hoping to advance students beyond the use of letters as labels. Each of
these efforts resulted in a lack of significant change in the error rate. Clement (1982)
identified three types of strategies used by students in the student professor problem (see
Figure 7).

Figure 7. Strategies Used in the Student Professor Problem (Clement, 1982, p. 21).

In the word order matching strategy, students displayed the label misconception,
operating at Küchemann’s (1978) Level 1. Similarly, in the static comparison, students
relied on a mental image of the makeup of a typical university with more students than
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professors. Clement (1982) found that the static comparison image was so strong that
even after considering the correct equation, S = 6P, students considered it impossible and
discarded it in favor of the erroneous equation.
Probability quantities are also affected by static comparisons. Static comparison
thinking may contribute to misconceptions in probability as well. Consider the following
problem: “Of the following two subgroups, which is larger? (a) Unmarried physicians, or
(b) Unmarried physicians who like to travel abroad” (Agnoli & Krantz, 1989, p. 543).
Respondents overwhelmingly chose (b), reasoning that unmarried physicians are
more likely to travel abroad than married ones. This reasoning also represents static
comparison: Agnoli and Krantz (1989) found that students based their decisions on a
priori knowledge rather than the meaning of the mathematical statement. Likewise,
MacGregor and Stacey (1997) suggested that students often make such errors as a result
of relying on intuition and making analogies to more familiar situations. Errors resulting
from static comparisons are persistent, resistant to direct interventions, and often result in
biased mathematical judgments in unfamiliar contexts (Shaughnessy & Bergman, 1993).
Kahneman and Tversky (1972, 1973a, 1973b, 1982, 1983), Agnoli and Krantz
(1989), and Shaughnessy and Bergman (1993) divided these biased judgments into two
categories, representativeness and availability. Representativeness, results from
transferring properties of large samples to small samples, especially the notion that small
samples reflect the parent population as well as large samples (or, “neglect of small
samples” in Shaughnessy & Bergman, 1993, p. 182). The second judgmental heuristic
error, availability, reflects a person’s tendency to estimate probabilities based on
available personal experiences. These judgment errors themselves do not appear to be
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misconceptions, but they do appear to emerge from a fundamental misunderstanding
about the nature of probabilistic quantities. Whether static comparison errors begin with
probability or algebra or affect both content domains simultaneously is unclear. These
errors may, however, link fundamental probability misconceptions to algebra
misconceptions.
MacGregor and Stacey (1997) suggested that misleading teaching practices and
materials may exacerbate the need for students to rely on judgmental heuristics in
mathematics. Thorpe (1989), Kieran (1989, 1992) and Leitzel (1989) suggested that decontextualizing the algebra curriculum may be one such misleading practice that guides
students away from the systemic structure of algebra. On the other hand, Kieran (2008)
noted that advances in instructional technology may help reverse some of this decontextualization. For example, Ainley, Bills, and Wilson (2004) presented evidence that
spreadsheet applications can help students build bridges from numerical specificity to
variable generality:
In the algebra-like notation of the spreadsheet, the cell reference is
used ambiguously to name both the physical location of a cell in a column
and row, and the information the cell may contain. The spreadsheet thus
offers a strong visual image of the cell as a container in two which
numbers can be placed…The image offered by the spreadsheet is
ambiguous in another powerful way: when a formula is entered in a cell, it
can be ‘filled down’ to operate on a range of cells in a column. The cell
reference can then be seen as both specific (a particular number I may put
in this cell) and general (all the values I may enter in this column). This
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image is likely to support the idea of variable as a range of numbers in
functional relationships (p. 2).
Chazan and Yerushalmy (2003) examined the complexity of variable concepts
and concluded that a functions-based approach focusing on variation/change rather than
unknowns to be solved allows students to develop more advanced understanding of
variables. Such an approach directs students to interpret variables at Küchemann’s (1978)
two highest abstract levels, generalized numbers and functional relationships. The
concept of variation as studied in probability follows Chazan and Yerushalmy’s advice:
Variables are quantities within which patterns for expected values are based on
distributions; Variation is examined as a measure of change that describes differences
between small samples and the population, variation from the mean within a sample; and
students explore patterns within random variables and the significance of small amounts
of variation in large samples (Watson & Kelly, 2005; Watson, Kelly, Callingham, &
Shaughnessy, 2003; Watson & Shaughnessy, 2004; Zawojewski & Shaughnessey, 2000).
Probability instruction, therefore, may offer an alternative approach to leading
students to the meaning of variable by combining the concept of variable with authentic
contexts and technological tools (e.g., spreadsheets) with the exploration of variation for
different sample sizes. Often, students underestimate the amount of variation in small
samples, inappropriately applying the Law of Large Numbers (Shaughnessy, 1992;
Shaughnessy & Bergman, 1993; Shaughnessy, Canada, & Ciancetta, 2003). Consider the
task depicted in Figure 8 (used in Watson & Shaughnessy, 2004: NAEP (1996) Released
Item).
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Figure 8. The Candy Problem (Watson and Shaughnessy, 2004, p. 107).

Student responses on this item indicated that some students have no intuitive
sense of the amount of variation they should expect in repeated sampling with
replacement while others included a reasonable amount of variation in their predictions
(Watson & Shaughnessy, 2004).
Green’s (1982) thumbtack question demonstrated how issues with variation are
linked with assumptions of uniformity and equality. In this problem, students were asked,
“A packet of 100 drawing pins is emptied out onto a table. Some drawing pins land
pointing up and some land pointing down: How many up and how many down would you
expect out of the 100?” (p. 30). Green (1983a) reported that most students chose a 50-50
outcome, assuming that the probability of up and down is equal. Trying a variation of the
same problem, he included additional information about a prior trial in which 32 tacks
landed up and 68 down. Some students chose a reversed solution, 64 landed up and 36
down, explaining that the given information did not match their own experiences (i.e., the
availability heuristic). The item was modified to its final form, making the prior trial
seem more realistic and including a non-numeric choice that all outcomes are equally
likely. In the final sample, students overwhelmingly chose the non-numeric option,
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confirming their belief in uniformity and equality.
Another question from Green (1982) linked notions of variation with randomness
and the belief that randomness means uniformity:
A teacher asked Clare and Susan each to toss a coin a large number
of times and to record every time whether the coin landed Heads or Tails.
For each ‘Heads,’ a 1 is recorded and for each ‘Tails,’ a 0 is recorded.
Here are the two sets of results:

Now one girl did it properly, by tossing the coin. The other girl
cheated and just made it up. Which girl cheated? How can you tell? (p.
27).
Students at all grade levels overwhelmingly believed that the regularity of Clare’s
pattern and the long run lengths in Susan’s pattern made Susan the most likely culprit for
having cheated, when, in fact, the reverse was true. Green conjectured that their
reasoning errors emerged from a deeper misconception about the nature of variation
within randomness and suggested a link between variation misunderstandings and beliefs
about uniformity.
The gambler’s fallacy is another example of a reasoning error that may be linked
to misconceptions about variation, representativeness, and randomness (Falk & Konold,
1994; Tversky & Kahneman, 1971). The gambler’s fallacy denotes a belief that, given a
sequence of independent events repeated a number of times and a particular outcome has
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occurred more than would normally be expected, a different outcome is more likely on
subsequent trials. For example, a student tosses a coin six times and gets a single tail the
first time and then five heads. The gambler’s fallacy represents the belief that the tails
outcome is more likely on the next flip.
When subjects are instructed to generate a random sequence of
hypothetical tosses of a fair coin…they produced sequences where the
proportion of heads in any short segment stays far closer to .50 than the
laws of chance would predict…Subjects act as if every segment of the
random sequence has strayed from the population proportion, a corrective
bias in the other direction is expected (Tversky & Kahneman, 1971, p.
106).
Tying Algebra, Probability, and Rational Numbers Together through Error Patterns
Static comparisons and judgment bias errors appear to affect the learning of both
algebra and probability. Some of these errors may be due to misunderstanding
fundamental concepts in algebra such as variable meaning and functions. Errors in
reasoning within probability may sometimes be due to misconceptions about rational
number quantities and their relationships within specific contexts. Misapplication of
additive and multiplicative structures in algebraic contexts may also be connected to
misunderstanding the rational number quantities within a specific situation. The
connections between these reasoning errors also appear in geometry contexts.
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Critical Misconceptions Specific to Learning Geometry
Spatial Reasoning
Student orientation toward geometry is quite different from that of algebra:
Students are often intrinsically motivated to study the properties that govern the shapes
encountered in daily life (Engel, 1970; Freudenthal, 1973). In spite of this motivational
factor, students still struggle with errors and misunderstandings in geometry due to
limited spatial reasoning (Clement & Battista, 1992).
Spatial reasoning begins with the differentiation between objects and
representations. Objects are abstractions, ideas considered through reasoning (Battista,
2007). Representations, on the other hand, are used to signify objects other than
themselves. For example, a line drawn on a piece of paper only represents a geometric
line, defined in Euclidean geometry as having infinite length and no thickness. The Van
Hiele (1959/1984a) framework is especially helpful for describing student spatial
reasoning processes and how they distinguish between objects and representations.
This framework classifies geometric reasoning into five levels. Within Level 0,
the base level (visual in Clement & Battista, 1992), children reason geometrically solely
on the basis of recognition. At this stage, shapes are examined as a whole. Only the
physical appearance of a shape is considered without regard to parts or properties, and no
distinction is made between objects and representations (Crowley, 1987). For example,
they may recognize that a rectangle is different than a square only because it appears
different. Within Level 1 (analysis in Crowley, 1987 and descriptive/analytical in
Clements & Battista, 1992), students analyze geometric concepts using properties and
characteristics of shapes and figures (Crowley, 1987). For example, students will
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recognize that a rectangle has four sides, that opposite sides are equal, and that the four
angles all measure 90°. They may not, however, recognize the hierarchical ordering of
properties. For example, they may attribute the properties of a rectangle to a square
without realizing that a square is actually a special rectangle. At Level 2
(abstract/relational; Clements & Battista, 1992), students do begin the ordering of
properties (Van Hiele, 1959/1984a) through informal deduction (Crowley, 1987).
Students using abstract/relational reasoning categorize shapes and figures according to
their properties and recognize hierarchical classifications, such as considering a square to
be a rectangle with congruent sides. At Level 3 (deduction in Crowley, 1987 and formal
deduction in Clements & Battista, 1992), students are able to develop theorems within an
axiomatic system. Additionally, they distinguish between the roles of theorems,
postulates, as definitions; their thinking is also concerned with the meaning of the
converse of a theorem (Crowley, 1987; Van Hiele, 1959/1984a). Most high school
instruction goes no further than Level 3 (Crowley, 1987); however, Level 4 (rigor in
Crowley, 1987 and rigor/mathematical in Clements & Battista, 1992), involves the
formal reasoning about mathematical systems in the absence of reference models.
Clements & Battista (1992) also proposed a pre-base level which they called prerecognition in which children are unable to distinguish between shapes.
The Van Hiele framework can be used to help explain common misconceptions
that develop in geometry through missing or inadequate spatial reasoning. Clements and
Battista (1992, p. 422) compiled 11 of the most common geometric misconceptions:
1. An angle must have one horizontal ray.
2. A right angle is an angle that points to the right.
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3. To be a side of a figure a segment must be vertical.
4. A segment is not a diagonal if it is vertical or horizontal
5. A square is not a square if its base is not horizontal.
6. The only way a figure can be a triangle is if it is equilateral.
7. The height of a triangle or parallelogram is a side adjacent to the base.
8. The angle sum of a quadrilateral is the same as its area.
9. The Pythagorean Theorem can be used to calculate the area of a
rectangle.
10. If a shape has four sides, then it is a square.
11. The area of a quadrilateral can be obtained by transforming it into a
rectangle with the same perimeter.
Students who hold Misconceptions 1 – 5 operate at the base level of recognition.
For example, a student who believes that a square is not a square unless its base is
horizontal (Misconception 5) does not associate the properties of a square to the label.
Instead, such a student relies strictly on the visual orientation of a particular drawing.
Students who hold Misconceptions 6 – 11 have moved to the analysis level: They are
aware of properties, but the properties have not been organized into a coherent system.
For example, a student who believes that the sum of a quadrilateral is the same as its area
(Misconception 8) acknowledges that a quadrilateral has the property of a constant sum
for its interior angles but confuses the meaning of an angle with the meaning of area.
Teaching methods and materials coupled with a lack of authentic experiences may
exacerbate misconceptions resulting from the limited spatial reasoning found at the lower
Van Hiele levels (Oberdorf & Taylor-Cox, 1999). They described the example of early
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geometric activities in which students are taught to distinguish between rectangles and
squares. They maintained that such differentiation is quite difficult to eradicate in later
grades. Instead, they advocated for the use of exploratory activities that allow students to
examine quadrilaterals as a whole and provide the substance for rich discussions about
similarities and differences between different quadrilaterals.
Monoghan (2000) found that textbooks tend to reinforce an over-reliance on
typical representations of geometric objects, a condition that may result in limiting
progression from the recognition stage to the analysis stage. Swindal (2000) and
Monaghan (2000) recognized a fundamental gap first identified by Van Hiele
(1959/1984a) and Shaughnessy and Burger (1985): Students and teachers think about the
same concepts from different levels. Most students in high school geometry reason at
Levels 0 or 1 (recognition and analysis) while teachers think, reason, and teach using
vocabulary from Level 2 (abstract/relational thinking). Furthermore, courses that focus
primarily on the development of proof using language from Level 3 offer most students,
who are functioning at Levels 0 and 1, limited opportunity to advance their understanding
of spatial properties and relationships (Hiebert & Grouws, 2007).
Misunderstandings about spatial properties and relationships appear dissimilar to
algebra, probability, and rational number reasoning errors on the surface, but the number
patterns within spatial relationships involve rational numbers and algebraic patterns.
Geometric models are also often used to represent probability ratios.
Proportionality and Geometric Learning
Just as with rational numbers, probability, and algebra, linear proportions abound
in geometry (e.g., side lengths and perimeter of similar figures follow the Rule of Three,
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as in Carter et al., 2010; Dietiker et al., 2007; Serra, 2003). Freudenthal (1983) and
Stacey (1983) noted that the abundance of linear applications in geometry often leads
students to the belief that linearity is universally applicable. Students often cling to the
linear model tenaciously in spite of additional information that discredits the linear model
for a particular scenario (De Bock et al., 1998, 2002; De Bock, Van Dooren, Verschaffel,
& Janssens, 2002). De Bock et al. (1998, 2002) studied student problem solving with
problems involving squares, circles, and irregular figures, half of which required a linear
proportion while the other half required non-linear reasoning. Their example for square
figures follows (De Bock et al., 1998, p. 68).
Enlargement of a square figure
Proportional item:
Farmer Gus needs approximately 4 days to dig a ditch around a
square pasture with a side of 100 m. How many days would he need to dig
a ditch around a square pasture with a side of 300 m? (Answer: 12 days)
Non-proportional item:
Farmer Carl needs approximately 8 hours to manure a square piece
of land with a side of 200 m. How many hours would he need to manure a
square piece of land with a side of 600 m? (Answer: 72 hours)
De Bock et al. (1998) found that 98% of their sample of 12 and13 year old
students solved the proportional problems correctly, whereas only 5% of the same sample
solved the non-proportional items correctly. They also found that problems for irregular
figures were missed more than problems for squares or circles. In their follow up study
(De Bock et al., 2002), they interviewed students who had missed non-proportional
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problems. The interviews progressed through five stages, each progressively adding more
information to direct the students toward a non-linear model. Most students required at
least three stages before realizing that the linear solution was incorrect; some students
clung to the linear solution even after all five stages.
The ability to distinguish how and when to use proportionality relationships
appears to affect the learning of geometry as well as algebra, probability, and rational
numbers. Misusing these relationships may be due to misunderstanding geometric ideas
and the connections between them. The inter-connectedness between these potential
misunderstandings with rational number, probability, and algebra may indicate that a
novel teaching strategy targeting the underlying misconceptions may help reduce
reasoning errors in all four content areas.
Teaching Probability to Correct Foundational Mathematical Misunderstandings
Stone, Alfeld, and Pearson (2008) echoed the sentiments of Freudenthal (1970):
In order to guide students to deep mathematical learning, mathematical content must be
tied to authentic experiences to which students can relate. Probability offers such a
connection between mathematics and the real world naturally (Liu & Thompson, 2007),
and its de-emphasis in U.S. high school mathematics curricula may account for many of
the difficulties students have connecting abstract mathematical ideas to concrete
examples (Davis, 1992). In spite of the ability of probability to bridge the gulf between
the abstract and concrete, several reasons explain its exclusion from mathematics
curricula. First, teachers are typically less familiar with probability content than other
areas of mathematics (Jendraszek, 2008; Swenson, 1998). Compounding this problem is
the fact that probability is often viewed as a second-rate topic (Mitchell, 1990;
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Shaughnessy, 2006). Furthermore, curriculum issues in the United States have
historically been problematic: Every state develops its own standards, varying widely in
organization and complexity (Boland & Nicholson, 1996; Reys & Lappan, 2007). Issues
of cognitive development of a child and student mobility between schools and states
compound curriculum issues even further (Engec, 2006; Fajemidagba, 1983). The
National Council of Teachers of Mathematics (NCTM) began an effort to coordinate the
development of a recommended mathematics curriculum, publishing the Curriculum and
Evaluation Standards as a result (NCTM, 1989). Even after concerted efforts to increase
the teaching of probability, Shaughnessy (1992) found that the NCTM recommendations
are minimized in the classroom. Figure 10 shows that, even when the recommendations
are followed, number, algebra, and geometry receive the greatest emphasis while
probability is given minimal attention.

Figure 9. NCTM (2000) Mathematics Strands for Grades K – 12 (p. 30).

Although data analysis and probability are inextricably linked, the two areas may
need separate degrees of emphasis in high school. Shaughnessy (2007) found that student
ability to compute means, medians, and modes had improved since his 1992 report, but
student understanding of randomness, chance, and variation had not improved
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correspondingly. Likewise, Smith (2003) found that many high school teachers handle
probability differently than statistics; they may relegate probability to the end of the year
as time permits or simply delete it from the curriculum completely.
This de-emphasis of probability has devastating consequences for mathematics
students. First, excluding probability from the mathematics curriculum may increase the
disparity between mathematics and the real world. Shaughnessy and Bergman (1993)
stated, “It appears that stochastic problems may closely resemble the type of problem
solving that our students will have to do in their own private lives or on their jobs” (p.
193). Furthermore, people are faced with choices involving probability on a daily basis
that affect the quality of life for themselves and their family and friends, e.g., career
decisions (Hume, 1970; Papps, 2008), interpreting weather, economic, and political
forecasts (Resnick, 1987), business and personal purchasing choices (Ashman, 2001;
McAvoy, 2001; Swaminathan, 2003), and gaming (Barry, 1988; Brandt & Pietras, 2008;
Clotfelter & Cook, 1991; Lai-Yin & Rob, 2005).
Second, Engel (1970) and Shermer (2008) found that humans typically do not
intuit probability correctly without formal training. In fact, researchers have found that
humans’ lack of intuition regarding probability poses one of the primary difficulties in
both the learning and teaching of the subject (Engel, 1970; Kahneman et al., 1982;
Kahneman & Tversky, 1972, 1973a, 1973b, 1983; Shaughnessy & Bergman, 1993). This
stumbling block creates a significant barrier to understanding abstract mathematical
concepts. For example, when students examine the conjunction of two sets (A ∩ B), they
often conclude that the conjunction has a greater magnitude than the parent sets (Agnoli,
1987; Agnoli & Krantz, 1989; Shaughnessy, 1992). This intuitive response has been
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traced to the use of judgment heuristics such as representativeness (Agnoli, 1987;
Shaughnessy, 1992). Heuristics are often useful for framing mathematical reasoning to
solve problems (Pólya, 1957; Schoenfeld, 1992). However, reliance on heuristic
judgments may lead to reasoning errors when they reflect beliefs rather than attributes or
when those heuristics are used as substitutes for understanding the meaning of concepts
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1983; Shaughnessy, 1992). Consider an example in which
students are asked to compare two sets, “Men who have had one or more heart attacks”
and “Men who are over 55 years old” (Agnoli, 1987, p. 3). Basing the comparison on
representativeness beliefs often leads students to conclude that the conjunction of these
two sets, “Men who have had one or more heart attacks and are over 55 years old,” is
actually larger than either of the two parent sets (i.e., they believe that men over 55 are
more likely to have a heart attack) when, actually, parent sets are always larger than their
conjunction.
Third, the misconceptions prevalent in probability may influence the foundations
of how students think about mathematics generally. For example, Green (1983b) reported
on a survey of over 3,000 British teens’ (ages 11 – 16) in which he identified a major
misconception in the area of proportions: Students most commonly chose the incorrect
answer that corresponded with the largest numerator value rather than the relative size of
the rational number relationship. Through tasks such as Green’s Marble Problem, an
exploration of probability problems provides a natural venue for exploring rational
number concepts. The authentic experiences so necessary for learning probability
concepts also require scrutiny of the meaning of the rational numbers used for reporting
probabilities. Additionally, the concrete applications of probability (e.g., flipping coins,
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rolling a die, simulation and modeling) may be a critical key for students struggling to
integrate abstract concepts into their prior conceptions of mathematics (Evans &
Tsatsaroni, 2000; Freudenthal, 1970; Fuson, 1998; Green, 1983b; Watson &
Shaughnessy, 2004). Connecting abstract concepts such as randomness to probability
simulations such as The Cliff Hanger applet (Mathematics, Science, and Technology
Education, 2005) may also improve student orientations toward mathematics (Stone,
Alfeld, & Pearson, 2008) and student flexibility in unfamiliar problem solving situations
(Evans & Tsatsaroni, 2000). As a result, students may develop a deeper relational
understanding of mathematical concepts, allowing them to handle greater mathematical
complexity and difficulty.
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A Conceptual Framework to Model Mathematics Learning
The similarity between reasoning across mathematics content areas suggests a
pathway of learning that either results in understanding or misconceptions and errors. To
develop a model that traces these pathways, several factors must be considered. First, the
introduction of new concepts is typically accompanied with tasks or problems for the
students to complete. The characteristics of these tasks (e.g., task complexity, difficulty,
discrimination between ability levels) may influence how students interpret the new
material. Second, students must filter tasks through their own knowledge framework.
Third, the pedagogical emphasis on either concepts or procedures direct students to
develop either relational or instrumental understanding (Skemp, 1976/2006). If students
learn relationally, then the conceptual understanding they develop may produce stronger,
more consistent procedural skills, which in turn may reinforce deeper more robust
conceptual understanding. This understanding may then be integrated into a student’s
knowledge framework for use with future tasks.
Alternatively, the development of instrumental understanding leads to the
development of procedures without meaning, with incomplete or erroneous meaning, or
even the lack of awareness of meaning (Skemp 1976/2006). Misunderstanding the
meaning of mathematical objects in some way is the very essence of misconceptions.
Mathematical misconceptions result in errors that are often difficult for teachers to
prevent or obstruct. Researchers have repeatedly found that systematic errors due to
misconceptions rather than faulty reasoning adhere to patterns of over- or undergeneralization of properties or concepts for a particular task (e.g., Chang, 2002; Falk,
1992; Fuys & Liebov, 1997; Kalchman & Koedinger, 2005; Van Dooren, De Bock,
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Depaepe, Janssens, and Verschaffel, 2003). For example, in geometry, Fuys and Liebov
(1997) suggested that students struggling to move from a visualization level of spatial
reasoning to an analysis level may under-generalize geometric properties by including
irrelevant characteristics of a shape in their mental framework; or conversely, they may
over-generalize relationships between figures by discarding any number of a shape’s
unique properties. If unchecked, these misconceptions may be integrated into students’
mathematical understanding, thereby influencing future learning.
Difficulties Inherent to Addressing Mathematical Misconceptions Directly
Multiple attempts to develop interventions for reducing misconceptions have met
with limited success. Some of these efforts have focused on addressing task-specific
errors (e.g., Rosnick & Clement, 1979). One difficulty with such a strategy is that if the
error was due to a misconception, the underlying misconception will remain in the
student’s knowledge framework to adapt and reappear in the same or other task. Other
endeavors have attempted to address the reasoning that leads to an error using a variety of
strategies such as worked examples (e.g., Fisher, 1988; Phillippe, 1992; Rosnick &
Clement, 1980). Directly addressing erroneous reasoning appeared to make no significant
improvement in student learning (Weinberg, 2007).
Weinberg (2007) suggested that another reason student errors can be so insidious
is that students attempt to adapt their knowledge base to the problem scenario, sometimes
accurately and sometimes not. The adaptive nature of these errors suggests that the
reasoning processes are built on a deeper foundation of understanding relating to the
structure and meaning of mathematical ideas (Kieran, 2007, 2008, 2009).
An even more robust intervention design may be needed to alter students’
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mathematical thinking and reasoning. Rather than targeting reasoning processes directly,
such an intervention might focus instead on transforming the instrumental understanding
responsible for difficulties in meaning that can lead to misconceptions into relational
understanding. If a teaching intervention targets the development of meaning and
connections, then misconceptions that develop may be only a normal, temporary part of
the learning process (Resnick, 1983).
Mathematical Task Characteristics
Teachers typically introduce new concepts by presenting a task or problem as a
motivation for learning the mathematical concept. Rousseau (1976) identified eight task
characteristics that potentially influence how students internalize the meaning of the task
and its connection to the underlying concept: task identity, task autonomy, skill variety,
task variety, task feedback, task learning, dealing with others, and task significance. Task
identity refers to the ownership a student assumes for an activity. Task autonomy, closely
aligned with identity, focuses on the degree of independence students have in decision
making throughout a task. Skill variety emphasizes the breadth and depth of skills
required to complete a particular task. Task variety, on the other hand, refers to the
breadth of subjects and courses provided by a school. Task learning represents the
breadth and scope of opportunities for obtaining new skills, what Hiebert and Grouws
(2007) referred to as opportunity to learn. Task feedback speaks to the amount of
feedback students receive from a task versus the feedback from teachers. Catanzaro
(1997) maintained that task feedback creates a more stimulating, positive learning
environment over instructor feedback. Rousseau (1976) defined dealing with others as
“the opportunity to interact with teachers, teaching assistants and other faculty” (p. 3).
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Many researchers would also emphasize the importance of interactions with other
students (e.g., Berg, 1993; Freeman, 1997; Henderson & Landesman, 1995; Nichols &
Miller, 1994; Parham, 1993; Slavin & Karweit, 1982; Slavin & Lake, 2008; Slavin, Lake,
& Groff, 2009; Whicker, Bol, & Nunnery, 1997). Task significance represents student
perceptions of a particular task’s relevance to life beyond academic concerns. Rousseau
(1976) found that task significance may have the strongest impact of her eight task
characteristics.
Student Thought Processes Influencing Mathematical Misconceptions
Erroneous thinking resulting from misconceptions is often stable and robust,
interfering with a student’s ability to learn mathematics (Moschkovich, 1998).
Researchers tend to agree that a possible key to addressing these issues may lie in the
alignment of student thought processes with mathematical logic (e.g., Behr, 1980; Blanco
& Garrote, 2007; Collis, 1975; Enfedaque, 1990; Kieran, 1980; Palarea Medina, 1999;
Socas Robayna, 1997) and the connection of specific misconceptions to the student’s
larger knowledge framework (e.g., Moschkovich, 1998; Smith, diSessa, & Roschelle,
1993). This knowledge framework includes (at least) four components that can influence
whether a student develops relational or instrumental understanding: (1) Discernment; (2)
Orientation toward mathematics; (3) Individual context; and (4) Environmental Context.
Discernment. Discernment has been defined as an aspect of knowledge that
encompasses the active, cognitive components of learning (Ronau & Rakes, 2010;
Ronau, Rakes, Wagener, & Dougherty, 2009; Ronau, Wagener, & Rakes, 2009). Kant
(1786/1901) proposed that cognition is engaged through the process of perceptions
leading to conceptions, which in turn lead to ideas. Davis (1992), comparing Japanese to
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American tests, considered the influence of such perceptions to be paramount to deep
mathematical learning:
Perhaps 75 one-step problems on a test will produce about the
same ranking of students as will 6 multistep problems that require serious
thought (and perhaps some originality). But the message that they send to
students is entirely different. The one-step problems say to students, “You
do not have to do much hard thinking in mathematics, nor must you be
very creative; all you have to do is pay attention in class, memorize
dutifully, practice diligently, and you will get no surprises on the tests.”
The Japanese tests send a different message ⎯ rather more in the spirit of
the contest problems that a very few U.S. students encounter ⎯ where it is
more clear from the outset that, if you have developed nothing more than
routine skills, you will be hopelessly ineffective. You must strive for
ingenuity and originality (p. 725).
Davis (1992) went on to consider the meaning of mathematics from a cognitive
perspective. He gave three examples of problems whose solution required the addition of
whole numbers. These problems differed in the degree of decision making required about
each contextual situation prior to concluding that addition is needed for each.
Now, here is the main point behind these three examples: Most
people who have not had an opportunity to think seriously about such
matters would claim that the mathematics is that part of the problem that
the calculator did. They might find the decisions…or the choice of
arithmetical operations…to be thought provoking, but they would
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probably not consider them an essential part of the mathematics…they
might not even notice that there was any thinking involved other than the
computation that the calculator carried out. I would argue that such
observers are precisely wrong. There is very little mathematics in the
actual carrying out of the computations…The mathematics lies mainly in
analyzing the real situation and deciding how to represent it in an
appropriate abstract symbolic form (Davis, 1992, p. 727).
Schoenfeld (1992) agreed with Davis’ conceptualization of the nature of
mathematical learning. He added that mathematical problem solving requires a great deal
of metacognitive regulation and that such behavior is learned best through “domainspecific instruction” (p. 357). In an earlier work (Schoenfeld, 1982), he considered three
types of analysis to be important to mathematical problem solving: analysis of tactical
knowledge (i.e., domain-specific facts and procedures), analysis of control knowledge
(i.e., strategic/executive behavior), and analysis of belief systems. The analysis of control
knowledge speaks directly to metacognition, the regulation of cognitive processes.
Several other researchers have suggested that cognitive and meta-cognitive skills filter
student ability to understand mathematical concepts (Andrade & Valtcheva, 2009;
Dermitzaki, Leondari, & Goudas, 2009; Fuson et al., 2005; Lin, Schwartz, & Hatano,
2005; Nemirovsky & Ferrara, 2009; Usher, 2009). Swanson (1990) found that the
development of metacognition may operate independently of aptitude and may impact
learning more:
On the surface, it appears that high metacognitive skills can
compensate for overall ability by providing a certain knowledge about
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cognition. This knowledge allows low-aptitude/high-metacognitive
children to perform in ways similar to those of children with high aptitude.
Thus, one may argue that measures of metacognition and general aptitude
in the present study are tapping different forms of knowledge, and that
high performance on the problem-solving tasks is more closely related to
higher performance on the metacognitive measures than on the aptitude
measures (Swanson, 1990, p. 312).
Schraw and Dennison (1994) identified two constructs that measure
metacognition: knowledge of cognition and regulation of cognition. They found that,
although the two constructs are correlated, each may affect cognitive performance in a
unique way. Other studies have shown that students use these cognitively-based
discernment faculties to connect abstract concepts to concrete representations (e.g.,
Secada, 1992; Spillane, 2000; Von Minden, Walls, & Nardi, 1998).
Orientation toward mathematics. Schoenfeld’s (1982) third type of analysis
focused on student beliefs. He posited that student beliefs about the nature of a
mathematical task can greatly influence the degree of cognitive effort expended for the
task. Schoenfeld (1985) conducted a survey of 230 students in three high schools. He
found three aspects to student beliefs about mathematics. (1) Students in his sample
attributed success in mathematics to work rather than luck. (2) Students in his sample
disagreed that mathematics solutions were either “right” or “wrong.” They also declared
the importance of teaching multiple ways to solve mathematics problems. This response
surprised Schoenfeld because “very little of such teacher behavior was observed in the
classroom studies…their response suggests either a strong acceptance of the mythology
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about teaching, or some strong degree of wishful thinking” (p. 14). (3) Students view
mathematics learning as largely dependent on memorization while simultaneously
viewing it as a means to develop logical thinking.
McLeod (1992) agreed with Schoenfeld’s description of beliefs and attitudes as
components of affect; however, he added a third, distinct component category: emotions.
Emotional reactions to mathematics learning occur when students experience obstacles to
solutions. Such obstacles elicit negative feelings such as tension, frustration, fear,
anxiety, embarrassment, and panic. Once obstacles are overcome, positive emotions
return. He maintained that one goal of mathematics pedagogy should be to reduce the
occurrence of these negative emotions. From attitudes, beliefs, and attitudes, seven
subconstructs of affect emerge: confidence, self concept, self efficacy, anxiety, effort and
ability attributions, learned helplessness, and motivation.
Schoenfeld and Mcleod agreed that affect and cognition are linked (Schoenfeld,
1989; McLeod, 1992). Schoenfeld (1989) found that beliefs and attitudes influence the
way people develop conceptions about mathematics, directly and indirectly impacting
their mathematical ability. Barkatsas, Kasimatis, and Gialamas (2009) found that high
levels of mathematics achievement are associated with positive attitudes toward learning
mathematics; positive attitudes, in turn, are associated with mathematics confidence and
affective engagement. Ismail (2009) found that self-confidence appeared to supersede the
impact of socio-economic disadvantage on student achievement.
In summary, components of affect such as beliefs, attitudes, and emotions mold
student orientations toward mathematics. Pedagogical strategies within mathematics
influence the development of conceptions or misconceptions as a result of their attention
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to orientation.
Individual context. The contextual factors that students bring to a mathematical
learning situation interact in multiple ways to influence how students interpret
mathematical concepts. These individual context factors refer to characteristics such as
gender, race, culture, socio-economic status, parent education levels, background
experiences, and learning styles (Ronau et al., 2009; Ronau & Rakes, 2010; Ronau,
Wagener, & Rakes, 2009).
Evidence has suggested that boys and girls construct their understanding of
mathematics differently (Fennema & Sherman, 1977) and hold different attitudes toward
mathematics (Sherman & Fennema, 1978). Although moderate changes have occurred
over time, inequity between genders still exists (Carrell, Page, & West, 2009; Fennema,
2000; Mendick, 2008; Van Langen, Rekers-Mombarg, & Dekkers, 2008; Wei & Hendrix,
2009; Zohar & Gershikov, 2008).
Kozol (1992, 2005) examined educational practices across the country and
asserted that inequalities also continue to exist across racial lines. Snipes and Waters
(2005) agreed with Kozol’s assessment, conducting a case study in a single state.
Lubienski (2001) and Lim (2008) found that race and class interact to produce an effect
on mathematics achievement. Class measures include factors such as parent education
levels and socio-economic status (SES). Parent education levels, one measure of SES,
significantly predicted above average achievement during the Third International Math
and Science Study (TIMSS; Schreiber, 2000). Lehrer, Strom, and Confrey (2002) found
that prior mathematical experiences influence student orientation toward mathematics.
Anderson (1990) asserted that cultural influences overshadow gender and racial effects
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on equity in student achievement. Nelson, Joseph, & Williams (1993) agreed with
Anderson, claiming that culture also has a direct bearing on affect. Strutchens (1995)
proposed the use of a five-dimensional framework for increasing equity in mathematics
education: content integration, knowledge construction, prejudice reduction, equitable
pedagogy, and empowering school and social culture.
Alomar (2007) and Esposito Lamy (2003) linked gender, race, culture, and affect
with family variables such as parenting style and poverty. Lopez, Gallimore, Garnier, and
Reese (2007) found that for immigrant populations, family factors influence English
language literacy, which in turn affects student mathematics achievement.
Personal characteristics such as learning styles, personality, and temperament also
influence how students learn mathematics. The Silver-Strong studies (Silver, Brunsting,
& Walsh, 2008; Silver, Strong, & Perini, 1997; Strong, Perini, Silver, & Thomas, 2004;
Strong, Silver, & Perini, 2001) together with the work of Keirsey (1998) suggest a link
between learning styles and personality. Keirsey (1998) described personality in terms of
the Myers-Briggs notation. In this framework, a person may be Introverted (I) or
extraverted (E); rely more on intuition (N) or the senses (S) to interpret a situation; rely
more on feelings (F) or thinking (T) to make decisions; and, prefer routine (J for
judgment) or sponteneity (P for perceiving), resulting in 16 different personality styles
that he grouped into four categories with internal reliability ratings between 0.82 and 0.83
(Alpine Media Corporation, 2003). Silver et al. (1997) used the same constructs to
determine four categories of learning styles: Mastery, Understanding, Interpersonal, and
Self-Expressive Learners. The dependence on these two frameworks on the Myers-Briggs
constructs (Myers, 1962) suggests a possible link between learning styles and personality.
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These frameworks directly map onto one another (Table 7).
Table 7
Alignment of Keirsey Personality Framework with Silver-Strong Learning Styles
Silver-Strong
Values and Educational
Associated Keirsey
Learning Style
Preferences
Personality Types
Mastery
Value: Clarity and Practicality
Guardian Administrators:
Prefer: procedure, drill and practice, concrete,
ISTJ; ESTJ
closed questioning.
Artisan Operators:
ISTP; ESTP
Understanding
Value: Logic and Evidence
All Rational Subgroups:
Prefer: logic, debate, inquiry, indendent study,
INTJ; INTP
argumentation, and why questions.
ENTJ; ENTP
Interpersonal
Value: The ability to help others
Guardian Conservators:
Prefer: topics that affect lives,
ISFJ; ESFJ
cooperative/collaborative learning, and teacher Artisan Entertainers:
attention to successes and struggles.
ISFP; ESFP
Self Expressive
Value: Originality and aesthetics
All Idealist Subgroups:
Prefer: use of imagination to explore ideas,
INFJ; INFP
creative artistic activity, open-ended
ENFJ; ENFP
questions, and generating possibilities and
alternatives.

Understanding the role of values and preferences of the various types of learners
directly impacts the equitable teaching of mathematics (Gardner & Hatch, 1989). Second,
the traditional mathematics education described by Fey (1979) that still continues today
(Hiebert, 2003; Hiebert & Grouws, 2007; Stigler & Hiebert, 1997) targets mastery
learners almost exclusively, while they account for only about 35% of the population
(Silver et al., 1997). In smaller samples, such as a single high school, the mastery learners
have been found to account for far lower percentages (24% in Tungate, 2008). That
mathematics teachers tend to be mastery learners themselves seems likely and would
account for the disproportionate bent toward traditional practices.
Personality has been framed most prominently as five major constructs known as
“The Big Five:” Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Neuroticism, and
Openness to Experience (Ahadi & Rothbart, 1994, p. 189) . Personality emerges from
temperament, but assessment of adult personality may not map directly from
temperament (Rothbart, Ahadi, & Evans, 2000). For example, cognitive self-concept may
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supersede temperamental tendencies (i.e., beliefs about how a person would like to be,
should be, and is in reality are difficult to separate).
Posner and Rothbart (2007), Rothbart and Jones (1998), Rueda, Rothbart,
Saccomanno, and Posner (2007) and Rudasill (2009) asserted that Attention, one
temperament factor, may influence the learning of mathematics both directly and
indirectly. “Everywhere in cognitive neuroscience, specific brain networks seem to
underlie performance. However, some of those networks have the improtant property of
being able to modify the activity in other networks” (Posner & Rothbart, 2007, pp. 1516).
In brief, individual factors such as gender, race, class, personality, learning styles,
and background experiences interact to influence orientation and cognition in
mathematics. Moreover, evidence suggests that temperament may be a critical individual
learning factor. Equitable mathematics teaching requires the consideration of the unique
effects of these individual context factors.
Environmental Context. Environmental factors interact with individual factors to
influence the equitability of learning opportunities in mathematics. Controversy over the
importance of environmental factors on learning lasted for decades, beginning with the
publication of Equality of Educational Opportunities, more commonly known as The
Coleman Report (Coleman et al., 1966). This study examined the achievement impact of
differences between races on: school factors such as class size, access to chemistry,
physics, and language laboratories, number of books in libraries, number of textbooks;
teacher and principal characteristics such as type of college attended, years of teaching
experience, salary, maternal education level, vocabulary ability, and dispositions; and
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student characteristics such as parental background, presence of parents at home, size of
family, parental expectations, parental involvement, and socio-economic status. Equality
fundamentally altered definitions of equality from simply comparing resource “inputs” to
analyzing the effects of inputs on educational achievements (Coleman, 1967a). Coleman
(1967b) considered the complexity of implicit assumptions present within an input-based
notion of equality:
It is one thing to take as given that approximately 60% of an
entering high school freshman class will not attend college; but to assign a
particular child to a curriculum designed for that 60% closes off for that
child the opportunity to attend college. Yet to assign all children to a
curriculum designed for the 40% who will attend college creates
inequality for those who, at the end of high school, fall among the 60%
who do not attend college… there is a wide variety of different paths that
adolescents take on the completion of secondary school (Coleman, 1967b,
p. 9).
Instead, Equality examined inequality based on five different criteria: degree of
racial segregation, allocation of resources, teacher orientations, weighted resource inputs
based on achievement predictability, and output (e.g., achievement, career choice)
differences (Coleman, 1968). Equality found that student characteristics accounted for the
majority of variance in achievement and of the impact of teacher characteristics on
learning. For example, Coleman et al. (1966) reported that teacher variables accounted
for 2.06% of the variation in mathematics achievement for Black students but only 0.61%
for White students (p. 294). They concluded that “variations in school quality are not
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highly related to variations in achievement of pupils” (p. 297). However, technology
capabilities of the time limited the researchers’ analytic capabilities (Stringfield &
Teddlie, 2004). Later studies (e.g., Bryk & Raudenbush, 1988; Raudenbush & Bryk,
1984) took advantage of technological advancements by conducting multilevel analyses
on the subsets of the Coleman et al. (1966) data set:
The results were startling ⎯ 83% of the variance in [learning]
growth rates was between schools. In contrast, only about 14% of the
variance in initial status was between schools…this analysis identified
substantial differences among schools that conventional models would not
have detected (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2004, pp. 9-10).
Recent studies have continued to emphasize the importance of environmental
factors on students learning. Hegedus and Kaput (2004) found that the way classroom
activities are organized affects the potential depth of student understanding. Cobb,
Gresalfi, and Hodge (2009) found that cultures within a classroom influence the
development of personal identities in mathematics. LaRocque (2008) found that student
perceptions of the classroom environment are associated with reading and mathematics
achievement. She noted that the interaction of perception with gender was not statistically
significant but that the interaction of perception with grade level was significant.
McMahon, Wernsman, and Rose (2009) agreed with LaRocque’s findings that
perceptions of classroom difficulty are strong predictors of mathematics and science selfefficacy. Bong (2008) found that classroom goal structures influence student perceptions
of mathematics learning. She also found that relationships influence perceptions of
learning. In like manner, Carter (2008) described the impact of having a classroom
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climate that values the struggle of connecting mathematical concepts to current
conceptions. She concluded that such a climate enhances student self efficacy and
confidence. Similarly, Murayama and Elliot (2009) concluded that classroom goal
structures influence the development of intrinsic motivation.
Amenkhienan and Kogan (2004) concluded that the student-teacher relationship
influences the amount of learning that occurs. Stemler, Elliott, Grigorenko, & Sternberg
(2006) proposed a framework for interpersonal relationships with teachers, noting that the
work of teaching is largely social in nature. Likewise, Hughes and Kwok (2007)
identified teacher relationships with both parents and students as mediating factors of
student motivation and achievement. They also noted an interaction between race and the
amount of teacher support received. Osterman (2000) summarized research findings on
the interaction of student belongingness and school and classroom conditions with
motivation and achievement:
Research also tells us that conditions in the classroom and school
influence students’ feelings about themselves; these in turn are reflected in
student engagement and achievement. Not all students experience
alienation to the same extent, yet, for the most part, students and
researchers describe schools as alienating institutions…While the “peer
culture” may establish norms dress and behavior, it is not necessarily one
that satisfies students’ need for belongingness (p. 360).
Stipek (2006) added to Osterman’s findings:
Learning requires effort, and one of the best predictors of students’
effort and engagement in school is the relationships they have with their
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teachers…To promote high academic standards, teachers need to create
supportive social contexts and develop positive relationships with students
(p. 46).
Accordingly, the impact of the learning environment and student perceptions of
that environment interact with individual context but also act as a distinct component to
student learning.
Putting the Model Together
Figure 10 offers a pictorial interpretation of how the characteristics of a task and
of a student’s knowledge framework may operate within a mathematics classroom
learning environment. Procedural knowledge isolated from conceptual knowledge and the
connections between ideas results in instrumental understanding (Skemp, 1976/2006).
Instrumental understanding may result in a cycle of misconceptions and faulty reasoning
reinforcing each other and weakening a student’s knowledge framework for
understanding future tasks. When conceptual knowledge and procedural knowledge
develop together, they reinforce each other and strengthen a student’s knowledge
framework for future tasks. When students complete a task, teachers have limited
opportunities to assess the knowledge framework and thought processes that lead to a
response; instead, assessment usually focuses on whether or not a response was correct.
Unfortunately, correct responses do not necessarily indicate that a student understands the
mathematical concepts completely. Figure 10 therefore includes the possibility that
correct responses can be produced even with erroneous reasoning, and if unchecked, that
reasoning will reinforce misconceptions and erroneous reasoning, thereby weakening a
student’s knowledge framework for understanding future tasks.
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Resnick (1983) suggested that errors often occur when students look for meaning
in situations where the given information is incomplete. In such cases, students often
attempt to use their prior knowledge to fill in the gaps and yielding misconceptions. Thus
Resnick (1983) found that working through these difficulties may be a normal part of the
learning process and that combating misconceptions and faulty reasoning must become
an expected part of the struggle that is so critical to deep conceptual learning as Hiebert
and Grouws (2007) later pointed out. Moschkovich (1998) agreed with Resnick when she
noted refinement of understanding as a primary goal of teaching: “We need to understand
the process of conceptual change that enables learners to transform and refine their
conceptions to more closely fit with the desired understanding” (p. 209).
Tracing the root causes of errors and recognizing erroneous reasoning requires an
examination of student explanations about their reasoning processes. Previous
interventions targeting specific errors or the underlying reasoning have met with limited
success (e.g., Clement, 1982; Fisher, 1988; Phillippe, 1992; Rosnick & Clement, 1979),
possibly because these interventions may have targeted the error instead of the latent
reasoning and misconception that led to the error. Furthermore, students with
misconceptions and faulty reasoning may produce correct answers; as a result,
interventions focusing on errors may miss unobservable erroneous reasoning.
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The rationale for using probability instruction as an intervention targets these
concerns: (1) Focusing on connections between probability concepts and algebra,
geometry, and rational number concepts may help students develop relational
understanding; (2) Probability instruction focuses on developing meaning rather than
eliminating errors; therefore, if students produce correct answers for incorrect reasons,
the development of meaning may help alter the misunderstandings that led to the
errorneous reasoning; and, (3) Probability simulations and experiments offer concrete
explorations for students investigating complex, abstract mathematical phenomena that
often lead to misunderstanding, misconception, and faulty reasoning.
Summary and Research Questions
Research into misconceptions is necessarily problematic due to the latent nature
of those misconceptions. Researchers must rely on observable errors and discern whether
those errors are due to faulty reasoning despite having solid relational understanding of
concepts or if they are due to misunderstanding about the meaning and connections of
mathematical ideas.
Students encounter special difficulties when transitioning from whole numbers to
rational numbers and from arithmetic to algebra. They often struggle to determine when
linear proportions are or are not appropriate. They also have difficulty distinguishing
between additive and multiplicative relationships. These difficulties appear in the study
of rational numbers, algebra, geometry, and probability and often create obstacles to
constructing meaning and connecting the meaning of ideas within structured
relationships. While these difficulties are equally poignant in the learning of probability,
the concepts within probability offer significantly more opportunities for simulations and
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experiments that help bridge the gap between abstract ideas and concrete examples.
Probability, however, is often deleted or minimized from the curriculum due to
time constraints and/or teacher insecurity with the material. The interconnectedness of
common mathematical misconceptions across probability, algebra, and geometry coupled
with the limited training students receive in probability and the significant potential of
probability experiments to bridge abstract mathematical concepts with concrete examples
suggests the possibility that probability instruction holds the key to alleviating
fundamental mathematics misconceptions. To explore this potential, the present study
will examine the following four research questions:
1) Do probability misconceptions have a causal influence on algebra, geometry,
and rational number misconceptions?
2) Does probability instruction reduce critical misconceptions in probability,
rational numbers, algebra, or geometry?
3) Do student attitudes toward mathematics influence the emergence of errors
due to misconceptions on mathematical tasks?
4) Does student metacognition influence the emergence of errors due to
misconceptions on mathematical tasks?
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CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY
The present study examines the structure of mathematical misconceptions in high
school and the impact of attitudes toward mathematics and metacognitive knowledge and
skills on the development of misconceptions. Additionally, the possible role of
probability instruction as an intervention for mathematical misconceptions will be
assessed.
The measurement of mathematical misconceptions is inherently problematic due
to the latent nature of those misconceptions. For example, Zawojewski and Shaughnessy
(2000) pointed out the inadequacy of simple multiple choice tests to identify the thought
patterns that result in a particular answer. Instead, they recommended including a
qualitative component to each question to provide clues to underlying student thinking. In
order to include that strategy in the instruments used in this study, an initial assessment of
student responses was necessary to determine the source of student reasoning errors. For
example, were reasoning errors occurring on a particular due to a lack of relational
understanding, despite having relational understanding, or due to a more fundamental
misunderstanding of foundational mathematical ideas? The results of that analysis,
presented in Chapter 4, were used to code errors for the subsequent quantitative analyses.
As such, the design of this study falls within the mixed methodology design as described
by Tashakkori and Teddlie (1998).
This chapter contains a description of the probability unit that will serve as the
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intervention along with the design of the study and its rationale, threats to validity, the
assessment instruments and their reliability coefficients, and data analysis techniques.
Research Design
Subjects
The present study was conducted with 19 mathematics teachers recruited from
four schools in three Kentucky school districts with 1,142 students enrolled in their 53
algebra and geometry classes. All elements of the protocol were approved by the
University of Louisville’s Internal Review Board for the protection of human subjects in
research, as required by federal regulations (Protection of Human Subjects, 2009).
Design Description
The present study used a randomly assigned untreated control group with a pretest
and switching replication (Equation 14; Shadish et al., 2002).

R O ATMI/MAI O NAEP
R O ATMI/MAI O NAEP

X O ATMI/MAI O NAEP
O ATMI/MAI O NAEP
O ATMI/MAI O NAEP X O ATMI/MAI O NAEP

(14)

The outcome of interest for the analysis of the intervention is the rate of growth
during the treatment period; the collection of pretest data removes pre-existing
differences as a source of group difference. Use of a control group allowed a comparison
of growth rates in the intervention group and the normal rate of growth without the
intervention thereby minimizing history and maturation threats to validity. Classes for
each teacher were randomly assigned to treatment conditions using Microsoft Excel 2007
and Minitab 15 statistical software to minimize any selection threats to validity. The
switching replication fulfilled two purposes: (1) The ethical obligations of research
demand that all students receive the intervention instruction; (2) The post-post test
provided data on the retention of intervention effects for follow-up studies.
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Probability Instruction Intervention
The intervention for this study was a probability unit designed to provide students
multiple opportunities to explore the meaning of fundamental mathematical concepts
rather than targeting specific error patterns. Because the relationship between probability
and algebra differs from that of probability and geometry, the probability concepts
studied in each class varied.
In algebra, the intervention consisted of five lessons. The length of instruction
varied across schools and teachers to accommodate the dynamics of particular classes.
From a teaching perspective, such adjustments should be encouraged since students learn
at varying paces. On the other hand, a research design perspective recognizes that such
adjustments pose a history threat to internal validity. For example, events occurring
concurrently with the treatment could cause the observed effect rather than the
intervention itself (Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002). Since the alternative of rigorously
abiding by a timeline would also have increased the risk of multiple threats to validity, I
chose to stay in close communication with each teacher about adjustments made to the
timeline. For most teachers, the intervention lasted approximately ten 90-minute class
periods. The overall topics for these lessons were:
1. Statistical structure (Appendix A and B)
2. Randomness (Appendix C and D)
3. Counting principles (Appendix E and F)
4. Event probability (Appendix G, H, and I)
5. Probability distributions (Appendix J and K)
In geometry, the intervention consisted of three lessons, normally lasting
approximately six 90-minute class periods. The overall topics for these lessons were:
94

1. Counting principles (Appendix E and F)
2. Geometry probability (Appendix G and I)
3. Probability distributions (Appendix J and L)
Teachers were also provided lesson plans for classes in the control condition;
most, however, chose to continue with their normal instructional sequence. Boston &
Smith (2009) suggested that teacher-made materials may not offer students the same
degree of cognitive load. Furthermore, teacher-made materials increase the potential
unreliability of treatment implementation threat to statistical conclusion validity (Shadish
et al., 2002). To manage this threat, classes were randomly assigned within teachers so
that teacher effects were distributed across both to treatment conditions. Classroom
observations and teacher interviews were conducted to measure the degree of
heterogeneity between groups.
Instrumentation
Three instruments were used to measure student mathematics knowledge, student
attitudes toward mathematics, and student metacognitive knowledge and skills. The
mathematics knowledge instrument was used to account for pre-existing mathematics
knowledge and ability. It was also used to analyze error response patterns to determine
which errors emerged from mathematical misconceptions or from non-conceptual
reasoning errors.
Mathematics Knowledge Instrument
Items for the mathematics knowledge instrument (Appendix N) were gathered
from National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) released items
(U.S.Department of Education, 1996, 2005, 2007). Although all 17 items remained as
given by NAEP, a prompt was included for each question asking students to explain how
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or why they chose their response.
NAEP items are rigorously developed, using review boards, pilot testing, classical
test theory, and Item Response Theory to analyze item performance (U.S.Department of
Education, 2008a). These items were deemed to have high content validity for the NAEPassociated content areas.
These items included rational number, probability, algebra, and geometry content.
Table 8 provides a description of each NAEP item used in the assessment instrument
along with the reported reliability coefficients for each item block (U.S. Department of
Education, 2008b, 2008c, 2008d, 2008e). These items were chosen based on two criteria:
(1) The item content matched the foundational concepts that research has suggested
connect rational number, probability, algebra, and geometry misconceptions closely
enough to be able to detect intervention effects; and, (2) The item content and wording
did not so closely match the activities and problems in the probability unit that the
treatment group would receive an unfair advantage over the control group. Table 8
presents the classical test theory difficulty coefficient (i.e., percent correct), the NAEP
classification of difficulty and complexity level of each item with respect to the intended
grade level of the item, and the internal consistency of the associated block of items as
they appeared on the NAEP instruments.
.
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Table 8
Reported NAEP Item Performance
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Item

Release
Year

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

2007
2005
2007
2005
2007
2005
1996
2007
2007
2005
2005

12

2005

13

2005

14

2007

15

2007

16
17

2007
2005

Content
Strand
Probability
Probability
Probability
Probability
Algebra
Algebra
Algebra
Algebra
Geometry
Geometry
Geometry
Rational
Number
Rational
Number
Rational
Number
Rational
Number
Algebra
Probability

Percent
Correct

Grade
Level

Difficulty

Complexity

NAEP
Block

Relative versus absolute comparison
Determine Conditional Probability
Repeated Sampling Probability
Dependent probability
Convert temperature units
Effect of variable change
Additive versus Multiplicative Structure
Solve algebraic word problem
Determine if a shape is a parallelogram
Area of shaded figure
Find dimensions from scale drawing

45%
49.5%
60%
18%
35%
34%
58%
47%
26%
77%
85%

Grade 4
Grade 12
Grade 8
Grade 8
Grade 8
Grade 8
Grade 8
Grade 8
Grade 8
Grade 8
Grade 12

Medium
Medium
Medium
Hard
Hard
Hard
Medium
Medium
Hard
Easy
Easy

Low
Low
Low
Moderate
Low
Moderate
Moderate
Moderate
Low
Moderate

M7
M12
M11
M12
M9
M3
M3
M11
M11
M4
M12

Cronbach
Coefficient
α
0.80
0.73
0.76
0.75
0.80
0.76
0.53
0.76
0.76
0.77
0.75

Rational Number Quantity Meaning

66%

Grade 12

Easy

Low

M3

0.73

Given the scale, determine length of side

56%

Grade 12

Medium

Low

M4

0.79

Arrange fractions in ascending order

49%

Grade 8

Medium

Low

M9

0.80

Determine fraction of figure shaded

89%

Grade 8

Easy

Low

M11

0.76

Determine equation to represent table.
Determine amount from probability

54%
40%

Grade 8
Grade 8

Medium
Medium

Moderate
Low

M7
M4

0.78
0.77

Content

Since the items were chosen from different blocks, the NAEP-reported
coefficients do not necessarily represent the internal consistency of the new instrument
compiled for the present study. Therefore, the pooled internal consistency of the new
instrument was re-assessed using the pretest data (α = 0.791, 95% CI [0.773, 0.808]) and
the posttest data (α = 0.772, 95% CI [0.751, 0.773]) and found to have adequate internal
consistency. The correlation of each item (Table 9) between the pre- and post-tests were
computed to measure test-retest reliability (i.e., stability). The correlations were moderate
and significant (p < 0.001) for all items except Item 17, which was only significant at the
93% confidence level (p = 0.068). Overall, the stability of the items appeared to be
acceptable (Table 9).
Table 9
Stability Correlations Between the Pre- and Post-Test Data for each Item
Item
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Correlation 0.491 0.173 0.273 0.310 0.277 0.217 0.422 0.308
Item
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
Correlation 0.354 0.385 0.268 0.154 0.460 0.300 0.325 0.083

9
0.279

10
0.354

11
0.385

Content validity of content area alignment to national, state, and local standards
was evaluated by the NAEP Validity Studies Panel. Daro, Stancavage, Ortega,
DeStefano, & Linn (2007) examined the content coverage, skill coverage, alignment to
NAEP framework, lack of philosophical bias, lack of ability bias, and representativeness
of information provided about students. They found that 96% of NAEP 2005 and 2007
items demonstrated adequate or marginal quality.
Item Response Theory (IRT) was applied to measure the characteristics of
difficulty, discrimination (i.e., the ability to distinguish between groups, in this case,
ability levels), and guessing for each item. IRT, unlike Classical Test Theory (CTT),
focuses on the correctness or incorrectness of each item individually rather than a raw
cumulative score (Baker & Kim, 2004). In CTT, difficulty is defined as the percentage of
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correct responses for an item (as in Table 12, means for pretest items and Table 13,
means for posttest items). CTT discrimination is typically measured as the point-biserial
correlation for each item. One problem with CTT is the circular dependence of observed
scores and samples (Fan, 1998).
IRT is based on the item characteristic curve, which is computed using a logistic
function. The curve can be computed as a Rausch model (1 parameter, item difficulty),
2PL (2 parameters, item difficulty and discrimination), or 3PL (3 parameters, item
difficulty, discrimination, and guessing). The logistic function for the 3-PL curve is
P (θ ) = c + (1 − c )

1
1+ e

− a (θ − b )

(15)

where:
a represents the discrimination coefficient
b represents the difficulty coefficient
c represents the guessing coefficient
θ represents the ability level of the respondent
ParScale 4.1 (Muraki & Bock, 2002) uses an iterative process to compute the item
characteristic curve. In the first iteration, ability levels (θ) for each subject were
computed. These values become the starting point for the second iteration, which is used
to compute the values for a, b, and c. The guessing coefficient, c. was estimated as c = 0
for all 17 items. Therefore, the model reduced to a 2PL curve, and the values for a and b
were computed for each item (Table 10).
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Table 10
IRT Coefficients for NAEP Items
Item
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

Discrimination, a
0.570
0.630
0.693
0.962
0.827
0.570
1.192
0.730
0.428
0.918
1.224
0.879
0.876
0.861
0.883
1.036
0.744

Difficulty, b
-0.618
0.379
-0.205
-0.090
-0.175
0.930
-0.273
0.430
-1.308
-0.446
-0.080
0.149
0.246
0.311
-0.554
0.203
0.525

Note: SE for all 17 items for both a and b was < 0.001

The item characteristic curves (Figure 11) can be used to compare the behavior of
each item. For each curve, the horizontal axis represents difficulty, b, and the vertical axis
represents the ability, θ.

Figure 11. Item Characteristic Curves for NAEP Mathematics Knowledge Instrument
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None of the curves in Figure 11 leveled off at the top or bottom, indicating no
ceiling or floor effects. The difficulty of an item is defined as the point on the item
characteristic curve for which the ability level is average, θ = 0.5. The discrimination of
the item, a, is defined as the slope of the curve. Being a highly difficult item does not
necessarily mean that an item is also highly discriminating across ability levels. Consider
a comparison of Items 6 and 7 (Figure 12).

Figure 12. Comparison of Item Curves for Items 6 and 7

The difficulty of Item 6 was 0.93 while the difficulty of Item 7 was -0.27, so Item
6 was the more difficult of the two items. The slope, however, of Item 7 (1.192) was
steeper than the slope of Item 6 (0.570); this characteristic means that although Item 6
was more difficult than Item 7, Item 7 discriminated between ability levels more than
Item 6.
The discrimination of items on the mathematics knowledge test ranged from
0.428 (less differences between high and low ability students) to 1.192 (more differences
between high and low ability students). The difficulty ranged from -1.308 (Easy) to 0.930
(Hard). Because the discrimination levels did not approach 0 (no differences between
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high and low ability students), and the difficulty levels did not indicate that any items
were extremely easy (approaching -3 and +3), the item characteristics were considered
appropriate for the planned analyses.
Mathematics Attitudes Inventory
Student orientation was measured using the Attitude Toward Mathematics
Inventory (ATMI; Appendix O; Tapia & Marsh, 2004). This instrument was selected
because its subscales have been extensively analyzed to establish high reliability and
content validity (Tapia & Marsh, 2004). The subscales for this inventory were developed
from multiple literature sources to maximize concurrent construct validity. According to
the Tapia and Marsh report, the ATMI measures four orientation constructs. Factor 1, self
confidence, consists of 15 items with a reported Cronbach alpha of 0.95. Factors 2 and 3,
perceptions of the value of mathematics and enjoyment of mathematics, each contain 10
items with a Cronbach alpha of 0.89. Factor 4, motivation to learn mathematics, contains
five items with a Cronbach alpha of 0.88.
The internal consistency for the full instrument and each subscale was measured
using the present study data to determine their reliabilities (Table 11).
Table 11
Internal Consistency Reliability for ATMI
Observed
Scale
Cronbach Alpha
Full Instrument
0.943
Factor 1: Self Confidence
0.909
Factor 2: Value
0.876
Factor 3: Enjoyment
0.798
Factor 4: Motivation
0.824

95% Confidence
Interval
[0.938, 0.949]
[0.901, 0.918]
[0.864, 0.888]
[0.778, 0.817]
[0.806, 0.842]

The observed reliability coefficients for the present study data appeared to be
comparable to those reported by Tapia and Marsh (2004) and had values higher than the
typical threshold of 0.7 (Urbina, 2004). The reliabilities were, therefore, determined to be
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acceptable.
MetaCognition Inventory
Student metacognition knowledge and skills were measured using the
Metacognitive Awareness Inventory (MAI; Appendix P; Schraw & Dennison, 1994).
This instrument was selected because of its unique subscales of metacognition,
knowledge of cognition and regulation of cognition and because it has been rigorously
tested through two experiments to establish concurrent construct validity for each block
of items. Three types of knowledge are measured as components of knowledge of
cognition: (1) Declarative knowledge, defined as knowledge of learning and of one’s own
cognitive skills and abilities; (2) Procedural knowledge, knowledge of how to use various
cognitive strategies; and, (3) Conditional knowledge, knowledge of when to use
particular cognitive strategies and why those strategies should be used. Under the
regulation of cognition, five components are measured: (1) Planning, including goal
setting and allocation of resources; (2) Organizing and managing information; (3)
Monitoring, reflection on cognitive processes during a learning task; (4) Debugging,
strategies for correcting performance errors or assumptions; and, (5) Evaluation,
reflection on cognitive processes after a learning task is completed (G. Schraw, personal
communication, May 31, 2009). Schraw and Dennison (1994) also reported high internal
consistency for the whole instrument (α = 0.93) and both metacognition factors (α =
0.88). The internal consistency for the full instrument and each subscale was measured
using the present study data to determine their reliabilities (Table 12).
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Table 12
Internal Consistency Reliability for MAI
Scale
Full Instrument
Factor 1: Knowledge of Cognition
Declarative Knowledge
Procedural Knowledge
Conditional Knowledge
Factor 2: Regulation of Cognition
Planning
Organizing
Monitoring
Debugging
Evaluation

Observed
Cronbach Alpha
0.946
0.870
0.744
0.615
0.668
0.924
0.727
0.788
0.735
0.694
0.673

95% Confidence
Interval
[0.941, 0.951]
[0.857, 0.882]
[0.718, 0.768]
[0.573, 0.654]
[0.633, 0.700]
[0.917, 0.932]
[0.699, 0.752]
[0.767, 0.808]
[0.708, 0.760]
[0.662, 0.725]
[0.639, 0.705]

The observed reliability coefficients for the full instrument and two main factors
demonstrated high internal consistency. Several of the sub-factors showed marginal
reliabilities (α < 0.7), so only the two main factors were used in the subsequent analysis
of contextual factors.
Missing Data
Rubin (1987) classified missing data due to non-response as either unit nonresponse, meaning that the subject refused to answer any of the items, and item nonresponse, meaning that the subject skipped questions.
Unit and Item Non-Response
The ATMI and MAI surveys of the present study included both types of nonresponse. Forty six students did not respond to any items on either survey; 63 additional
students did not respond to a majority of items, ending at various points throughout the
survey (Table 13). The format of the questionnaire may shed light on the most typical
pattern of unit non-response: The front of the survey form included the ATMI and the
first three questions of the MAI. Questions 4 – 52 of the MAI (i.e., the back of the
survey) were the most commonly skipped questions. Based on this pattern, which may
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well be the result of bias in the non-response patterns, I concluded that most nonresponse on the MAI was due to the presentation format of the instrument.
The NAEP achievement data, both pre- and post-test, consisted of very low
proportions of missing data. On the pretest, missing data accounted for 5.6% of the
entries across all items and subjects, and only 11 students (< 1%) did not respond to any
items (Table 13). On the posttest, missing data accounted for 6.5% of the entries across
all items and subjects, and only 12 students (1.1%) did not respond to any items.
Table 13
Sources of Missing Data
Instrument N
Unit Non-Response
(No items answered)
ATMI
964
46 (4.6%)

MAI

964

109 (11.3%)

Pretest

1142

11 (0.96%)

Posttest

1021

12 (1.1%)

Item Non-Response
• 0 of 40 items with full data
• 256 (26.6%) cases missing at least one value
• 2,457 of 16,388 (6.4%) values missing
• 0 of 52 items with full data
• 316 (32.8%) cases missing at least one value
• 6,060 of 16,388 (12.1%) values missing
• 0 of 17 items with full data
• 242 (21.4%) cases missing at least one value
• 1093 of 19,278 (5.6%) values missing
• 0 of 17 items with full data
• 248 (24.3%) cases missing at least one value
• 1121 of 17,357 (6.5%) values missing

Imputation of Missing Data
Multiple imputation is an expansion of multiple regression imputation that uses
Bayesian inference from observed data using probability models to impute values for the
missing data. The process of multiple imputation begins by estimating a probability
model for the observed data (the prior distribution). The process continues by computing
a conditional probability distribution based on the observed data (Gelman, Carlin, Stern,
& Rubin, 2004). First, the model regresses each missing data point on every other
variable. Second, the true value for the missing data point is considered the mean of a
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distribution. Sampling error will therefore result in a potentially different value each time
a multiple regression imputation is run. To account for this variance, multiple imputation
creates any number of complete data sets. Rubin (1987) suggested that three to ten
imputation sets are needed to account for variance in missing data. Brick, Jones, Kalton,
and Valliant (2005) and Garson (2009) suggested that five sets are typically used. Each
data set is used in subsequent analyses, and the results of each analysis are averaged. To
complete the overall analysis, standard errors for each resulting point estimate are
computed. Table 14 presents the sample sizes, means, and standard deviations for each
imputed data set for the pretest and surveys, which were administered at the same time.
Imputation 0 represents the unimputed data set after listwise deletion.
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Table 14
Means and Standard Error for Pretest and Survey Data Set
Imputation
5
4
Pretest Misconception Responses
Sample Size (N)
1133
1133
Mean Ratio
0.361
0.361
Standard Error
0.006
0.006
T ratio from Imputation 0
1.381
1.381
Pretest Correct Responses
Sample Size (N)
1133
1133
Mean
0.480
0.481
Standard Error
0.007
0.007
T ratio from Imputation 0
-2.143* -2.000*
ATMI Enjoyment
Sample Size (N)
921
921
Mean
2.960
2.959
Standard Error
0.026
0.026
T ratio from Imputation 0
0.038
0.000
ATMI Motivation
Sample Size (N)
921
921
Mean
2.953
2.952
Standard Error
0.030
0.030
T ratio from Imputation 0
-0.131
-0.164
ATMI Value
Sample Size (N)
921
921
Mean
3.528
3.527
Standard Error
0.025
0.025
T ratio from Imputation 0
-0.160
-0.200
ATMI Self Confidence
Sample Size (N)
921
921
Mean
3.217
3.220
Standard Error
0.026
0.026
T ratio from Imputation 0
-0.077
0.038
MAI Knowledge of Cognition
Sample Size (N)
921
921
Mean
3.423
3.427
Standard Error
0.021
0.021
T ratio from Imputation 0
-0.930
-0.744
MAI Regulation of Cognition
Sample Size (N)
921
921
Mean
3.214
3.223
Standard Error
0.019
0.019
T ratio from Imputation 0
-0.359
0.103
*t > 1.96, p < 0.05

3

2

1

0

1133
0.363
0.0063
1.652

1133
0.362
0.006
1.534

1133
0.362
0.006
1.534

900
0.352
0.007
-

1133
0.481
0.007
-2.000*

1133
0.481
0.007
-2.000*

1133
0.480
0.007
-2.143*

900
0.495
0.007
-

921
2.950
0.026
-0.346

921
2.959
0.026
0.000

921
2.962
0.026
0.115

918
2.959
0.026
-

921
2.947
0.030
-0.328

921
2.952
0.030
-0.164

921
2.956
0.030
-0.033

911
2.957
0.031
-

921
3.527
0.025
-0.200

921
3.529
0.025
-0.120

921
3.530
0.025
-0.080

919
3.532
0.025
-

921
3.215
0.026
-0.154

921
3.218
0.026
-0.038

921
3.219
0.026
0.000

916
3.219
0.026
-

921
3.422
0.021
-0.976

921
3.435
0.021
-0.372

921
3.424
0.021
-0.883

893
3.443
0.022
-

921
3.216
0.020
-0.250

921
3.220
0.019
-0.051

921
3.213
0.019
-0.410

894
3.221
0.020
-

In addition to the means and standard deviations displayed in Tables 12, Figures 13 – 20
display the frequency distribution for each data set for each variable.
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Figure 13. Pretest Percent Correct Data Distributions.
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Figure 14. Pretest Percent Misconception Data Distributions.
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Figure 15. ATMI Enjoyment of Mathematics Data Distributions.
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Figure 16. ATMI Mathematics Motivation Data Distributions.
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Figure 17. ATMI Mathematics Self Confidence Data Distributions.
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Figure 18. ATMI Value of Mathematics Data Distributions.
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Figure 19. MAI Knowledge of Cognition Data Distributions.

1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5
0

1

2
80
60

Frequency

40
20
3

4

5

80
60
40
20
0

1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5

1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5

Regulation of Cognition
Panel variable: Imputation_

Figure 20. MAI Regulation of Cognition Data Distributions.
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0

Missing data on the posttest were also imputed using multiple imputation. Table
15 displays the means and standard errors for these data sets, and Figures 21 and 22
present the frequency distribution for each posttest variable.
Table 15
Means and Standard Error for Posttest Data Set
Imputation
5
Misconceptions Responses
Sample Size (N)
915
Mean Ratio
0.377
Standard Error
0.003
T ratio from Imputation 0
2.546*
Correct Responses
Sample Size (N)
915
Mean
0.486
Standard Error
0.007
T ratio from Imputation 0
-1.488
*t > 1.96, p < 0.05

4

3

2

1

0

915
0.375
0.003
1.980*

915
0.376
0.003
2.263*

915
0.375
0.003
1.980*

915
0.377
0.003
2.546*

690
0.368
0.004
-

915
0.485
0.007
-1.612

915
0.484
0.007
-1.736

915
0.485
0.007
-1.612

915
0.486
0.007
-1.488

690
0.498
0.009
-

00 14 28 42 56 70 84 98
0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0.

0

1

2
100
75

Frequency

50
25
3

4

5

100
75
50
25
0
00 14 28 42 56 70 84 98
0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0.

00 14 28 42 56 70 84 98
0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0.

Posttest_Percent_Correct

Figure 21. Posttest Percent Correct Data Distributions.

112

0

00 12 24 36 48 60 72 84
0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0.

0

1

2

150

100

Frequency

50

150

3

4

5

0

100

50

0
00 12 24 36 48 60 72 84
0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0.

00 12 24 36 48 60 72 84
0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0.

Posttest_Percent_Misconception

Figure 22. Posttest Percent Misconception Data Distributions.

T tests were used to compare each imputation to the raw data file for the pretest,
surveys, and posttest. These tests indicated that the imputed data sets for the pretest and
posttest variables contained significant differences from the unimputed data set (i.e., |t| >
1.96), implying that the data deleted because of unit and item non-response through
listwise deletion contained important information that was lost. The ATMI and MAI
factors did not appear to have significant differences between the unimputed and imputed
data sets. Based on these results, the imputed data sets were used for all quantitative
analyses, and the results were compiled into a mean and standard deviation for each
statistic.
Attrition
In addition to unit and item non-response, the posttest consisted of additional
missing data due to attrition. These data were un-recoverable through imputation because
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not enough data were available to make inferences about the posterior distributions of
responses. Attrition occurred in three schools for different reasons, resulting in 113
students who took the pretest but not the posttest and approximately 100 students who
took neither test.
In school A, one teacher refused to participate in the study without informing me,
the department chair, or the principal. When I observed his classes, the instruction in both
treatment and control classes matched the expected condition. Prior to instruction, the
teacher informed me that he “needed to organize” the pretests. On subsequent visits, he
was absent. As other teachers began to complete the posttest, I sent a message to the
teacher asking when we could meet to hand off his data. I received the following message
in response:
I don’t have any data for you. I never did your study because I
didn’t have a need to. I had already covered my stats that was required for
Algebra 1 earlier in the year, and to repeat it would have put me way
behind schedule for the semester. As for my Geometry classes, I work
probability into each unit, and to talk about it as a separate unit did not
seem reasonable for me. I had originally thought I would make up data for
you, but then I realized two things, one that that isn’t fair to you, and two,
it was going to be too much work to make it up
Because these concerns were not voiced until the study was almost completed, addressing
them in time to avoid the loss of his classes was impossible.
In school B, two teachers chose to leave the study because of pressure from the
administration to increase their pace of instruction because of concerns about state
testing. The three teachers from the first school and the two teachers from this school had
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already administered the pretest, so their data were retained for the qualitative analysis of
student responses and the structural model analyses.
In School C, the superintendent of the district volunteered the entire mathematics
department to participate in the study. Implementation of the protocol began with the
administration of the pretest. Three teachers gave the pretest before the others. The day
after these teachers had completed the pretest, the principal of the school required the
department chair to withdraw the school from the study. No complaints about the study
or the protocol from the mathematics teachers were responsible for this decision; rather,
the difficulties appeared to be the result of internal disagreements at the district level. The
following message was sent from the school’s mathematics department chair:
I have some bad news. Our principal called a math dept. meeting
this morning to inform us that we would not be participating in the
research study. I am not really sure what happened and I didn’t even know
we were having the meeting until she came in and had it announced that
we were meeting. She said after speaking to some people in the dept., she
doesn’t want us to spend 6 days giving the test and survey’s because it
would take away from instruction. One teacher had already given the pretest and survey and it took 3 days which will bump us up to 9 days for all
three. It is because we have such short periods. We had a big setback in
math test scores last year and the complaints were that we did not have
enough time to cover the content. She and the assistant superintendent
made the decision to pull us from the study because we are already behind
in our curriculum again this year. I am very sorry.
In response to this message, I discussed the situation at length over the phone with the
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department chair, and as a result, I went to the school to meet with the principal and
discuss her concerns. Although the principal was expecting me and had agreed to meet,
when I arrived the principal refused to meet with me. Based on this response and
subsequent conversations with the department chair and superintendent, I decided to halt
further efforts to persuade the principal to remain in the study.
Statistical Power
In a meta-analysis examining instructional interventions in algebra (Rakes,
Valentine, & McGatha, 2010), significant effect sizes in algebra across multiple
intervention strategies averaged around 0.33. Based on that review of literature, this
effect size was deemed to be a reasonable target when computing statistical power (i.e.,
the ability to detect significant effects). Tables from Cohen (1988) were consulted to find
the minimum sample sizes needed to obtain a power of 0.80 (as recommended by Cohen,
1988, p. 390) for finding an effect size of 0.33. The tables in Cohen (1988, p. 384)
recommended a sample size of 45 for an effect size of 0.30 and 33 for an effect size of
0.35. Using linear interpolation, the computed sample size needed to meet the power
requirements was 38.
Statistical power in a cluster randomized experiment is influenced more by the
number of clusters than by the number of subjects per cluster (Spybrook, 2008). The
target sample of 38 was therefore directed toward the number of classes in the study
rather than the number of students. Computations using Optimal Design Software
(Raudenbush, 2009) confirmed this estimate (Figure 23).
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Figure 23. Power Curve for Cluster Randomized Trials

The curve in Figure 23 estimates the power based on an assumption of having an
average of 20 students per cluster with an intra-class correlation of 0.05. These
assumptions seemed reasonable: The average number of students in each class was 17
(SD = 4.3).
Data Analysis
The data analysis for the present study progressed through three stages: (1)
qualitative analysis of student error responses and explanations, (2) structural analysis of
content area misconceptions, and (3) hierarchical analysis of student and contextual
factors on misconceptions. The qualitative analysis of student responses was used to
adjust the coding of misconceptions for the subsequent quantitative analysis.
Qualitative Analysis
The qualitative analysis served two critical functions in the present study. First,
classroom observations and teacher interviews (structured around topics relating to
implementation of the intervention lessons) before, during, and after the treatment
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periods provided data on fidelity of treatment. While observing classrooms, the
researcher attempted to minimize distractions inherent to having a visitor in a classroom.
In some classrooms, this goal was best met by slipping in quietly and sitting in the back
of the class. In other classrooms, teachers preferred to introduce the researcher and
involve him in the lesson.
Fidelity to the probability intervention lessons varied widely between teachers.
Shaughnessy and Bergman (1993) pointed out that many teachers are uncomfortable with
probability content; varying responses to such discomfort were expected. Some teachers
preferred to revert to normal, procedural methods of teaching. In this case, the ability of a
probability unit to counter misconceptions may have been reduced. Other teachers
followed the lessons provided by the researcher with varying degrees of success. One role
of the researcher during the treatment period was to provide assistance to the teachers
throughout the intervention lessons.
The second major function of the qualitative analysis was to provide an analysis
of student responses to the open response items on the mathematics knowledge
assessment. This analysis was used to assess hypotheses of previously identified
misconception patterns and advance the understanding of the relationship between
mathematical misconceptions and reasoning errors. This analysis was conducted from the
constructivist point of view using a narrative analysis (Creswell, 2007; Patton, 2002) of
symbolic interactions (i.e., the symbols used to provide meaning to students), semiotics
(i.e., how signs and symbols are used to convey meaning), and hermeneutics (i.e., how
students interpret signs and symbols).
These qualitative analyses were fundamental for establishing the context for all
subsequent quantitative analysis. The first analysis provided evidence of treatment
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fidelity and intervention effectiveness. The second analysis provided a foundation for the
interpretation of all quantitative findings.
Quantitative Analysis
The quantitative analysis was carried out in two stages. First, using the pretest
data on the NAEP multiple choice items, possible causal relationships between content
area misconceptions were examined using structural equation modeling. Second, the
impact of item, student, and class characteristics on misconception errors was
investigated using hierarchical modeling.
Structural analysis of content area misconceptions. Six structural equation models
were used to compare the competing hypothesized models of misconception relationships
among content areas (Figure 24). The pretest data were randomly split into two groups
irrespective of treatment group assignment. The first group of pretest data was used to
calibrate the six hypothesized models. The second group of pretest data was used to
validate the resultant models.
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Figure 24. Hypothesized Structural Equation Models.

Model identification. Model identification is an extremely important initial
consideration for any structural equation modeling (SEM) analysis and is determined by
the degrees of freedom (df), computed by subtracting the number of freely estimated
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Err

parameters from the number of independent data moments available (Byrne, 2009). If a
model has less data moments than parameters (i.e., df < 0), it is considered underidentified (Byrne, 2009, p. 34). Because an infinite number of solutions are possible for
an under-identified model, an analysis cannot proceed with such a relationship. If a
model has an equal number of data moments and parameters (i.e., df = 0), it is considered
just-identified (Byrne, 2009, p. 34). A just-identified model computes a unique solution to
the model, but because there are no degrees of freedom, the model can never be rejected.
The only acceptable model is one that is over-identified (Byrne, 2009, p. 34), having
more data moments than parameters (i.e., df > 0). In an over-identified model, a unique
solution can be computed, and that solution has a possibility of being rejected. In a multilevel structural equation model (i.e., all models except 12F), each level of the model must
be over-identified as well as the full model. All six models in Figure 24 are overidentified along with each level within the model (Table 16).
Table 16
Degrees of Freedom for Models in Figure 24
Model
Full Model
Level 2
Level 3
A
116
14
4
B
116
9
9
C
114
53
⎯
D
116
14
⎯
E
116
20
⎯
F
113
⎯
⎯
Each multiple choice item was coded dichotomously as demonstrating a
misconception or not based on the qualitative document analysis. Therefore, the
polychoric and asymptotic covariance matrices were computed to adjust for the
discontinuous nature of the observed variables (Byrne, 1998).
Goodness of fit indices were computed to provide supporting evidence for
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determining which model of misconception structure best matches the data. Since each fit
index “operate[s] somewhat differently given the sample size, estimation procedure,
model complexity, and/or violation of the underlying assumptions of multivariate
normality and variable independence” (Byrne, 2001, p. 87), multiple fit indices were
computed and compared to determine which model carries the least amount of
misspecification for the data. The chi square statistic (χ2) is the foundational statistic used
to compare models (Hu & Bentler, 1995). χ2 tests the null hypothesis that the covariance
matrix reproduced according to the hypothesized model is the same as the population
covariance matrix (Bandalos, 1993). However, as sample size increases, smaller
differences will be magnified to the extent that unimportant differences will be
statistically significant (Bandalos, 1993). This sensitivity to sample size led to the
development of other goodness of fit statistics. Unfortunately the resulting statistics are
also often prone to sample size correlation, sensitivity to non-normality, factor loading
magnitudes, and model complexity. These statistics have been categorized as
incremental, absolute, and residual-based absolute.
Incremental indices compare the target model test statistic to the independence
model test statistic. Type 1 indices do so with no underlying distribution assumed, with
the caveat that the same distribution is used for both the hypothesized and independence
model. Type 2 indices rely on the central χ2 distribution, a distribution with a mean of 0
and standard deviation of 1. Type 3 indices rely on the non-central χ2 distribution. The
present study will report the Comparative Fit Index (CFI), a Type 3 incremental index
recommended by Byrne (2009), Hu and Bentler (1995), and Goffin (1993). Byrne (2009)
recommended considering a CFI greater than 0.95 to reflect a well-fitting model.
Absolute fit indices approach the analysis of model fit from a different
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perspective than the incremental indices: rather than examining the hypothesized model
against the independence model, these indices examine how the hypothesized model
compares to the null model (i.e., not having a model). Marsh et al. (1988) found that the
Goodness of Fit index (GFI; Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1984) provided the most accurate
results from the absolute index category. For example, although the GFI is correlated
with sample size, it does not inflate Type I error for sample sizes greater than 100
(Shevlin & Miles, 1998). Furthermore, its measurements are robust against latent
dependence for sample sizes greater than 250 (Shevlin & Miles, 1998). The GFI is not,
however, robust against non-normality at sample sizes below 500, and the present study
will rely on dichotomous data, which are not normal. Since each half of the pretest
sample will be greater than 500, this weakness in the GFI is not considered a major threat
to validity. A GFI value greater than 0.90 represents a well-fitting model.
Additionally, Browne and Cudeck’s (1989, 1993) Expected Cross Validation
Index (ECVI) is an adjusted absolute fit index that measures a model’s ability to hold in
the population beyond a single sample by adjusting Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC;
Akaike, 1973, 1983). Byrne (2009) recommended comparing ECVI values across
models: The model with the smallest ECVI “exhibits the greatest potential for
replication” (p. 82).
Residual-based absolute fit indices also compare the hypothesized model to the
null model, but these statistics examine the residuals (i.e., unexplained variance) rather
than the explained variance. The two primary residual fit indices are the Root Mean
Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA; Steiger, 1998; Steiger & Lind, 1980; Steiger,
Shapiro, & Browne, 1985) and the Root Mean Residual (RMR; Jöreskog & Sörbom,
1984). RMSEA has been found to be uncorrelated with sample size but moderately
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influenced by the magnitude of factor loadings and model complexity (Bandalos, 2009;
Hu & Bentler, 1995). Byrne (2009) considered an RMSEA value less than 0.05 to
represent a good-fitting model. RMR has been found to be highly sensitive to nonnormality, but is less correlated with factor loading magnitudes and model complexity.
RMR is unstandardized with a lower bound of zero and no upper bound. Interpretation is,
therefore, problematic: RMR values must be compared to sample variance/covariance
magnitudes. Jöreskog and Sörbom (1996) presented a modified version of RMR based on
standardized values (i.e., correlations instead of covariances). The resultant statistic, the
standardized RMR (SRMR) is bounded between zero and one. Kline (2005) found that
SRMR values less than 0.10 represented good-fitting models.
A subcategory of indices, the parsimony-adjusted indices, does not measure
goodness of fit; instead, these statistics penalize fit statistics for increasing model
complexity. Including these parsimony-adjusted indices allows the researcher to
simultaneously examine two interdependent pieces of information about a model: the
goodness (or badness) of fit and “how parsimonious the model was in its use of the data
in achieving that goodness of fit” (Mulaik et al., 1989, p. 439). In the present study, the
parsimony version of the GFI and CFI (PGFI and PCFI) were provided to assess model
complexity from the perspective of both incremental and absolute fit indices. Mulaik et
al. (1989) and Byrne (2009) suggested that values of 0.5 or greater for both indices are
not uncommon in acceptable models.
This mosaic of fit indices provides multiple perspectives of how well each model
fits. The particular set of indices described above spans the various types of fit indices
and a wide array of strengths and weaknesses. By incorporating all of them into the
proposed analysis, confidence in the best fitting model will have a stronger foundation.
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Analysis of contextual factors. In addition to the analysis of misconception
structures, the present study also examined the impact of the probability intervention,
attitudes toward mathematics, and metacognition on mathematical misconceptions using
hierarchical generalized linear models (HGLM). The Bernoulli HGLM model best fits the
dichotomous nature of the outcome data (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). In a Bernoulli
model, the outcome variable is transformed to a logit, η, of the odds ratio, φ, for the
outcome variable as seen in Equation 16. The computed logit becomes the linear outcome
variable as seen in Equation 17. In this analysis, NAEP items (Level 1) are nested within
students (Level 2, Equation 18), and students are nested within classes (Level 3, Equation
19). Variable abbreviations are defined in Table 17.
Hypothesized Item Level 1 Model

Prob (Misconcept ion ijk = 1 | π jk ) = φ ijk

(15)

⎡ φ ijk
Log ⎢
⎣⎢1 − φ ijk

(16)

⎤
⎥ = η ijk
⎦⎥

ηijk = π 0jk + π 1jk (Item Discrimina tion ij )

(17)

+ π 2jk (Item Difficulty ij ) + π 3jk (Moderate Complexity ij ) + eijk

(18)

Hypothesized Student Level 2 Initial Model
For q = 0 to 3,
π qjk = β q 0 k + β q1k Conf jk − Conf •k + β q 2 k Value jk − Value •k

(

(
(RCog

)

(

)

) (
) (
) + β (NAEP_Pre − NAEP_Pre ) + r

+ β q 3k Enjoy jk − Enjoy •k + β q 4 k Mot jk − Mot •k + β q 5 k KCog jk − KCog •k
+ β q6k

jk

− RCog •k

q7k

jk
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•k

qjk

)

Hypothesized Class Level 3 Initial Model
For q = 0 to 3, p = 0 to 7
β qpk = γ qp 0 + γ qp1 (Treatment k ) + γ qp 2 Mean _ Conf k − Mean _ Conf •

(

(
)
(MeanEnjoy − Mean_Enjoy )
(Mean_Mot − Mean_Mot )
(Mean _ KCog − MeanKCog )
(MeanRCog − MeanRCog )
(Mean_NAEP_Pre − Mean_NAEP_Pre )

(19)

)

+ γ qp 3 Mean _ Value k − Mean _ Value•
+ γ qp 4
+ γ qp 5
+ γ qp 6
+ γ qp 7
+ γ qp 8

•

k

•

k

•k

jk

•k

jk

•k

jk

+ u qpk

Table 17
Declaration of Variables in Equations 15 – 19
Variable
Description
Conf
ATMI Self Confidence subscale.
Enjoy
ATMI Enjoyment of Mathematics subscale.
Difficulty
Item Response Theory Parameter b.
Discrimination
Item Response Theory Parameter a.
Guessing/Chance
Item Response Theory Parameter c.
KCog
MAI Knowledge of Cognition subscale.
Mean_Conf
Classroom average of AMTI Self Confidence subscale.
Mean_Enjoy
Classroom average of ATMI Enjoyment of Mathematics subscale.
Mean_KCog
Classroom average of MAI Knowledge of Cognition subscale.
Mean_Mot
Classroom average of ATMI Motivation subscale.
Mean_NAEP_Pre Classroom average NAEP mathematics knowledge pretest score.
Mean_RCog
Classroom average of MAI Regulation of Cognition subscale.
Mean_Value
Classroom average of ATMI Valuing Mathematics subscale.
Mot
ATMI Motivation subscale.
NAEP_Pre
NAEP mathematics knowledge pretest score
RCog
MAI Regulation of Cognition subscale.
Treatment
Indicator Variable for Treatment Group Assignment.
Value
ATMI Valuing Mathematics subscale.
Scale variables were centered to facilitate interpretation of the intercepts and
slopes. In the student Level 2 equation (Equation 18), centering occurred at the group
level (noted by the subscripts jk and •k), causing the intercepts and slopes to be
interpretable as student deviation from the classroom average (i.e., intercept represents
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the average student in the same class on all predictor variables; slope for any variable
represents the impact of being an above or below average student in the class). In the
classroom Level 3 equation (Equation 19), scale variables were grand mean centered,
meaning that the overall mean is subtracted from each classroom mean (noted by the
subscripts k and •). Grand mean centering changes the interpretation of the classroom
Level 3 intercepts and slopes just as group centering did on the student Level 2 intercepts
and slopes. At the classroom level, intercepts now represented the value for the average
classroom on all predictor variables, and slopes represented the impact of being in an
above or below average classroom. The regression coefficient for each classroom
variable therefore represented the effect of a variable on the impact of each
corresponding student variable. The variables eijk in Equation 17, rqjk in Equation 18, and
uqpk in Equation 19 represented the random error measurement at the respective levels.
These variables can be considered the random effect not captured by the model at each
level, the unique effect of an individual item, student, or classroom on the effect, or
variance not explained by the model at each level. The generic forms presented here
include these random effects as potentially applicable to each equation. In reality, these
random coefficients may or may not be desirable for a particular model. If present, the
slope for any particular item, student, or school may vary uniquely within the respective
group. If absent, the slope for all items, students, or schools on a particular equation are
held constant. Therefore, an equation that excludes the random effect is used to answer
questions about an effect controlling for a particular variable (i.e., excluding the effect of
a particular variable); an equation that includes the random effect is used to answer
questions about the effects of those variables (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). Equations that
exclude random effects are especially useful for questions that involve an analysis of
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covariance (Keppel & Wickens, 2004). For example, a pre-posttest design usually
involves questions about student growth during a treatment period. The effect of the
pretest on the posttest is not interesting in and of itself; rather, removing that effect from
the observed gain is critical to understanding the effect of the treatment. An equation
designed to answer this type of question would therefore exclude the random coefficient.
Summary of Methodology
Five fundamental mathematics misconceptions were discovered through an
examination of previous studies (e.g., Clement, 1982; Clements & Battista, 1992; Falk,
1992; Kahneman & Tversky, 1973a, 1973b, 1982, 1983; Küchemann, 1978; Shaughnessy
& Bergman, 1993; Warren, 2000). Seventeen NAEP mathematics items were compiled
into an instrument to test for these misconceptions within algebra, geometry, rational
numbers, and probability. The difficulty, discrimination, and guessing coefficients for
each NAEP item were measured using Item Response Theory. A unit of probability
instruction was developed as a treatment for misconceptions based on the rationale that
the abstract connections within probability’s abundant concrete explorations and
simulations would help students understanding the meaning of abstract concepts and the
connections between ideas. A randomized pretest-posttest design with a switching
replication was used to test this hypothesis. In addition to NAEP content area scores
(percent correct and percent of misconception errors), two surveys were administered to
measure the impact of contextual factors related to mathematics misconceptions. The
Attitudes Toward Mathematics Inventory (ATMI) measured four factors of mathematics
orientation (enjoyment, value, self confidence, and motivation; Tapia & Marsh, 2004);
the Metacognitive Awareness Inventory (MAI) measured two factors of metacognition
(knowledge of cognition and regulation of cognition; Schraw & Dennison, 1994).
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Treatment fidelity was assessed from classroom observations and teacher
interviews. Student explanations on the NAEP instrument were examined qualitatively to
code content area misconception responses. The structural relationship of content area
misconceptions was examined using structural equation modeling. The impact of item,
student, and class characteristics on the emergence of misconception errors for a
particular task was examined using three level hierarchical generalized linear modeling
and two level hierarchical linear modeling. Chapter 4 presents the results of these
analyses.
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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS
This chapter describes the results of three analyses. First, student responses were
examined to differentiate between reasoning or procedural errors and errors indicating an
underlying misconception. Second, hypothesized relationships among content area
misconceptions were examined using structural equation modeling. Third, the impact of
item, student, and class characteristics was measured using three-level hierarchical
generalized linear modeling and two level hierarchical linear modeling. Observations and
teacher interviews were conducted to establish fidelity of treatment implementation for
the third analysis.
Identifying Misconception Patterns
A sub-sample was chosen for a qualitative analysis of patterns of misconception
responses on the NAEP-based mathematics knowledge test. On all items, students were
asked to provide an explanation for their response choice. Approximately 74% of the
sample left these explanations blank. To improve representativeness of the overall
sample, the qualitative sub-sample was chosen using purposive stratification across
classes; specifically, tests were chosen to be part of the sub-sample if they filled in the
explanation section of the test for most items. Such a sampling technique produced a
selection bias — students who completed their explanations were more likely to choose
the correct answer, resulting in a reduced sample for each distractor to each item. To help
manage this bias, the sampling procedure continued until all distractors for each item
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were represented (N = 72). Division of items by content area (i.e., algebra, geometry,
probability, and rational number) transferred directly from the NAEP classification of
each item.
The following descriptions focus primarily on student explanations of errors;
however, the analysis began with a recognition that correct responses do not necessarily
indicate conceptual understanding. For all items in which the correct response
explanations are not discussed explicitly, the explanations by students indicated that they
did, in fact, understand the concept not understood by students who chose incorrect
responses. The thick description provided in this analysis was used to establish
trustworthiness for the coding of misconception responses.
Misconceptions on Algebra Content Knowledge Items
Algebra items (i.e., Items 5, 6, 7, 8, and 16; Appendix N) included distractors that
reflected misconceptions about additive/multiplicative structures, the meaning and
interpretation of variables, and the meaning of rational numbers.
Item 5 response patterns. Item 5 described the formula to convert temperature
from Fahrenheit to Celsius in words and then asked students to convert 393°F to Celsius.
I hypothesized that choices A, B, and C would represent misconceptions about the
meaning of rational numbers. Student responses confirmed this hypothesis. For example,
one student chose A, “Because 393 – 32 = 361; 5/9 = .55, so you divide 361 by 5/9,
answer is 656.3, to the nearest degree is 650.” This explanation represents the
explanations of others who chose A, indicating that students who chose A did so because
they divided by the rational number rather than multiplying, not realizing that the
resultant rational number, 5/9 of 361, should be smaller than 361.
I hypothesized that Choice B for Item 5 would result from the ignoring of the
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denominator, and again, student explanations confirmed this hypothesis. The most
explicit case of this type chose B, “Because 393 x 5 = 1805.” This student also failed to
note that he/she had subtracted the 32 from the 393 properly; 361 x 5 is 1805 while 393 x
5 is actually 1965. I decided that this particular error was simply one of reporting rather
than a misconception, so it was excluded for the purposes of this analysis. Another
student who chose B stated, “361 • 5/9 = 200 5/9 = 200 x 9 = 1800 + 5 = 1805.” This
student failed to realize that the rational number was accounted for by the 200 and
continued to try to incorporate the fraction, ultimately doing so by misusing both
numbers. From this question, I considered how the student had correctly computed the
200 if he/she did not understand how to use the 5/9 later. My best guess was that the
student used a calculator for the first computation, but thought that 200 x 9 would be an
easy calculation, so he/she did the last steps by hand and did not check them on the
calculator. Although this conclusion is wholly speculative, if true, it may suggest that the
use of calculators to explore the meaning of rational numbers may open an avenue for
addressing student conceptions and perceptions of rational numbers.
I also hypothesized that Choice C would represent a misconception about rational
numbers, specifically, that students would choose C by ignoring the rational number
altogether. Student responses also verified this hypothesis. Students who chose C
justified their response with statements such as, “Divide 393 and 32.”
Originally, I hypothesized that E would not represent a similar misconception as
those for A, B, and C on Item 5. Student responses, however, contradicted this
hypothesis. Students who chose E also ignored the denominator and misused the
numerator as did students who chose B. For example, students justified choice E with
statements such as, “Divide the numbers,” specifically 361 by 5. Therefore, Choice E was
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added to the misconception choices for Item 5.
These interpretations of rational numbers appeared to typify student responses to
rational numbers. I generalized these patterns of rational number interpretation into five
types:
1. Rational number is understood to be a single quantity, but confusion
about the meaning of that quantity results in the application of the
wrong operation or the correct operation(s) to the wrong quantities
(e.g., Divide instead of multiply, multiply by the wrong number). This
error connects to rational number meaning misconceptions identified
by Fosnot and Dolk (2002).
2. Reverse the role of the numerator and/or denominator. This error is
similar to those described by Baturo (1994), Behr et al. (1992), and
Lamon (1999).
3. Ignore either the numerator or denominator (as in Green, 1983b;
Watson & Shaugnessy, 2004).
4. Ignore the numerator/denominator AND reverse the role of the
remaining part of the rational number (e.g., Divide by the numerator)
5. Ignore the rational number altogether. This error appeared to connect
to variable number misconception described by Küchemann (1978) in
which students ignored the presence of variables.
While this categorization of rational number meaning errors may not account for
every rational number meaning error for every problem, it may serve as a foundation for
exploring rational number meaning errors in other problems/contexts. Additionally, this
list appears to be hierarchical; that is, a Type 2 rational number misinterpretation may
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represent a greater degree of confusion about the meaning of rational numbers than Type
1, as would Types 3, 4, and 5 over a Type 2.
Item 6 response patterns. Item 6 offered students a linear function (y = 4x) and
asked about the change in y based on an increase of two units to x. Prior to the present
analysis, only Choices D and E were hypothesized as misconception responses — I
expected students with additive/multiplicative structure misconceptions to choose D by
squaring the independent variable coefficient and E by doubling that same coefficient (as
described by Warren, 2000). Explanations from students who chose these two responses
supported this expectation. For example, students who chose E typically showed their
calculation as “4 x 2 = 8.” Alternatively, students who chose A, the correct answer, also
performed this same calculation but knew to add it to the overall y value rather than
making it a new coefficient. Therefore, D and E remained misconception responses in the
coding procedures. Additionally, explanations for choices B and C also indicated
misconceptions in student reasoning about additive and multiplicative structures. For
example, students who chose B stated, “4 + 2 = 6” or “It also increases by 2,” similar to
patterns found by Warren (2000) and Moss et al. (2008). Likewise, students who chose C
offered one of three justifications, all of which represented a misconception about how to
handle an additive structure in an algebraic equation. The first type of explanation
demonstrated a reliance on the balance-beam principle of algebraic equations, stating
something such as, “You basically add 2 more to the other side,” “Because both sides
need to be the same, or “Because if one increases, so does the other.” The second type of
explanation showed that some students chose C because they thought that the change of
two should be added to the coefficient, stating rationales such as, “Because 4 + 2 = 6 that
is 2 more than the original amount” or “Because 4x + 2 = 6x.” The third type of response
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to support Choice C indicated that students knew that the change in y should be additive,
but they failed to understand the role of the coefficient in that change. These students
justified their choice of C by asserting, “It would be y = 4x + 2.” As a result of this
analysis, the coding of misconception responses was expanded to include choices B and
C. These errors appeared to occur because students were relying on procedures isolated
from meaning and connections between ideas. The framework in Figure 10 may shed
light on how these errors emerged. For example, students who relied on the balance beam
principle for solving algebra equations did not seem to understand why such an approach
works and what it means to a particular context. These students appeared to demonstrate
procedural knowledge with instrumental understanding (Skemp, 1976/2006). As a result,
these students developed algebraic misconceptions about how, when, and why the
algebra balance beam works. These misconceptions about the balance beam led to faulty
reasoning that may have reinforced the balance beam misconceptions.
Item 7 response patterns. Item 7 asked students to choose an expression to
represent the situation, “A plumber charges $48 for each hour and an additional $9 for
travel.” The correct response, choice E, uses the $48 per-hour charge as the coefficient to
the number of hours and adds the $9 travel fee as a one-time charge. Every distractor
response was hypothesized to represent a misconception about additive/multiplicative
structures. Student explanations verified this prediction. For example, students who chose
A interpreted each charge as an “additional” charge. Likewise, students who chose B
thought the calculation resulting from such an expression should be “added on to the
original.” They also believed that both charges should be multiplied by the number of
hours. Students who chose C knew that a charge should be added and another multiplied,
but they reversed the quantities. Finally, students who chose D understood that the
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expression should represent “48 times the hours plus 9,” but they did not understand how
to translate those words into an expression. I concluded that choice D could possibly
represent variable misconceptions as well as additive/multiplicative structure
misconceptions, but since the analyses of the present study will not differentiate between
types of misconceptions, D was left as a misconception response.
Item 8 response patterns. Item 8 presented students with the following scenario:
“Carmen sold 3 times as many hot dogs as Shawn. The two of them sold 152 hot dogs
altogether. How many hot dogs did Carmen sell?” Originally, I hypothesized that choice
B would represent the reversal error, reflecting the wrong person’s amount, similar to the
reversal error identified by Clement (1982). The present analysis revealed that such was
not the case in this sample. In fact, students who chose B provided correct equations such
as “I did 3s + s = 152 and add the s to the 3s to get 4s and divided 152 and 4 by 4 and got
s = 38.” Not one student who chose B in the sub-sample indicated that they thought the
38 represented Carmen’s amount. As a result, I concluded that choosing B did not
represent a variable meaning misconception so much as a careless error; specifically, not
catching that the question asked for Carmen’s amount instead of Shawn’s. Almost twice
as many students in the sub-sample chose C instead of B, and these students did indicate
one of Küchemann’s (1978) variable interpretation errors — they unanimously ignored
the variables altogether and simply divided 152 by 3. Students who chose E also ignored
the variables entirely, showing a similar calculation to that of C. For example, students
who chose C justified their answers with statements such as, “Because 152 ÷ 3 gives you
50.8, round and you get 51.” Likewise, students who chose E wrote statements such as,
“Because 50 + 50 + 50 = 150 – 2.” In both cases, students failed to recognize the role of
the variable in partitioning the total amount. Other students who chose C and E
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demonstrated Küchemann’s Level 1 interpretation, evaluating the variable using trial and
error. Therefore, I concluded that choices C and E should represent the variable
misconception rather than the original choice B.
Item 16 response patterns. Item 16 presented students with a table of values and
asked them to determine the function that best modeled the data. I hypothesized that
choice A would represent a misconception about the nature of the functional relationship;
student responses verified this expectation. Students who chose A made statements that
indicated an understanding of a relationship, but they looked at the relationship
backwards, i.e., they thought of n as the dependent variable rather than the independent
variable, similar to the reversal error in Clement (1982). Although such an inversion
might also be due to a rational number meaning misconception (i.e., doubling rather than
halving, as in Item 5, error 2, Baturo, 1994; Behr et al., 1992; Lamon, 1999), the purpose
of the present analysis is not to distinguish between misconception types but rather to
reflect the presence of misconceptions in a content area. Therefore, choice A remained a
misconception response in the analysis. This overlap indicates the possibility of an
underlying multicollinearity across content area misconceptions resulting from the
influence of the underlying misconceptions.
Student explanations for choosing C or D on Item 16 also indicated the presence
of variable misconceptions. Students who chose C explained that they had only used the
first column of values to determine the equation, concluding that, “You subtract by the n
and that equals p.” For choice D, students explained that they thought the number of days
was one of the variable quantities of importance, “Because the days matter too.” These
students then used the first column of values to conclude that subtraction held the key to
solving this problem. As a result of this analysis, choices C and D were included as
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misconception responses for Item 16.
Misconceptions on Geometry Content Knowledge Items
The geometry items on the NAEP instrument (i.e., Items 9, 10, and 11; Appendix
N) examined student misconceptions about spatial reasoning and the meaning of rational
numbers.
Item 9 response patterns. Item 9 presented students with a rectangle and asked
them whether the figure should be classified as a parallelogram. Students who chose the
correct response, A, did so because, “It has parallel sides” or “It has equal sides.” This
explanation indicated that these students were operating at least at Van Hiele Level 1, in
which students recognize that figures have characteristics and properties. Students who
chose B, on the other hand, indicated operating at Van Hiele Level 0, in which students
rely on visual recognition of shapes. For example, students made statements such as,
“Parallelograms are crooked

” and “The figure she drew has right angles.” Other

students indicated that they thought that being a rectangle and square excludes a shape
from being a parallelogram through statements such as, “It is a square” and “No. It is a
rectangle.” These types of errors indicate a fundamental spatial reasoning misconception
resulting from low Van Hiele levels of understanding (Clements & Battista, 1992;
Crowley, 1987). Based on this evidence, I retained choice B as a misconception response.
Item 10 response patterns. Item 10 presented students with a shaded figure within
a grid of centimeter squares. I hypothesized that Choice D would represent a spatial
reasoning misconception, in which students would rely on the lengths to compute the area
rather than on the meaning of area, similar to Clements and Battista’s (1992) 9th and 11th
most common spatial reasoning misconceptions. Explanations by students who chose D
verified this hypothesis with statements such as, “Because you multiply the length and
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width of squares.” Additionally, to arrive at Choice D, students also needed to be
confused about the length of the diagonals; in this case, they evidently chose to add them
as a little more than 1, then rounded the length to an even 7 cm. They also failed to
recognize that the width on one end was 2 cm while on the other end it was 3 cm.
Therefore, this choice was retained as a misconception choice.
Additionally, an analysis of Choice C explanations revealed the presence of
additive/multiplicative structure and spatial reasoning misconceptions, or Van Dooren et
al.’s (2003) illusion of linearity applied to geometric shapes. Students who chose C
explained that they simply “counted them all up,” approximating the diagonal lengths as
1.5 cm and computing a perimeter rather than an area. Therefore, I added Choice C as a
misconception choice for Item 10.
Students who chose A for their response to Item 10 also revealed an error in
spatial reasoning. These students recognized that they needed to count shaded areas, but
they counted only the wholly shaded squares and ignored the half shaded squares, as
indicated by statements such as, “There are 9 squares that are fully shaded” and “The
image is mainly 3 by 3 so 9 sq centimeters, a = 3 • 3 = 9.” These explanations led me to
believe that Choice A resulted from faulty reasoning, but not necessarily a misconception
— they knew to add areas, and they appeared to recognize that area is the space inside a
closed figure. Therefore, Choice A was not added to the misconception choices for Item
10.
Item 11 response patterns. For Item 11, students were asked to convert the
dimensions of an object from one unit of measure to another. I hypothesized that the
difficulty in Item 11 for students lay in the recognition that the dimensions represented
two quantities rather than one, so the misconception of interest was the way students
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ignored these variable quantities. Some students ignored one of the variables; others
thought that the variables were simply labels and therefore traded labels in a one-to-one
relationship. Prior to this investigation, I hypothesized only that choice A would represent
a misconception response, indicating the use of the variable as a label. Explanations by
students who chose A confirmed this hypothesis, indicating that the values “don’t
change.”
Additionally, students who chose B and C also indicated that only one variable
needed to be accounted for in the computation. Students justified their choices with
explanations such as, “I did 5 x 3 = 15, then left 3 the same.” Therefore, choices B and C
were added to the list of misconception responses for Item 11.
From this investigation, misconception responses for geometry items were
expanded to include additional choices. Because misconceptions such as
additive/multiplicative structure were also evident in algebra items, items from both
content domains may co-vary in the SEM analysis.
Misconceptions on Probability Content Knowledge Items
Probability items (i.e., Items 1, 2, 3, 4, and 17; Appendix N) on the NAEP
instrument examined student errors in probability rooted in absolute/relative comparison,
additive/multiplicative structure, spatial reasoning, and rational number meaning
misconceptions.
Item 1 response patterns. For Item 1, students were asked to determine which
picture represented the greatest probability. I hypothesized that misconception responses
would follow the patterns identified by Shaughnessy & Bergman (1993) and Watson &
Shaughnessy (2004): Students with probability misconceptions would focus on the
number of black marbles rather than the ratio of black to white marbles, or, confusing
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absolute and relative comparisons. Students demonstrated this misconception precisely as
expected. For example, students who chose answer C stated that its dish “contains more
blacks” or “has the most black marbles.” Likewise, students who chose E also indicated
that the number of black marbles was the only number of importance. Students who
chose “B” made two absolute comparisons, looking for a combination of the “most white
and black.”
Item 2 response patterns. Item 2 presented students with a two-way table (gender
by color of puppies) and asked students to compute the conditional probability of a puppy
being male given that it is brown. I hypothesized that Choices B, C, D, and E would
indicate a misconception about the meaning of rational numbers, as described by BarHillel and Falk (1982) and Falk (1992). Student explanations for these responses verified
this hypothesis.
Students who chose B on Item 2 ignored the condition of being brown altogether
and instead gave the probability of being male, providing explanations such as “Because
it’s seven puppies and two of them are male” or “2 total males and 7 total puppies;
chance a male will be picked 2/7.” These students appeared to be unsure of how to
incorporate the brown condition into the probability quantity.
Students who chose C and E on Item 2 gave explanations that indicated confusion
between part-part relationships (i.e., odds) and part-whole relationships (i.e., probability).
These students justified their choices with statements such as, “There’s 1 male and 3 girls
so the probability is 1/3” or “Because there’s 2 female and 3 male.” One student who
chose C, however, did so because, “There are 3 black puppies and 1 is a male.” This
student, rather than being confused about the meaning of rational numbers, simply
computed the wrong conditional probability (black instead of brown), and he/she did so
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correctly. This way of choosing C appeared to be an abberation rather than the pattern, so
although C could be reached through a reasoning process not emerging from a
misconception, the explanations of students in this sample indicated that the choice was
overwhelmingly due to the misconception. No such abberations appeared in explanations
for Choice E. Therefore, both C and E were retained as a misconception response.
Students who chose D for Item 2 provided explanations that indicated two
reasoning processes, both of which represented thinking based on misconceptions about
rational numbers. The first explanation, used by the majority of students who chose D,
relied on a comparison of brown dogs to dogs; these students made statements such as,
“There are 2 male puppies and only 1 is brown” or “Because all together there is 1 male
black and 1 brown, add them up which = 2 (so, 1/2).” These responses indicated
confusion about which quantities should have been represented by the part whole
relationship. The second type of explanation relied instead on the uniformity heuristic as
described by Falk (1992). These students chose D, “Because there are only 2 types of
genders that you can pick.” Whether from confusion about part-whole relationship
quantities or the uniformity heuristic, the evidence from student explanations indicated
that choice D did represent a misconception.
Item 3 response patterns. Item 3 also asked students about a conditional
probability. In this scenario, Bill had a bag of 30 candies, 10 each of red, blue, and green.
Using a random draw, Bill ate two pieces of blue candy. Students are then asked if the
probability of getting a blue candy on the next draw is still 10/30 or 1/3. I hypothesized
that students who chose A (yes) would ignore the conditional aspect of the probability
altogether and that students who chose B (no) would recognize that the quantity making
up the part-whole relationship had changed. Student explanations to both choices verified
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this hypothesis. Students who chose A sometimes relied on the uniformity heursistic,
making statements such as, “Because there are 3 colors, and 1 could be picked blue.”
Others who chose A simply ignored the conditional, justifying their response with
statements such as, “You have 10 of each color candy to add up to 10/30” or “Because
there are ten and all together are 30.”
In contrast to explanations of choice A, students who chose B did not appear to do
so by guessing or elimination. Indeed, these students recognized that the consumption of
the two pieces of blue candy changed the quantities represented by the probability: “He
ate 2/10, so it’s now 8 blues instead of 10,” “Because he has already eaten 2, which
lessens his chances,” “He already ate 2 of them, so its 28 left,” “Because his chances go
down,” or “Because he took out 2 candies; it’s now 8/28.” Based on these explanations, I
concluded that students in this sample who chose correctly did indeed demonstrate a
stronger conceptual understanding of the meaning of the rational number quantities
present in the probability, so Choice A was retained as a misconception indicator for Item
3.
Item 4 response patterns. Item 4 presented students with a spinner divided in two
halves, with one of the halves divided in half again. The arrow on the spinner pointed to
one of the quarter regions. Students were then asked how many times they should expect
the arrow to land in that region after 300 spins. I hypothesized that a spatial reasoning
misconception would result in students deciding that the probability of the region was 1/3
instead of 1/4. Based on this hypothesis, I expected Choice C to result from students
taking 1/3 of 300. I also expected students to choose D by taking 1/3 of 360, the number
of degrees of the circle. Explanations for choosing C verified that part of my hypothesis.
These students made statements such as, “Because there’s 3 spaces and 300 ÷ 3 is 100”
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or “I divided 300 ÷ 3 & got 100.” Therefore, I retained Choice C as a misconception
choice. Students who chose D, on the other hand, did not verify my hypothesis. Instead,
these students indicated that they had recognized the probability of the region as being
1/4 but made a computation error. Noone who chose D gave explanations that indicated a
misconception, so it was eliminated as a misconception choice. Explanations for
choosing B did, however, indicate a misconception, possibly one of spatial reasoning or
rational number meaning. These students recognized that the region was 1/4 of the circle,
so they fell back on the number of degrees in a circle. These students made statements
such as, “The circle is in an angle of 90º,” “Circle = 360, divide it by 4, you get 90,” or
“Because the circle is split up into 3 parts; a circle’s measure is 360, if cut in half, each
part will be 180, if one half of the split circle is cut in half again, that side is now 2 sets of
90º.” This error could be due to misunderstanding about the meaning of the quantities in
a probability ratio, or it could be due to misunderstanding the quantity being predicted,
focusing on a single circle instead of the same circle 300 times. Regardless of which
misconception led to this choice, it seemed clear that choosing B for Item 4 represented at
least one type of misconception, so it was added as a misconception choice for this Item.
As with Item 16, the convergence of fundamental misconceptions on multiple content
areas increased the likelihood of a high degree of collinearity between content area
misconceptions.
Item 17 response patterns. Item 17 asked students to visualize a cube whose faces
are labeled R or S. The probability of landing on R was given as 1/3. Students were then
asked to determine how many faces of the cube should be labeled R. I hypothesized that
Choices C and E would represent misconceptions about absolute/relative comparisons or
the meaning of rational numbers. Students who chose these responses and explained their
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answers corroborated this expectation with statements such as “because 1/3

1,” “one

because there is a one out of three chance,” or “the number on the bottom is how many.”
Some students who chose C ignored the stated probability altogether, similar to students
who ignored rational number quantities in Item 5 (as students did with variables in
Küchemann, 1978). These students relied instead on the uniformity heuristic (Falk,
1992), stating that “each face R and S gets three sides” and “half of 6 is 3.” From these
explanations, I concluded that C and E should be retained as representative of
misconception-based reasoning.
Misconceptions on Rational Number Content Knowledge Items
Rational number items (i.e., Items 12, 13, 14, and 15; Appendix N) on the NAEP
instrument examined student errors on rational numbers based on absolute/relative
comparison, additive/multiplicative structure, and rational number meaning
misconceptions.
Item 12 response patterns. Item 12 presented students with a situation in which
the postage cost for a letter is based on a different rate for the first ounce. I hypothesized
that Choice D would indicate an additive/multiplicative structure misconception (as in
Moss et al., 2008; Warren, 2000). Explanations by students who chose D confirmed this
hypothesis, making statements such as, “I multiplied .33¢ times 2.7” and “Because 33 +
33 = 66; 0.7

1

66 + 22 = 88.” Student explanations of other choices revealed

additional misconception responses for Item 12. Students who chose E followed the same
reasoning as students who chose D, but they remembered to round the 2.7 to 3. So, these
students wrote explanations such as “33 x 3 ounces = 99 cents.” Students who chose B
used two types of reasoning to arrive at their answer. First, students added “33 + 22 +
11,” “33 + 22 + 0.7,” or “You have 2 whole ounces, 33¢ + 22¢ = 55¢, next you have to
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figure out the .7. Take 22 • 70%, which is 18. So you add 12 to 55, total would be 66¢.”
This final statement, apart from the readily apparent calculation errors, shows the same
basic reasoning as the first two. This particular justification included several erasures
over numbers, a characteristic that appeared to indicate that the student had changed
numbers to arrive at the closest answer available. So, not only does the response
demonstrate the same additive/multiplicative structure misconception, it may also
indicate the persistence of the misconception even in the face of numbers not adding up
correctly. The second type of justification for choice B relied on a multiplicative-only
strategy, for example, “I multiplied 33 times 2.” Students who chose A used similar
reasoning to that used by students who chose B. These students also dropped the 0.7 or,
in one case, the second ounce. Most of these justifications were some variation of, “33 +
22 = 55.” The student who ignored the second ounce stated, “First ounce is 33 cents, next
0.7 of ounce is 22, rounded.” As a result of this analysis, I included choices A, B, and E
as misconception responses in addition to the original hypothesized choice D. The
presence of additive/multiplicative structure misconceptions in rational numbers as well
as algebra emphasizes the likelihood of collinearity between content area misconceptions.
Item 13 response patterns. Item 13 presented students with a diagram and a scale
of 3/4 in = 10 ft. They were then asked to convert 48 feet to the scale drawing length. I
hypothesized that Choices D and E would represent reasoning indicative of rational
number meaning misconceptions. Students chose D because, “3/4 x 10 = 7.5 in” or “3 ÷ 4
= 0.75, 7.5 in.” These students demonstrated the first rational number misinterpretation
identified by the analysis of Item 5 responses – performing the correct rational number
operation to the wrong quantity (as in Fosnot & Dolk, 2002). Therefore, Choice D was
retained as a misconception response.
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Students who chose E, however, did not justify their choices with responses that
implied that they had ignored the numerator as I had hypothesized. Instead, they made
statements such as, “Because you add 3/4 to 48 ft” or “Add them all up and divide by
10.” These responses clearly indicated an error in thinking, but I chose to discard E as a
misconception choice because I could not find a clear connection between
misconceptions identified by previous research and the reasoning process that led to this
choice.
Students who chose C for Item 13 indicated a misconception that I did not
anticipate in my hypotheses. These students indicated that they had ignored the rational
number altogether, the fifth rational number mis-interpretation identified by the analysis
of Item 5. Some students justified their choice with statements such as, “48 ÷ 10 = 4.8 or
5.” Therefore, choice C was included as a misconception response for Item 13.
Item 14 response patterns. In Item 14, students were asked to arrange a set of
three fractions in ascending order, distinguishing between absolute and relative
comparisons. Students who responsed with choice E recognized the relative relationship
between fractions, but they misunderstood the nature of that relationship. For example,
students understood that fractional numbers compare differently than other rational
number forms, but they failed to recognize that the denominator quantity is the one that
has this inverse relationship (as in Baturo, 1994; Behr et al., 1992; Lamon, 1999).
Students who chose E simply stated that “smaller fractions are larger.” Although this
faulty reasoning clearly demonstrates a misunderstanding, these students did not
demonstrate the absolute/relative comparison misconception, so E was not included as a
misconception response. In constrast, students who chose B cited a comparison of the
numerators only, ignoring the impact of the denominator on the overall quantity (i.e.,
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absolute versus relative comparison misconception). Therefore, B was the only response
recognized as a misconception response for Item 14.
Item 15 response patterns. Item 15 presented students with a rectangle divided
into two columns of 10 cells for a total of 20 cells, six of which were shaded. Students
were then asked to determine which rational number best represented the probability of
the shaded region. I hypothesized that students who chose D would do so because they
used a part-part relationship rather than a part-whole relationship. Explanations by
students who chose D verified this hypothesis, making statements such as, “3 are black
and 7 are white.” Therefore, Choice D was retained as a misconception choice for Item
15.
Implications of Item Response Patterns
This analysis of student responses to the NAEP mathematics knowledge test
fundamentally altered the way misconception responses were coded. For several items,
student responses validated the hypothesized misconception choices and rationales for
each choice. For several other items, student responses suggested that the hypothesized
misconception responses were either not due to misconceptions at all, not due to the
hypothesized misconception, or not due to the hypothesized misconception for the correct
reasons. As a result, the coding of these items was changed to match student response
patterns to maximize content validity prior to the structural analysis of content area
misconceptions and the analysis of contextual factors on the emergence of
misconceptions on a particular item. Table 18 summarizes the changes from hypothesized
to observed misconception responses.
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Table 18
Summary of Observed Misconception Responses
Hypothesized Misconception Observed Misconception
Item
Responses
Responses
1
C, E
C, E
2
B, C, D, E
B, C, D, E
3
A
A
4*
C,D
B, C
5*
A, B, C
A, B, C, E
6*
D, E
B, C, D, E
7
A, B, C, D
A, B, C, D
8*
B
C, E
9
B
B
10*
D
C, D
11*
A
A, B, C
12*
D
A, B, D, E
13*
D, E
C, D, E
14
B
B
15
D
D
16*
A
A, C, D
17
C, E
C, E
*Indicates an item where coding was changed because of response analysis.

Structure of Content Area Misconceptions
To examine the structure of misconceptions between content areas in secondary
mathematics, six potential theoretical models were hypothesized (Figure 24). These
models were compared by their goodness of fit indices. Additionally, the six data sets
were randomly split into two data files each, one for calibration of the structural models
and the other for validation of the resultant models (as recommended by Byrne, 1998) to
maximize convergent validity.
Calibration of Hypothesized Structural Models
Patterns in the modification indices (MIs) across imputations were examined to
ensure that the maximum amount of error within the model had been explained. I focused
on the maximum modification index from each data set; however, I also looked for high
MIs that matched the maximum MI from other data sets for the same model. Instead of
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finding high matches, I found that the maximum modification index in one data set was
invariably small in the others (i.e., less than 4, p > 0.05). Therefore, I focused instead on
the theoretical relevance of each maximum modification index. I considered an MI to be
theoretically sound based on the content knowledge examined and the underlying
misconception addressed.
Analysis of Model A
Model A specified misconceptions in rational number content area as an
independent variable that predicts misconceptions in probability content area, which in
turn predicted misconceptions in algebra and geometry (Figure 24A). Therefore, in this
model, probability acted as a filter for rational number. The goodness of fit indices
suggested that this model fit the data very well (Table 19).
Table 19
Model A Goodness of Fit Indices from Calibration Samples
Imputation
χ2
CFI
GFI
RMSEA RMSEA 90% CI
0 (N = 478) 606.76
0.99
0.87
0.024
[0.009, 0.035]
1 (N = 577) 716.34
0.98
0.87
0.031
[0.022, 0.040]
2 (N = 553) 680.20
0.99
0.89
0.018
[0.000, 0.029]
3 (N = 558) 778.03
0.98
0.87
0.032
[0.023, 0.041]
4 (N = 566) 646.52
0.99
0.88
0.025
[0.014, 0.034]
5 (N = 575) 716.60
0.99
0.88
0.025
[0.013, 0.034]
Wtd. Avg.
707.53
0.99
0.88
0.026
[0.017, 0.035]
SEAvg
24.494 0.003 0.004
0.003
Note: df = 116

SRMR
0.075
0.076
0.066
0.076
0.074
0.072
0.073
0.002

PGFI
0.66
0.66
0.68
0.66
0.67
0.67
0.68
0.004

PCFI
0.728
0.714
0.726
0.721
0.716
0.723
0.748
0.004

ECVI
1.42
1.37
1.15
1.44
1.25
1.25
1.29
0.057

Calibration. Model A MIs most commonly called for covariances between Item 6
and 12 and Items 5 and 15 error terms (Table 20). Items 6 and 12 both measured
additive/multiplicative structure misconceptions, so a relationship between these two
variables seemed plausible even though they measured different content knowledge.
Likewise, Items 5 and 15 both measured rational number meaning misconceptions.
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Table 20
Model A Maximum Modification Indices from Calibration Samples
Imputation
Maximum Modification Index
Associated Parameter to Add
0
33.17
TH (4, 6); Covariance between Item 5 and 15 errors
1
339.07
TH (1, 8); Covariance between Item 7 and 12 errors
2
43.79
TH (1, 7); Covariance between Item 6 and 12 errors
3
894.40
TH (1, 7); Covariance between Item 6 and 12 errors
4
68.22
TD (3, 2); Covariance between Item 13 and 14 errors
5
361.69
TH (4, 6); Covariance between Item 5 and 15 errors

Since the unimputed data file called for the error covariance of Items 5 and 15,
this parameter was added to the model and the goodness of fit statistics were computed
(Table 21).
Table 21
Model A2 Goodness of Fit Indices, Covary Item 5 and 15 Errors
Imputation
χ2
CFI
GFI
RMSEA RMSEA 90% CI
0 (N = 478) 578.83
0.99
0.88
0.021
[0.000, 0.033]
1 (N = 577) 750.91
0.97
0.87
0.032
[0.023, 0.040]
2 (N = 553) 679.00
0.99
0.89
0.019
[0.000, 0.030]
3 (N = 558) 769.37
0.98
0.87
0.031
[0.022, 0.040]
4 (N = 566) 627.74
0.99
0.89
0.022
[0.009, 0.032]
5 (N = 575) 680.75
0.99
0.89
0.021
[0.0073, 0.031]
Wtd. Avg.
701.59
0.98
0.88
0.025
[0.015, 0.035]
SEAvg
28.967
0.004
0.005
0.003
Note: df = 115

SRMR
0.075
0.075
0.066
0.075
0.073
0.070
0.072
0.002

PGFI
0.66
0.66
0.67
0.65
0.67
0.67
0.664
0.004

PCFI
0.743
0.736
0.745
0.732
0.745
0.745
0.741
0.003

ECVI
1.36
1.37
1.15
1.40
1.19
1.19
1.26
0.058

The difference of χ2 test revealed a statistically significant reduction of model
misfit for both the unimputed data file (listwise deletion) and the imputed data files (Δχ2
Unimputed [1]

= 27.93, p < 0.0001; Δχ2Imputed Avg[1] = 5.935, p = 0.015). I therefore, retained

Model A2 and examined its modification indices (Table 22).
Table 22
Model A2 Maximum Modification Indices
Imputation
Maximum Modification Index
0
311.76
1
178.20
2
60.24
3
64.18
4
66.25
5
39.05

Associated Parameter to Add
BE (2, 3); Regression path from Geometry to Algebra
TH (1, 8); Covariance between Item 7 and 12 errors
TD (4, 1); Covariance between Item 12 and 15 errors
TE (4, 1); Covariance between Item 1 and 4 errors
TD (3, 2); Covariance between Item 13 and 14 errors
TE (12, 11); Covariance between Item 9 and 10 errors

The addition of the regression path from geometry to algebra created an unstable
model that would not converge across the data sets. The covariance between Items 7 and
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12 indicated by Imputation 1 made theoretical sense to me since both items measured
additive/multiplicative structure misconceptions. So, the parameter was added to the
model, and the goodness of fit statistics were computed (Table 23).
Table 23
Model A3 Goodness of Fit Indices, Covary Item 7 and 12 Errors
Imputation
χ2
CFI
GFI
RMSEA RMSEA 90% CI
0 (N = 478) 578.82
0.99
0.88
0.022
[0.000, 0.033]
1 (N = 577) 743.84
0.98
0.87
0.032
[0.023, 0.040]
2 (N = 553) 675.08
0.99
0.90
0.019
[0.000, 0.030]
3 (N = 558) 769.14
0.98
0.87
0.031
[0.022, 0.040]
4 (N = 566) 627.27
0.99
0.89
0.023
[0.0097, 0.033]
5 (N = 575) 677.92
0.99
0.89
0.022
[0.0077, 0.032]
Wtd. Avg.
698.67
0.99
0.88
0.025
[0.016, 0.035]
SEAvg
28.604
0.003 0.007
0.003
Note: df = 114

SRMR
0.075
0.075
0.066
0.075
0.073
0.070
0.072
0.002

PGFI
0.65
0.65
0.67
0.65
0.66
0.66
0.66
0.004

PCFI
0.657
0.657
0.663
0.635
0.660
0.667
0.656
0.006

ECVI
1.36
1.36
1.13
1.40
1.19
1.19
1.25
0.059

The difference of χ2 test did not reveal a statistically significant reduction of
model misfit for either the unimputed data file (listwise deletion) or the imputed data files
(Δχ2Unimputed [1] = 0.01, p > 0.5; Δχ2Imputed Avg[1] = 2.923, p = 0.087). I therefore, discarded
this model and returned to Model A2.
The other MIs from Model A2 failed to reveal any theoretically sound alterations
to the model. For example, Items 12 and 15, Items 1 and 4, measured different content
areas and different underlying misconceptions. And although Items 13 and 14 both
examined rational number content, they measured different underlying misconceptions.
Therefore, I concluded that Model A2 was the best calibration of Model A possible with
these data (Figure 25).
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Figure 25. Final Structural Model A2

Validation of Model A2. To examine the convergent validity of Model A2, the
goodness of fit statistics were computed based on the validation sample (Table 24).
Table 24
Model A2 Goodness of Fit Indices from Validation Samples
Imputation
χ2
CFI
GFI
RMSEA RMSEA 90% CI
0 (N = 449) 621.32
0.98
0.86
0.025
[0.0098, 0.036]
1 (N = 556) 617.42
0.99
0.89
0.020
[0.000, 0.031]
2 (N = 580) 717.36
0.98
0.88
0.028
[0.018, 0.037]
3 (N = 575) 764.96
0.98
0.88
0.030
[0.020, 0.038]
4 (N = 567) 651.59
0.99
0.90
0.022
[0.0073, 0.032]
5 (N = 558) 701.17
0.98
0.88
0.028
[0.017, 0.037]
Wtd. Avg.
689.92
0.98
0.89
0.026
[0.018, 0.033]
SEAvg
28.762 0.003 0.004
0.002
Note: df = 115

SRMR
0.081
0.070
0.076
0.078
0.069
0.0742
0.073
0.002

PGFI
0.65
0.67
0.66
0.66
0.67
0.66
0.66
0.003

PCFI
0.741
0.745
0.735
0.735
0.737
0.735
0.737
0.002

ECVI
1.50
1.14
1.27
1.30
1.13
1.26
1.22
0.040

The goodness of fit statistics were then compared to those based on the calibration
sample using a t-test to compare the difference in the point estimates. Even though the
population distribution of these fit indices are not always normally distributed, because of
the central limit theorem, the sampling distribution around the point estimate will always
be normally distributed, so a two-way, two-sample t-test is appropriate for comparisons
of the imputed data sets (Table 25).
Table 25
Model A2 Comparison of Calibration and Validation Sample Fit Indices
Imputation
χ2
CFI
GFI
RMSEA SRMR

PGFI

PCFI

ECVI

Imputed Data Set t value

0.00

1.57

0.82

0.40

0.00

-0.88

154

-0.39

-0.50

No statistic from the imputed data sets was significantly different for the
calibration and validation samples (i.e., all t values less than 1.96), indicating that Model
A2 fit the validation and calibration samples equally well. I, therefore, concluded that the
model had good convergent validity across samples.
Analysis of Model B
Calibration. Model B reversed the relationship specified in Model A for
probability and rational number. In this model, misconceptions in rational number
content filtered the influence of probability on the development of misconceptions in
algebra and geometry. The goodness of fit indices suggested that this model fit the data
well (Table 26).
Table 26
Model B Goodness of Fit Indices from Calibration Samples
Imputation
χ2a
CFI
GFI
RMSEA RMSEA 90% CI
0 (N = 478) 607.05
0.99
0.87
0.023
[0.008, 0.034]
1 (N = 577) 756.98
0.97
0.87
0.032
[0.023, 0.040]
2 (N = 553) 682.40
0.99
0.89
0.018
[0.000, 0.029]
3 (N = 558) 744.63
0.98
0.87
0.031
[0.021, 0.040]
4 (N = 566) 649.92
0.98
0.88
0.026
[0.015, 0.035]
5 (N = 575) 710.91
0.99
0.88
0.024
[0.013, 0.034]
Wtd. Avg.
709.18
0.98
0.88
0.026
[0.017, 0.036]
SEAvg
22.042 0.004
0.004
0.003
Note: df = 116

SRMR
0.075
0.075
0.066
0.074
0.074
0.071
0.072
0.002

PGFI
0.66
0.66
0.68
0.66
0.67
0.67
0.67
0.004

PCFI
0.75
0.74
0.76
0.74
0.75
0.75
0.748
0.004

ECVI
1.41
1.39
1.14
1.41
1.27
1.25
1.29
0.055

The unimputed data set called for the addition to Model B of the regression path
from geometry to algebra (Table 27). This potential structural alteration seemed to offer
the most substantive change to the hypothesized model. Therefore, this parameter was
added to the model.
Table 27
Model B Maximum Modification Indices from Calibration Samples
Imputation
Maximum Modification Index
Associated Parameter to Add
0
165.58
BE (2, 3); Regression path from Geometry to Algebra
1
62.53
TD (4, 1); Covariance between Item 1 and 4 errors
2
44.08
TE (12, 7); Covariance between Item 7 and 11 errors
3
267.85
LY(5, 1); Crossloading, Rational Number to Item 5
4
46.16
TE(9, 4); Covariance between Item 15 and 16 errors
5
71.34
TE(5, 4); Covariance between Item 5 and 15 errors
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Although the addition of this parameter to Model A resulted in an unstable model,
it did not have such an effect on Model B.Even though the parameter represented the
same regression path, its meaning within the model was quite different from that of
Model A. In Model A, it represented dependence of algebra misconceptions on geometry
misconceptions above and beyond its dependence on probability misconceptions with
rational number misconceptions acting as the independent, exogenous variable. In Model
B, this regression pathway represented the dependence of algebra misconceptions on
geometry misconceptions above and beyond its dependence on rational number
misconceptions while probability misconceptions acted as the independent, exogenous
variable. Table 28 displays the resultant model fit indices.
Table 28
Model B2a Goodness of Fit Indices, Regress Algebra Misconceptions on Geometry Misconceptions
Imputation
χ2
CFI
GFI
RMSEA RMSEA 90% CI SRMR PGFI PCFI
0 (N = 478) 606.20
0.99
0.87
0.024
[0.0088, 0.035]
0.075
0.65
0.740
1 (N = 577) 756.28
0.97
0.87
0.032
[0.023, 0.041]
0.075
0.65
0.725
2 (N = 553) 676.54
0.99
0.90
0.017
[0.000, 0.028]
0.067
0.67
0.737
3 (N = 558) 738.19
0.98
0.87
0.031
[0.022, 0.040]
0.073
0.65
0.732
4 (N = 566) 644.92
0.98
0.88
0.026
[0.015, 0.035]
0.073
0.66
0.735
5 (N = 575) 703.87
0.99
0.88
0.024
[0.013, 0.034]
0.071
0.66
0.743
Wtd. Avg.
704.19
0.98
0.88
0.026
[0.016, 0.036]
0.072
0.66
0.734
SEAvg
22.565 0.004
0.006
0.003
0.002
0.004 0.003
Note: df = 115

ECVI
1.42
1.39
1.13
1.42
1.27
1.25
1.29
0.058

The difference of χ2 test revealed a schism between the imputed data set averages
and the unimputed data file. In the unimputed data file, the difference was not statistically
significant (Δχ2Unimputed [1] = 0.85, p = 0.357). Using the weighted average of the five
imputed data sets, the reduction of model misfit was significant (Δχ2Imputed Avg[1] = 4.988,
p = 0.026). To decide whether to retain the model, I considered that the MI that began
this calibration came from the unimputed data set. So, I expected that any schism should
have favored the unimputed data set rather than the imputed data sets. This reversal of
effects suggested to me that the parameter did not affect the model the way the MI
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suggested it would and that the parameter may add instability to the model even though
all the data sets converged. I therefore decided to reject this model change and returned to
the original hypothesized Model B.
Other maximum MIs from the original Model B called for the addition of a
crossloading from Rational Number misconceptions to Item 5 and error covariances
between Items 1 and 4, 7 and 11, 5 and 15, and 15 and 16. I found no theoretical
foundation for co-varying Items 1 and 4, Items 7 and 11, or Items 15 and 16. Items 5 and
15, on the other hand, both measured rational number meaning misconceptions; so, their
covariance seemed plausible as well as the cross-loading between rational number
misconceptions and Item 5. Since the cross-loading indicated the largest drop in model
misfit, I chose to try it first. Table 29 displays the resultant fit indices.
Table 29
Model B2b Goodness of Fit Indices, Regress Item 5 on Rational Number Misconceptions
Imputation
χ2
CFI
GFI
RMSEA RMSEA 90% CI SRMR PGFI
0 (N = 478) 579.13
0.99
0.88
0.021
[0.000, 0.032]
0.075
0.66
1 (N = 577) 755.81
0.97
0.87
0.032
[0.023, 0.041]
0.075
0.66
2 (N = 553) 680.76
0.99
0.89
0.018
[0.000, 0.029]
0.066
0.67
3 (N = 558) 737.37
0.98
0.87
0.030
[0.020, 0.039]
0.074
0.66
4 (N = 566) 630.43
0.99
0.89
0.023
[0.010, 0.033]
0.073
0.67
5 (N = 575) 675.78
0.99
0.89
0.021
[0.0066, 0.031]
0.070
0.67
Wtd. Avg.
696.15
0.98
0.88
0.025
[0.015, 0.035]
0.072
0.67
SEAvg
25.285 0.004 0.005
0.003
0.002
0.003
Note: df = 115

PCFI
0.743
0.736
0.745
0.743
0.745
0.745
0.743
0.002

ECVI
1.36
1.38
1.14
1.38
1.21
1.19
1.26
0.056

The difference of χ2 test revealed a statistically significant reduction of model
misfit for both the unimputed data file (listwise deletion) and the imputed data files (Δχ2
Unimputed [1]

= 27.92, p < 0.0001; Δχ2Imputed Avg[1] = 13.029, p = 0.0003). I therefore,

retained Model B2b and examined its modification indices (Table 30).
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Table 30
Model B2b Maximum Modification Indices
Imputation
Maximum Modification Index
0
37.03
1
62.45
2
44.22
3
125.79
4
56.68
5
40.62

Associated Parameter to Add
TD (3, 1); Covariance between Item 1 and 3 errors
TD (4, 1); Covariance between Item 1 and 4 errors
TE (12, 7); Covariance between Item 7 and 11 errors
TE (12, 6); Covariance between Item 6 and 11 errors
TE (12, 10); Covariance between Item 11 and 9 errors
TE (11, 10); Covariance between Item 9 and 10 errors

Items 1 and 4, Items 6 and 11, and Items 7 and 11 measured different content
areas and different underlying misconceptions, so these three pairs of error covariances
were excluded from consideration. Items 1 and 3 measured probability content
knowledge but did not measure the same underlying misconception — Item 1 examined
absolute/relative comparison misconceptions while Item 3 examined meaning of rational
number misconceptions. Likewise, Items 9 and 11 both measured geometry knowledge,
but Item 9 measured spatial reasoning misconceptions while Item 11 measured meaning
of variable misconceptions. Therefore, these error covariances were considered
theoretically marginal for inclusion in the model. Items 9 and 10, however, both
measured geometry content knowledge and spatial reasoning misconceptions, so their
error covariance was explored for possible inclusion in the model (Table 31).
Table 31
Model B3 Goodness of Fit Indices, Covary Item 9 and 10 Errors
CFI
GFI
RMSEA RMSEA 90% CI
Imputation
χ2
0 (N = 478) 575.78
0.99
0.88
0.021
[0.000, 0.033]
1 (N = 577) 724.69
0.98
0.88
0.030
[0.020, 0.039]
2 (N = 553) 676.54
0.99
0.89
0.019
[0.000, 0.030]
3 (N = 558) 712.22
0.98
0.88
0.029
[0.019, 0.038]
4 (N = 566) 622.22
0.99
0.89
0.023
[0.0095, 0.033]
5 (N = 575) 650.53
0.99
0.89
0.020
[0.000, 0.030]
Wtd. Avg.
677.24
0.99
0.89
0.024
[0.008, 0.016]
SEAvg
21.237 0.003
0.003
0.003
Note: df = 114

SRMR
0.074
0.074
0.066
0.072
0.072
0.068
0.070
0.002

PGFI
0.65
0.65
0.67
0.65
0.66
0.67
0.66
0.005

PCFI
0.731
0.724
0.745
0.724
0.734
0.745
0.734
0.005

ECVI
1.35
1.32
1.14
1.35
1.19
1.16
1.23
0.048

The difference of χ2 test revealed a statistically significant decrease in model
misfit in the imputed data sets (Δχ2Imputed Avg[1] = 18.907, p < 0.0001). The reduction in
model misfit, however, was significant only within a 93% confidence interval
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(Δχ2Unimputed [1] = 3.35, p = 0.067). Since the modification reduced a significant amount
of misfit across the imputed data sets and nearly significant in the unimputed data sets, I
concluded that the modification should be retained. Therefore, the modification indices
for Model B3 were examined for further calibration (Table 32).
Table 32
Model B3 Maximum Modification Indices
Imputation
Maximum Modification Index
0
38.01
1
62.40
2
44.31
3
78.97
4
38.25
5
39.06

Associated Parameter to Add
TD (3, 1); Covariance between Item 1 and 3 errors
TD (4, 1); Covariance between Item 1 and 4 errors
TE (12, 7); Covariance between Item 7 and 11 errors
TE (11, 7); Covariance between Item 7 and 10 errors
TE (3, 2); Covariance between Item 13 and 14 errors
TH (5, 8); Covariance between Item 8 and 17 errors

Items 1 and 3, Items 1 and 4, and Items 13 and 14 measured similar content
knowledge but different underlying misconceptions, so these error covariances were
considered theoretically marginal for inclusion in the model. Items 7 and 10, Items 7 and
11, and Items 8 and 17 measured different content knowledge and different underlying
misconceptions, so these error covariances were considered theoretically poor for
inclusion in the model. Therefore, I concluded that Model B3 (Figure 26) represented the
best calibration of the hypothesized model with these data.

Figure 26. Final Structural Model B3.

Validation of Model B3. To examine the convergent validity of Model B3, the
goodness of fit statistics were computed based on the validation sample (Table 33).
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Table 33
Model B3 Goodness of Fit Indices from Validation Samples
Imputation
χ2
CFI
GFI
RMSEA
RMSEA 90% CI
0 (N = 449) 628.51
0.98
0.86
0.026
[0.011, 0.037]
1 (N = 556) 592.18
0.99
0.90
0.018
[0.000, 0.029]
2 (N = 580) 704.41
0.98
0.88
0.028
[0.017, 0.037]
3 (N = 575) 755.89
0.98
0.88
0.029
[0.019, 0.038]
4 (N = 567) 612.77
0.99
0.90
0.019
[0.000, 0.030]
5 (N = 558) 665.66
0.98
0.89
0.026
[0.015, 0.035]
Wtd. Avg.
665.46
0.98
0.89
0.024
[0.015, 0.032]
SEAvg
33.392 0.003 0.005
0.003
Note: df = 114

SRMR
0.081
0.068
0.074
0.077
0.067
0.072
0.072
0.002

PGFI
0.64
0.67
0.66
0.66
0.67
0.66
0.66
0.003

PCFI
0.729
0.737
0.735
0.735
0.737
0.727
0.734
0.002

ECVI
1.51
1.12
1.25
1.28
1.09
1.22
1.19
0.041

The goodness of fit statistics were then compared to those based on the calibration
sample using a t-test to compare the difference in the point estimates (Table 34).
Table 34
Model B3 Comparison of Calibration and Validation Sample Fit Indices
Imputation
χ2
CFI
GFI
RMSEA
Imputed t value

0.42

0.67

-0.97

0.00

SRMR

PGFI

PCFI

ECVI

-1.00

-0.97

0.00

0.92

No statistic from the imputed data sets was significantly different for the
calibration and validation samples (i.e., all t values less than 1.96), indicating that Model
B3 fit the validation and calibration samples equally well. I, therefore, concluded that the
model had good convergent validity across samples.
Analysis of Model C
Model C specified misconceptions in rational number and probability content
areas as covarying independent variables, each directly influencing the development of
misconceptions in algebra and geometry content areas.
Finding a structurally stable Model C. Imputations 1, 2, and 4 for Model C would
not converge with the hypothesized model. Using intermediate reported values as new
starting points, the models were run several times, trying to reach convergence. Instead of
converging, the models continued to diverge (Table 35).
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Table 35
Model C Goodness of Fit Indices from Calibration Samples
Imputation
χ2a
CFI
GFI
RMSEA RMSEA 90% CI SRMR
0 (N = 478) 603.47
0.99
0.87
0.024
[0.009, 0.035]
0.075
1 (N = 577)
Hypothesized Model Would not Converge
2 (N = 553)
Hypothesized Model Would not Converge
3 (N = 558) 722.31
0.98
0.87
0.030
[0.020, 0.039]
0.073
4 (N = 566)
Hypothesized Model Would not Converge
5 (N = 575) 710.29
0.99
0.88
0.025
[0.013, 0.034]
0.071
Wtd. Avg.
716.21
0.99
0.88
0.027
[0.021, 0.033]
0.072
SEAvg
8.500
0.007
0.007
0.004
0.001
Note: df = 114

PGFI
0.65

PCFI
0.74

ECVI
1.42

0.65

0.73

1.37

0.66
0.66
0.007

0.74
0.74
0.007

1.26
1.31
0.078

An examination of the intermediate values revealed that the parameter estimates
for the regression weights from probability to geometry, from rational number to algebra,
and from probability to algebra differed greatly from all other estimates. Therefore,
modifications were made to the model, starting with removing the regression pathway
from probability to geometry. With this change, all imputations except Imputation 4
converged (Table 36).
Table 36
Model C2a Calibration Samples Goodness of Fit Indices
Imputation
χ2
CFI
GFI
RMSEA RMSEA 90% CI SRMR
0 (N = 478) 603.71
0.99
0.87
0.024
[0.0084, 0.035]
0.075
1 (N = 577) 754.77
0.97
0.87
0.033
[0.024, 0.041]
0.075
2 (N = 553) 679.23
0.99
0.89
0.018
[0.000, 0.029]
0.066
3 (N = 558) 723.33
0.98
0.87
0.029
[0.019, 0.038]
0.073
4 (N = 566)
Model C2a did not Converge
5 (N = 575) 710.32
0.99
0.88
0.025
[0.013, 0.034]
0.071
Wtd. Avg.
717.26
0.98
0.88
0.026
[0.021, 0.031]
0.071
SEAvg
9.220
0.008
0.008
0.003
0.002
Note: df = 115

PGFI
0.66
0.65
0.67
0.66

PCFI
0.751
0.725
0.745
0.743

ECVI
1.41
1.40
1.15
1.36

0.66
0.66
0.000

0.743
0.739
0.006

1.26
1.29
0.074

Since Imputation 4 did not converge, the original hypothesized Model C was
adjusted again by removing the regression pathway from rational number to algebra
(Table 37).
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Table 37
Model C2b Calibration Samples Goodness of Fit Indices
Imputation
χ2
CFI
GFI
RMSEA RMSEA 90% CI SRMR
0 (N = 478) 606.39
0.99
0.87
0.024
[0.0098, 0.035]
0.075
1 (N = 577)
Model C2b did not Converge
2 (N = 553) 678.18
0.99
0.89
0.019
[0.000, 0.030]
0.066
3 (N = 558) 762.34
0.98
0.87
0.031
[0.022, 0.040]
0.075
4 (N = 566) 645.32
0.98
0.88
0.025
[0.014, 0.035]
0.074
5 (N = 575)
Model C2b did not Converge
Wtd. Avg.
695.09
0.98
0.88
0.025
[0.018, 0.032]
0.072
SEAvg
30.178 0.003
0.005
0.003
0.002
Note: df = 115

PGFI
0.65

PCFI
0.74

ECVI
1.42

0.67
0.65
0.66

0.75
0.73
0.74

1.15
1.41
1.25

0.66
0.005

0.737
0.003

1.27
0.066

Since Imputations 1 and 5 did not converge, the original hypothesized Model C
(Model C3a) was adjusted again by removing both regression pathways, rational number
to algebra and probability to geometry (Table 38).
Table 38
Model C3a Fit Indices, Remove Rational Number to Algebra and Probability to Geometry Regression Paths
Imputation
χ2
CFI
GFI
RMSEA RMSEA 90% CI SRMR PGFI PCFI
ECVI
0 (N = 478) 607.07
0.99
0.87
0.024
[0.0086, 0.035]
0.075
0.66
0.751
1.42
1 (N = 577) 759.38
0.97
0.87
0.032
[0.023, 0.041]
0.075
0.66
0.736
1.40
2 (N = 553) 679.80
0.99
0.89
0.018
[0.000, 0.029]
0.066
0.68
0.756
1.15
3 (N = 558) 762.49
0.98
0.87
0.031
[0.021, 0.040]
0.075
0.66
0.743
1.40
4 (N = 566) 648.89
0.98
0.88
0.025
[0.014, 0.035]
0.074
0.67
0.746
1.26
5 (N = 575) 727.47
0.99
0.88
0.025
[0.014, 0.035]
0.072
0.67
0.754
1.27
Wtd. Avg.
715.85
0.98
0.88
0.026
[0.017, 0.036]
0.072
0.67
0.747
1.30
SEAvg
24.986 0.004 0.004
0.003
0.002
0.004 0.004
0.053
Note: df = 116

The difference of χ2 test did not reveal statistically significant reduction of model
misfit for either the unimputed data file (listwise deletion) or the imputed data files (Δχ2
Unimputed [2]

= 1.61, p = 0.477; Δχ2Imputed Avg[2] = 0.89, p > 0.5). Alternatively, the other set

of regression pathways was removed, rational number to geometry and probability to
algebra (Model C3b; Table 39).
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Table 39
Model C3b Fit Indices, Remove Rational Number to Geometry and Probability to Algebra Regression Paths
Imputation
χ2
CFI
GFI
RMSEA RMSEA 90% CI SRMR PGFI PCFI
ECVI
0 (N = 478) 608.68
0.99
0.87
0.024
[0.0085, 0.035]
0.075
0.66
0.75
1.42
1 (N = 577) 754.60
0.97
0.87
0.032
[0.023, 0.040]
0.076
0.66
0.74
1.39
2 (N = 553) 679.95
0.99
0.89
0.017
[0.000, 0.029]
0.066
0.68
0.76
1.14
3 (N = 558) 771.63
0.98
0.87
0.032
[0.022, 0.040]
0.075
0.66
0.74
1.43
4 (N = 566) 652.76
0.98
0.88
0.026
[0.015, 0.035]
0.074
0.67
0.75
1.28
5 (N = 575) 723.82
0.99
0.88
0.025
[0.014, 0.034]
0.072
0.67
0.75
1.27
Wtd. Avg.
716.74
0.98
0.88
0.026
[0.016, 0.037]
0.073
0.67
0.747
1.30
SEAvg
24.929 0.004 0.004
0.003
0.002
0.004 0.004
0.057
Note: df = 116

The difference of χ2 test did not reveal statistically significant reduction of model
misfit for either the unimputed data file (listwise deletion) or the imputed data files (Δχ2
Unimputed [2]

= 3.6, p = 0.165; Δχ2Imputed Avg[2] = 5.21, p = 0.074). However, both models

added stability across imputations, so they were deemed superior to the original
hypothesized model. Furthermore, neither model provided a statistically better fit, so both
were retained for the synthesizing of the structural model calibration results.
Calibration of Model C3. Model C specified Rational Number and Probability
Misconceptions as covarying independent variables. Model C3A specified the regression
of Algebra on Probability Misconceptions and of Geometry on Rational Number
Misconceptions. Model C3B specified the regression of Geometry on Probability
Misconceptions and of Algebra on Rational Number Misconceptions. Since both models
emerged from the original hypothesized model and neither model contained a
significantly lower amount of model misfit, both models were calibrated using their
respective modification indices (Table 40).
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Table 40
Model C3 Maximum Modification Indices from Calibration Samples
Model,
Maximum Modification Index
Associated Parameter to Add
Imputation
Model C3-A, 0
89.94
LY(3, 2); Crossloading, Geometry to Item 7
1
53.42
TD (4, 1); Covariance between Item 1 and 4 errors
2
45.28
TE(8, 3); Covariance between Item 7 and 11 errors
3
106.69
TE(8, 2); Covariance between Item 6 and 11 errors
4
52.39
TE(8, 6); Covariance between Item 9 and 11 errors
5
64.77
TH(9, 1); Covariance between Item 5 and 15 errors
Model C3-B, 0
31.54
TH(1, 7); Covariance between Item 5 and 15 errors
1
58.32
TD(4, 1); Covariance between Item 1 and 4 errors
2
343.10
TH(6, 8); Covariance between Item 11 and 12 errors
3
61.68
TD(4, 1); Covariance between Item 1 and 4 errors
4
45.46
TH(9, 5); Covariance between Item 15 and 16 errors
5
91.97
TH(9, 1); Covariance between Item 5 and 15 errors

Calibration of Model C3A. No theoretical foundation supported the crossloading
from Geometry to Item 7, the covariance between Item 1 and 4 errors, Item 7 and 11
errors, or Item 6 and 11 errors. The covariance between Item 9 and 11 errors was
considered theoretically marginal since those items measured the same type of content
knowledge but different underlying misconceptions. Likewise, Items 5 and 15 measured
the same underlying misconception (rational number meaning) but different content
knowledge. I chose to try the covariance between Item 5 and 15 errors because the
alignment of underlying misconceptions seemed more consistent with the present study
purpose. Table 41 displays the goodness of fit statistics for the resultant model.
Table 41
Model C3Aii Goodness of Fit Indices, Covary Item 5 and 15 Errors
Imputation
χ2
CFI
GFI
RMSEA RMSEA 90% CI
0 (N = 478) 579.28
0.99
0.88
0.021
[0.000, 0.033]
1 (N = 577) 757.67
0.97
0.87
0.032
[0.024, 0.041]
2 (N = 553) 678.58
0.99
0.89
0.019
[0.000, 0.030]
3 (N = 558) 755.37
0.98
0.87
0.030
[0.020, 0.039]
4 (N = 566) 629.57
0.99
0.89
0.023
[0.0095, 0.032]
5 (N = 575) 687.99
0.99
0.89
0.022
[0.0087, 0.032]
Wtd. Avg.
701.97
0.98
0.88
0.025
[0.016, 0.034]
SEAvg
27.316 0.004
0.005
0.003
Note: df = 115

SRMR
0.075
0.075
0.066
0.075
0.073
0.070
0.072
0.002

PGFI
0.66
0.65
0.67
0.66
0.67
0.67
0.66
0.004

PCFI
0.743
0.725
0.745
0.743
0.745
0.745
0.741
0.004

ECVI
1.36
1.39
1.15
1.37
1.20
1.20
1.26
0.055

The difference of χ2 test revealed a statistically significant reduction of model
misfit for both the unimputed data file (listwise deletion) and the imputed data files (Δχ2
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Unimputed [1]

= 27.79, p < 0.0001; Δχ2Imputed Avg[1] = 13.881, p = 0.0002). I therefore,

retained Model C3Aii and examined its modification indices (Table 42).
Table 42
Model C3Aii Maximum Modification Indices
Imputation
Maximum Modification Index
0
76.22
1
53.02
2
45.29
3
105.95
4
375.57
5
40.75

Associated Parameter to Add
LY (3, 2); Crossloading between Geometry and Item 7
TD (4, 1); Covariance between Item 1 and 4 errors
TE (8, 3); Covariance between Item 7 and 11 errors
TE (8, 2); Covariance between Item 6 and 11 errors
TH (6, 3); Covariance between Item 7 and 12 errors
TE (7, 6); Covariance between Item 9 and 10 errors

The potential modifications of crossloading Geometry to Item 7, covarying Items
1 and 4, Items 7 and 11, and Items 6 and 11 were considered theoretically weak because
there was no shared content area or underlying modifications. Items 7 and 12 measured
the same underlying misconception in different content areas, so I considered the addition
of their covariance to be theoretically marginal. Items 9 and 10, on the other hand,
measured the same content area and underlying misconception, so I chose to add their
covariance to the model (Table 43).
Table 43
Model C3Aiii Goodness of Fit Indices, Covary Item 9 and 10 Errors
CFI
GFI
RMSEA RMSEA 90% CI
Imputation
χ2
0 (N = 478) 575.55
0.99
0.88
0.021
[0.000, 0.033]
1 (N = 577) 726.56
0.98
0.88
0.030
[0.021, 0.039]
2 (N = 553) 673.93
0.99
0.89
0.019
[0.000, 0.030]
3 (N = 558) 729.14
0.98
0.88
0.029
[0.019, 0.038]
4 (N = 566) 621.79
0.99
0.89
0.022
[0.009, 0.032]
5 (N = 575) 662.61
0.99
0.89
0.021
[0.005, 0.031]
Wtd. Avg.
682.82
0.99
0.89
0.024
[0.016, 0.032]
SEAvg
22.736 0.003
0.003
0.002
Note: df = 114

SRMR
0.074
0.074
0.066
0.073
0.072
0.069
0.071
0.002

PGFI
0.65
0.65
0.67
0.65
0.66
0.66
0.66
0.004

PCFI
0.731
0.724
0.745
0.724
0.734
0.734
0.732
0.004

ECVI
1.36
1.32
1.15
1.34
1.19
1.17
1.23
0.045

The difference of χ2 test revealed a statistically significant decrease in model
misfit in the imputed data sets (Δχ2Imputed Avg[1] = 19.143, p < 0.0001). The reduction in
model misfit, however, was significant only within a 94% confidence interval for the
unimputed data set (Δχ2Unimputed [1] = 3.73, p = 0.053). Since the modification reduced a
significant amount of misfit across the imputed data sets and nearly significant in the
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unimputed data sets, I concluded that the modification should be retained. Therefore, the
modification indices for Model C3Aiii were examined for further calibration (Table 44).
Table 44
Model C3Aiii Maximum Modification Indices
Imputation Maximum Modification Index
0
32.26
1
53.13
2
45.28
3
65.74
4
39.93
5
39.26

Associated Parameter to Add
TD (8, 6); Covariance between Item 12 and 14 errors
TD (4, 1); Covariance between Item 1 and 4 errors
TE (8, 3); Covariance between Item 7 and 11 errors
TE (7, 3); Covariance between Item 7 and 10 errors
TD (8, 7); Covariance between Item 13 and 14 errors
TH (5, 4); Covariance between Item 8 and 17 errors

Of the potential modifications for Model C3Aiii, none were theoretically relevant
except the covariance of Item 12 and 14 errors and of Item 13 and 14 errors. Both of
these item pairs measured the same content area but different underlying misconceptions.
Therefore, I considered these modifications to be theoretically marginal. Furthermore, the
magnitudes of MIs appeared small relative to previous models, so I concluded that Model
C3Aiii represented the best calibration of Model C3A for these data (Figure 27).

Figure 27. Final Structural Model C3Aiii.
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Validation of Model C3Aiii. To examine the convergent validity of Model C3Aiii,
the goodness of fit statistics were computed based on the validation sample (Table 45).
Table 45
Model C3Aiii Goodness of Fit Indices from Validation Samples
Imputation
χ2
CFI
GFI
RMSEA
RMSEA 90% CI
0 (N = 449)
626.37
0.98
0.86
0.026
[0.012, 0.037]
1 (N = 556)
615.57
0.99
0.89
0.020
[0.000, 0.030]
2 (N = 580)
727.21
0.98
0.88
0.029
[0.019, 0.037]
3 (N = 575)
753.28
0.98
0.88
0.029
[0.019, 0.038]
4 (N = 567)
639.74
0.99
0.90
0.021
[0.0064, 0.031]
5 (N = 558)
687.05
0.98
0.88
0.027
[0.017, 0.037]
Wtd. Avg.
683.92
0.98
0.89
0.025
[0.018, 0.032]
SEAvg
28.851
0.003
0.004
0.002
Note: df = 114

SRMR
0.081
0.070
0.076
0.077
0.068
0.073
0.073
0.002

PGFI
0.64
0.67
0.66
0.66
0.67
0.66
0.664
0.003

PCFI
0.729
0.745
0.735
0.735
0.737
0.735
0.737
0.002

ECVI
1.52
1.14
1.27
1.28
1.12
1.25
1.21
0.038

The goodness of fit statistics were then compared to those based on the calibration
sample using a t-test to compare the difference in the point estimates (Table 46).
Table 46
Model C3Aiii Comparison of Calibration and Validation Sample Fit Indices
Imputation
χ2
CFI
GFI
RMSEA
SRMR

PGFI

PCFI

ECVI

Imputed Data Set t value

-1.70

-1.58

0.55

-0.04

0.67

0.00

-0.50

-1.00

No statistic from the imputed data sets was significantly different for the
calibration and validation samples (i.e., all t values less than 1.96), indicating that Model
C3Aiii fit the validation and calibration samples equally well. I, therefore, concluded that
the model had good convergent validity across samples.
Calibration of Model C3B. The potential modifications of covarying Item 11 and
12 errors, Item 1 and 4 errors, and Items 15 and 16 errors were considered theoretically
weak because they did not measure the same content knowledge or underlying
misconception. Because Items 5 and 15 measured the same underlying misconception,
the covariance of their errors was added to the model (Table 47).
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Table 47
Model C3Bii Goodness of Fit Indices, Covary Item 5 and 15 Errors
Imputation
χ2
CFI
GFI
RMSEA RMSEA 90% CI
0 (N = 478) 580.28
0.99
0.88
0.021
[0.000, 0.033]
1 (N = 577) 752.43
0.97
0.87
0.032
[0.023, 0.041]
2 (N = 553) 678.98
0.99
0.89
0.018
[0.000, 0.029]
3 (N = 558) 764.96
0.98
0.87
0.031
[0.021, 0.040]
4 (N = 566) 630.49
0.99
0.89
0.023
[0.0099, 0.033]
5 (N = 575) 687.72
0.99
0.89
0.022
[0.0083, 0.032]
Wtd. Avg.
703.00
0.98
0.88
0.025
[0.015, 0.035]
SEAvg
27.783 0.004 0.005
0.003
Note: df = 115

SRMR
0.075
0.075
0.066
0.075
0.073
0.070
0.072
0.002

PGFI
0.66
0.66
0.67
0.65
0.67
0.67
0.66
0.004

PCFI
0.743
0.736
0.745
0.732
0.745
0.745
0.741
0.003

ECVI
1.36
1.31
1.14
1.40
1.20
1.20
1.25
0.052

The difference of χ2 test revealed a statistically significant decrease in model
misfit for both the unimputed data set (listwise deletion) and the imputed data sets
(Δχ2Unimputed [1] = 28.4, p < 0.0001; Δχ2Imputed Avg[1] = 13.741, p = 0.0002). Therefore,
Model C3Bii was retained, and the modification indices were examined (Table 48).
Table 48
Model C3Bii Maximum Modification Indices
Imputation Maximum Modification Index
0
32.22
1
58.08
2
127.66
3
61.75
4
37.65
5
52.48

Associated Parameter to Add
TH (1, 7); Covariance between Item 1 and 10 errors
TD (4, 1); Covariance between Item 1 and 4 errors
TH (6, 8); Covariance between Item 11 and 12 errors
TD (4, 1); Covariance between Item 1 and 4 errors
TD (8, 7); Covariance between Item 13 and 14 errors
TH (8, 1); Covariance between Item 5 and 14 errors

Items 1 and 10, Items 1 and 4, Items 5 and 14, and Items 11 and 12 measured
different content knowledge and underlying misconceptions, so they were discarded as
potential modifications. Items 13 and 14, on the other hand, both measured rational
number content while examining different underlying misconceptions. In this case, the
underlying misconceptions were rational number meaning and absolute/relative
comparisons, and both examined rational number content. The relationship between these
two misconceptions, therefore, warranted the addition of this covariance parameter to the
model (Table 49).
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Table 49
Model C3Biii Goodness of Fit Indices, Covary Item 13 and 14 Errors
Imputation
χ2
CFI
GFI
RMSEA RMSEA 90% CI
0 (N = 478) 579.49
0.99
0.88
0.022
[0.000, 0.033]
1 (N = 577) 751.81
0.97
0.87
0.032
[0.024, 0.041]
2 (N = 553) 678.80
0.99
0.89
0.019
[0.000, 0.030]
3 (N = 558) 764.66
0.98
0.87
0.031
[0.022, 0.040]
4 (N = 566) 592.02
0.99
0.89
0.019
[0.000, 0.030]
5 (N = 575) 686.72
0.99
0.89
0.022
[0.0093, 0.032]
Wtd. Avg.
694.87
0.98
0.88
0.025
[0.014, 0.035]
SEAvg
34.474 0.004 0.005
0.003
Note: df = 114

SRMR
0.075
0.075
0.066
0.075
0.071
0.070
0.071
0.002

PGFI
0.65
0.65
0.67
0.65
0.67
0.66
0.66
0.005

PCFI
0.73
0.72
0.75
0.73
0.75
0.73
0.736
0.007

ECVI
1.36
1.38
1.14
1.40
1.14
1.21
1.25
0.064

The difference of χ2 test revealed a statistically significant decrease in model
misfit in the imputed data sets (Δχ2Imputed Avg[1] = 8.121, p = 0.004). The reduction in
model misfit, however, was non-significant for the unimputed data (Δχ2Unimputed [1] =
0.79, p = 0.374). Furthermore, the ECVI values increased, suggesting that whatever
model misfit was eliminated by the new parameter was the result of overfitting the model
to a sample. Therefore, I removed this parameter and retained Model C3Bii as the best
calibration of this model for these data (Figure 28).

Figure 28. Final Structural Model C3Bii.
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Validation of Model C3Bii. To examine the convergent validity of Model C3Aiii,
the goodness of fit statistics were computed based on the validation sample (Table 50).
Table 50
Model C3Bii Goodness of Fit Indices from Validation Samples
Imputation
χ2
CFI
GFI
RMSEA RMSEA 90% CI
0 (N = 449)
627.99
0.98
0.86
0.025
[0.0093, 0.036]
1 (N = 556)
611.02
0.99
0.89
0.019
[0.000, 0.030]
2 (N = 580)
754.73
0.98
0.88
0.029
[0.020, 0.038]
3 (N = 575)
764.78
0.98
0.88
0.029
[0.020, 0.038]
4 (N = 567)
641.47
0.99
0.90
0.020
[0.0037, 0.031]
5 (N = 558)
698.49
0.98
0.88
0.027
[0.017, 0.037]
Wtd. Avg.
693.31
0.98
0.89
0.025
[0.017, 0.033]
SEAvg
33.881
0.003 0.004
0.002
Note: df = 115

SRMR
0.081
0.070
0.077
0.078
0.068
0.074
0.073
0.002

PGFI
0.65
0.67
0.66
0.66
0.67
0.66
0.66
0.003

PCFI
0.741
0.745
0.735
0.735
0.737
0.735
0.737
0.002

ECVI
1.50
1.13
1.30
1.30
1.11
1.26
1.22
0.047

The goodness of fit statistics were then compared to those from the calibration
sample using a t-test to compare the difference in the point estimates (Table 51).
Table 51
Model C3Bii Comparison of Calibration and Validation Sample Fit Indices
Imputation
χ2
CFI
GFI
RMSEA SRMR

PGFI

PCFI

ECVI

Imputed Data Set t value

0.00

1.57

0.63

0.31

0.00

-0.88

0.00

-0.50

No statistic from the imputed data sets was significantly different for the
calibration and validation samples (i.e., all t values less than 1.96), indicating that Model
C3Bii fit the validation and calibration samples equally well. I, therefore, concluded that
the model had good convergent validity across samples.
Analysis of Model D
Calibration. The original hypothesized Model D specified Rational Number
Misconceptions as the sole independent variable with Probability, Algebra, and Geometry
Misconceptions acting as dependent variables. The goodness of fit indices indicated an
excellent fit (Table 52).
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Table 52
Model D Goodness of Fit Indices from Calibration Samples
Imputation
χ2a
CFI
GFI
RMSEA
RMSEA 90% CI
0 (N = 478)
607.05
0.99
0.87
0.023
[0.008, 0.034]
1 (N = 577)
756.98
0.97
0.87
0.032
[0.023, 0.040]
2 (N = 553)
682.40
0.99
0.89
0.018
[0.000, 0.029]
3 (N = 558)
744.63
0.98
0.87
0.031
[0.021, 0.040]
4 (N = 566)
649.92
0.98
0.88
0.026
[0.015, 0.035]
5 (N = 575)
710.91
0.99
0.88
0.024
[0.013, 0.034]
Wtd. Avg.
709.18
0.98
0.88
0.026
[0.017, 0.036]
SEAvg
22.042
0.004
0.004
0.003
Note: df = 116

SRMR
0.075
0.075
0.066
0.074
0.074
0.071
0.072
0.002

PGFI
0.66
0.66
0.68
0.66
0.67
0.67
0.67
0.004

PCFI
0.751
0.736
0.756
0.743
0.746
0.754
0.747
0.004

ECVI
1.41
1.39
1.14
1.41
1.27
1.25
1.29
0.055

The maximum MIs for Model D called for the addition of several error covariance
terms (Table 53).
Table 53
Model D Maximum Modification Indices from Calibration Samples
Imputation
Maximum Modification Index
Associated Parameter to Add
0
37.24
TE(3,1); Covariance between Item 1 and 3 errors
1
62.53
TE(4,1); Covariance between Item 1 and 4 errors
2
44.08
TE(13,8); Covariance between Item 7 and 11 errors
3
113.58
TE(13,7); Covariance between Item 6 and 11 errors
4
46.16
TH(4, 10); Covariance between Item 15 and 16 errors
5
71.34
TH(4, 6); Covariance between Item 5 and 15 errors

The covariances of the error terms for Items 7 and 11, Items 6 and 11, and Items
15 and 16 were considered theoretically weak because they shared neither common
content knowledge nor underlying misconception. The covariances of the error terms for
Items 1 and 3 and Items 1 and 4 were considered theoretically marginal because they
measured the same content knowledge but not the same underlying misconception. The
covariance of the error terms for Items 5 and 15 was also considered theoretically
marginal because the items measured the same underlying misconception but not the
same content knowledge. To decide whether to add a parameter, and if so, which one, I
also considered that Item 3 measured Rational Number Meaning misconceptions while
Item 1 measured Absolute/Relative Comparison misconceptions, two misconceptions that
are closely related. Finally, I considered that the covariance of Items 5 and 15 had been
used in previous models to reduce a statistically significant amount of model misfit, that

171

the MI for Items 5 and 15 was the second highest across the data sets, and that the MI for
Items 1 and 3 was the lowest across the data sets. Therefore, I chose to add the
covariance between Item 5 and 15 error terms to Model D (Table 54).
Table 54
Model D2 Goodness of Fit Indices, Covary Item 5and 15 Errors
Imputation
χ2
CFI
GFI
RMSEA RMSEA 90% CI
0 (N = 478) 579.13
0.99
0.88
0.021
[0.000, 0.032]
1 (N = 577) 755.81
0.97
0.87
0.032
[0.023, 0.041]
2 (N = 553) 680.76
0.99
0.89
0.018
[0.000, 0.029]
3 (N = 558) 737.37
0.98
0.87
0.030
[0.020, 0.039]
4 (N = 566) 630.43
0.99
0.89
0.023
[0.010, 0.033]
5 (N = 575) 675.78
0.99
0.89
0.021
[0.0066, 0.031]
Wtd. Avg.
696.15
0.98
0.88
0.025
[0.015, 0.035]
SEAvg
25.285 0.004 0.005
0.003
Note: df = 115

SRMR
0.075
0.075
0.066
0.074
0.073
0.070
0.072
0.002

PGFI
0.66
0.66
0.67
0.66
0.67
0.67
0.67
0.003

PCFI
0.743
0.736
0.745
0.743
0.745
0.745
0.743
0.002

ECVI
1.36
1.38
1.14
1.38
1.21
1.19
1.26
0.056

The difference of χ2 test revealed a statistically significant decrease in model
misfit for both the unimputed data set (listwise deletion) and the imputed data sets
(Δχ2Unimputed [1] = 27.92, p < 0.0001; Δχ2Imputed Avg[1] = 13.031, p = 0.0003). Therefore,
Model D2 was retained, and the modification indices were examined (Table 55).
Table 55
Model D2 Maximum Modification Indices from Calibration Samples
Imputation Maximum Modification Index
Associated Parameter to Add
0
37.03
TE(3,1); Covariance between Item 1 and 3 errors
1
62.45
TE(4,1); Covariance between Item 1 and 4 errors
2
44.22
TE(13,8); Covariance between Item 7 and 11 errors
3
125.79
TE(13,7); Covariance between Item 6 and 11 errors
4
56.68
TE(13, 11); Covariance between Item 9 and 11 errors
5
40.62
TE(12, 11); Covariance between Item 9 and 10 errors

The covariance of Item 9 and 10 error terms offered the theoretically strongest
adjustment to Model D2. Table 56 displays the goodness of fit statistics for the new
model resulting from this parameter (Model D3).
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Table 56
Model D3 Goodness of Fit Indices, Covary Item 9 and 10 Errors
Imputation
χ2
CFI
GFI
RMSEA RMSEA 90% CI
0 (N = 478) 575.78
0.99
0.88
0.021
[0.000, 0.033]
1 (N = 577) 724.69
0.98
0.88
0.030
[0.020, 0.039]
2 (N = 553) 676.54
0.99
0.89
0.019
[0.000, 0.030]
3 (N = 558) 712.22
0.98
0.88
0.029
[0.019, 0.038]
4 (N = 566) 622.22
0.99
0.89
0.023
[0.0095, 0.033]
5 (N = 575) 650.53
0.99
0.89
0.020
[0.000, 0.030]
Wtd. Avg.
677.24
0.99
0.89
0.024
[0.016, 0.033]
SEAvg
21.237 0.003 0.003
0.003
Note: df = 114

SRMR
0.074
0.074
0.066
0.072
0.072
0.068
0.070
0.002

PGFI
0.65
0.65
0.67
0.65
0.66
0.67
0.66
0.005

PCFI
0.731
0.724
0.745
0.724
0.734
0.745
0.734
0.005

ECVI
1.35
1.32
1.14
1.35
1.19
1.16
1.23
0.048

The difference of χ2 test revealed a statistically significant decrease in model
misfit in the imputed data sets (Δχ2Imputed Avg[1] = 18.907, p < 0.0001). The reduction in
model misfit, however, was significant only within a 93% confidence interval for the
unimputed data set (Δχ2Unimputed [1] = 3.35, p = 0.067). To decide whether to retain the
model, I considered three characteristics of the analysis: (1) The large amount of model
misfit removed across the imputed data sets, (2) The proximity of the significance level
of the unimputed data set to a 95% confidence interval, and (3) The theoretical strength
of the additional parameter. I concluded, therefore, that the modification should be
retained and the modification indices for Model D3 were examined for further calibration
(Table 57).
Table 57
Model D3 Maximum Modification Indices from Calibration Samples
Imputation
Maximum Modification Index
Associated Parameter to Add
0
2268.68
LY (1,3); Crossloading, Geometry to Item 1
1
62.40
TE(4,1); Covariance between Item 1 and 4 errors
2
44.31
TE(13,8); Covariance between Item 7 and 11 errors
3
78.97
TE(12,8); Covariance between Item 7 and 10 errors
4
38.25
TD(3, 2); Covariance between Item 13 and 14 errors
5
39.06
TE(9, 5); Covariance between Item 8 and 17 errors

I found no theoretical support for adding the crossloading from geometry to Item
1; furthermore, the size of the MI exceeded the total amount of misfit in the model, so
this MI was disregarded. The addition of the covariances between Items 1 and 4, Items 7
and 11, Items 7 and 10, and Items 8 and 17 were also disregarded as theoretically weak
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because each pair of items measured different content knowledge and underlying
misconception. Items 13 and 14, however, measured the same content knowledge, so
their error covariance was considered theoretically plausible, and the parameter was
added to the model. Table 58 displays the goodness of fit statistics for the resultant model
(Model D4).
Table 58
Model D4 Goodness of Fit Indices, Covary Item 13 and 14 Errors
Imputation
χ2
CFI
GFI
RMSEA RMSEA 90% CI
0 (N = 478)
574.99
0.99
0.88
0.022
[0.000, 0.033]
1 (N = 577)
724.59
0.98
0.88
0.030
[0.021, 0.039]
2 (N = 553)
676.08
0.99
0.89
0.019
[0.000, 0.030]
3 (N = 558)
711.55
0.98
0.88
0.029
[0.019, 0.038]
4 (N = 566)
583.40
0.99
0.90
0.019
[0.000, 0.030]
5 (N = 575)
649.62
0.99
0.89
0.020
[0.0036, 0.031]
Wtd. Avg.
669.05
0.99
0.89
0.023
[0.014, 0.033]
SEAvg
28.122
0.003 0.004
0.003
Note: df = 113

SRMR
0.074
0.074
0.066
0.072
0.070
0.068
0.070
0.002

PGFI
0.65
0.65
0.66
0.65
0.66
0.66
0.66
0.003

PCFI
0.731
0.724
0.734
0.724
0.726
0.734
0.728
0.003

ECVI
1.36
1.32
1.14
1.35
1.13
1.16
1.22
0.053

The difference of χ2 test revealed a statistically significant decrease in model
misfit in the imputed data sets (Δχ2Imputed Avg[1] = 8.194, p = 0.004). The reduction in
model misfit, however, was non-significant for the unimputed data (Δχ2Unimputed [1] =
0.79, p = 0.374). Therefore, D4 was discarded; and as a result of no other theoretically
reasonable MIs, Model D3 was retained as the best calibration of Model D for these data
(Figure 29).
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Figure 29. Final Structural Model D3.

Validation of Model D3. To examine the convergent validity of Model D3, the
goodness of fit statistics were computed based on the validation sample (Table 59).
Table 59
Model D3 Goodness of Fit Indices from Validation Samples
CFI
GFI
RMSEA RMSEA 90% CI
Imputation
χ2
0 (N = 449) 628.51
0.98
0.86
0.026
[0.011, 0.037]
1 (N = 556) 592.18
0.99
0.90
0.018
[0.000, 0.029]
2 (N = 580) 704.41
0.98
0.88
0.028
[0.017, 0.037]
3 (N = 575) 755.89
0.98
0.88
0.029
[0.019, 0.038]
4 (N = 567) 612.77
0.99
0.90
0.019
[0.000, 0.030]
5 (N = 558) 665.66
0.98
0.89
0.0267
[0.015, 0.035]
Wtd. Avg.
665.46
0.98
0.89
0.024
[0.015, 0.033]
SEAvg
33.392 0.003 0.005
0.003
Note: df = 114

SRMR
0.081
0.068
0.074
0.077
0.067
0.072
0.072
0.002

PGFI
0.64
0.67
0.66
0.66
0.67
0.66
0.66
0.003

PCFI
0.729
0.737
0.735
0.735
0.737
0.727
0.734
0.002

ECVI
1.51
1.12
1.25
1.28
1.09
1.22
1.19
0.041

The goodness of fit statistics were then compared to those from the calibration
sample using a t-test to compare the difference in the point estimates (Table 60).
Table 60
Model D3 Comparison of Calibration and Validation Sample Fit Indices
Imputation
χ2
CFI
GFI
RMSEA
SRMR

PGFI

PCFI

ECVI

Imputed Data Set t value

-1.00

-0.05

0.91

0.42

0.68

-1.00

-0.03

-0.77

No statistic from the imputed data sets was significantly different for the
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calibration and validation samples (i.e., all t values less than 1.96), indicating that Model
D3 fit the validation and calibration samples equally well. I, therefore, concluded that the
model had good convergent validity across samples.
Analysis of Model E
Calibration. Model E reversed the relationship between probability and rational
numbers from Model D, specifying misconceptions in probability as the independent
variable with misconceptions in rational number, algebra, and geometry acting as
dependent variables. The goodness of fit indices suggested that the Model E fit the
calibration data very well (Table 61).
Table61
Model E Goodness of Fit Indices from Calibration Samples
Imputation
χ2
CFI
GFI
RMSEA RMSEA 90% CI
0 (N = 478) 606.76
0.99
0.87
0.024
[0.009, 0.035]
1 (N = 577) 751.43
0.98
0.87
0.031
[0.022, 0.040]
2 (N = 553) 680.20
0.99
0.89
0.018
[0.000, 0.029]
3 (N = 558) 778.03
0.98
0.87
0.032
[0.023, 0.041]
4 (N = 566) 646.52
0.99
0.88
0.025
[0.014, 0.034]
5 (N = 575) 716.60
0.99
0.88
0.025
[0.013, 0.034]
Wtd. Avg.
714.68
0.99
0.88
0.026
[0.017, 0.035]
SEAvg
26.460 0.003
0.004
0.003
Note: df = 116

SRMR
0.075
0.076
0.066
0.076
0.074
0.072
0.073
0.002

PGFI
0.66
0.66
0.68
0.66
0.67
0.67
0.67
0.004

PCFI
0.751
0.743
0.734
0.743
0.765
0.743
0.746
0.006

ECVI
1.42
1.37
1.15
1.44
1.25
1.25
1.29
0.057

The maximum modification indices for Model E called for the addition of
covariance parameters between the error terms for Items 5 and 15, Items 7 and 12, Items
6 and 12, and Items 13 and 14 (Table 62).
Table 62
Model E Maximum Modification Indices from Calibration Samples
Imputation Maximum Modification Index
Associated Parameter to Add
0
33.17
TE(5, 4); Covariance between Item 5 and 15 errors
1
339.07
TE(7, 1); Covariance between Item 7 and 12 errors
2
42.79
TE(6, 1); Covariance between Item 6 and 12 errors
3
894.64
TE(6, 1); Covariance between Item 6 and 12 errors
4
68.22
TE(3, 2); Covariance between Item 13 and 14 errors
5
361.69
TE(5, 4); Covariance between Item 5 and 15 errors

The item pairs Items 6 and 12, Items 7 and 12, and Items 5 and 15 measured the
same underlying misconception, so they were considered theoretically plausible. Item 13
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and 14 measured the same content knowledge, so it was also considered theoretically
plausible. Because the highest MI called for the addition of the error covariance between
Items 6 and 12 and because that MI was called for by two data sets, I chose to disregard
the fact that the highest MI was also larger than the total unaccounted variance in the
model and added this parameter first (Table 63).
Table 63
Model E2 Goodness of Fit Indices from Calibration Samples, Covary Item 6 and 12 Errors
Imputation
χ2
CFI
GFI
RMSEA RMSEA 90% CI SRMR PGFI
0 (N = 478)
598.94
0.99
0.87
0.024
[0.0097, 0.035]
0.074
0.65
1 (N = 577)
729.62
0.98
0.87
0.031
[0.022, 0.040]
0.074
0.66
2 (N = 553)
633.47
0.99
0.90
0.017
[0.000, 0.028]
0.065
0.67
3 (N = 558)
761.00
0.98
0.87
0.032
[0.023, 0.041]
0.076
0.65
4 (N = 566)
632.07
0.99
0.89
0.024
[0.013, 0.034]
0.073
0.67
5 (N = 575)
704.59
0.99
0.88
0.024
[0.013, 0.034]
0.071
0.66
Wtd. Avg.
692.41
0.99
0.88
0.026
0.072
0.66
SEAvg
28.888
0.003 0.007
0.003
0.002
0.004
Note: df = 115

PCFI
0.740
0.743
0.737
0.732
0.745
0.743
0.740
0.003

ECVI
1.42
1.36
1.13
1.43
1.24
1.25
1.28
0.058

The difference of χ2 test revealed a statistically significant decrease in model
misfit for both the unimputed data set (listwise deletion) and the imputed data sets
(Δχ2Unimputed [1] = 7.82, p = 0.005; Δχ2Imputed Avg[1] = 22.274, p < 0.0001). Therefore,
Model E2 was retained, and the modification indices were examined (Table 64).
Table 64
Model E2 Maximum Modification Indices from Calibration Samples
Imputation Maximum Modification Index
Associated Parameter to Add
0
36.16
TE(7, 6); Covariance between Item 6 and 7 errors
1
68.61
LY(5, 1); Crossloading, Rational Number to Item 5
2
42.79
TE(6, 1); Covariance between Item 6 and 12 errors
3
420.34
TE(7, 5); Covariance between Item 5 and 7 errors
4
67.67
TE(3, 2); Covariance between Item 13 and 14 errors
5
289.01
TE(5, 4); Covariance between Item 5 and 15 errors

The error covariance of Items 6 and 12 was rejected as theoretically implausible
because the two items shared neither content area or underlying misconception. Items 13
and 14, Items 5 and 15, and Items 5 and 7 were considered theoretically plausible
because each pair shared content area while measuring different underlying
misconceptions. The error covariance between Items 6 and 7 offered the theoretically
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strongest MI; both items measured the same content area and underlying misconception.
So, although the MI for this parameter was the smallest across the data sets, I chose to
add it to the model next (Table 65).
Table 65
Model E3 Goodness of Fit Indices from Calibration Samples, Covary Item 6 and 7 Errors
Imputation
χ2
CFI
GFI
RMSEA RMSEA 90% CI SRMR PGFI
0 (N = 478)
592.29
0.99
0.87
0.024
[0.0084, 0.035]
0.074
0.65
1 (N = 577)
705.52
0.98
0.88
0.030
[0.021, 0.039]
0.074
0.65
2 (N = 553)
627.37
0.99
0.90
0.016
[0.000, 0.028]
0.065
0.67
3 (N = 558)
752.80
0.98
0.87
0.032
[0.023, 0.041]
0.075
0.65
4 (N = 566)
629.14
0.99
0.89
0.025
[0.013, 0.034]
0.073
0.66
5 (N = 575)
700.17
0.99
0.88
0.024
[0.013, 0.034]
0.071
0.66
Wtd. Avg.
683.20
0.99
0.88
0.025
0.072
0.66
SEAvg
27.007
0.003 0.006
0.003
0.002
0.004
Note: df = 114

PCFI
0.740
0.724
0.737
0.732
0.734
0.743
0.734
0.003

ECVI
1.41
1.34
1.12
1.42
1.23
1.24
1.27
0.057

The difference of χ2 test revealed a statistically significant decrease in model
misfit for both the unimputed data set (listwise deletion) and the imputed data sets
(Δχ2Unimputed [1] = 6.65, p = 0.010; Δχ2Imputed Avg[1] = 9.21, p < 0.002). Therefore, Model
E3 was retained, and the modification indices were examined (Table 66).
Table 66
Model E3 Maximum Modification Indices from Calibration Samples
Imputation Maximum Modification Index
Associated Parameter to Add
0
45.07
TE(12, 10); Covariance between Item 9 and 11 errors
1
81.17
LY(7, 1); Crossloading, Rational Number to Item 7
2
90.93
TE(12, 1); Covariance between Item 11 and 12 errors
3
1423.41
TE(5, 1); Covariance between Item 5 and 12 errors
4
131.15
TE(4, 1); Covariance between Item 12 and 15 errors
5
186.00
TE(5, 4); Covariance between Item 5 and 15 errors

The crossloading from rational number to Item 7 along with the error covariances
of Items 5 and 12 and Items 11 and 12 were considered theoretically weak (i.e., no
matching content knowledge or underlying misconception). The error covariances of
Items 9 and 11 and Items 12 and 15 were considered theoretically plausible because each
pair measured the same content knowledge or underlying misconception. The error
covariance of Items 5 and 15 was considered the strongest plausible modification because
each item measured rational number meaning misconceptions. Table 67 displays the
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goodness of fit indices for the model resulting from the addition of this parameter.
Table 67
Model E4 Goodness of Fit Indices from Calibration Samples, Covary Item 5 and 15 Errors
CFI
GFI
RMSEA RMSEA 90% CI SRMR PGFI
Imputation
χ2
0 (N = 478)
561.19
0.99
0.88
0.021
[0.000, 0.032]
0.073
0.65
1 (N = 577)
703.79
0.98
0.88
0.031
[0.021, 0.039]
0.074
0.65
2 (N = 553)
626.72
0.99
0.90
0.017
[0.000, 0.029]
0.064
0.66
3 (N = 558)
744.57
0.98
0.87
0.031
[0.021, 0.040]
0.075
0.64
4 (N = 566)
609.20
0.99
0.89
0.022
[0.0074, 0.032]
0.072
0.66
5 (N = 575)
661.25
0.99
0.89
0.021
[0.0055, 0.031]
0.069
0.66
Wtd. Avg.
669.20
0.99
0.89
0.024
[0.014, 0.035]
0.071
0.66
SEAvg
27.777
0.003 0.006
0.003
0.002
0.004
Note: df = 113

PCFI
0.731
0.724
0.726
0.721
0.734
0.734
0.728
0.003

ECVI
1.34
1.33
1.12
1.39
1.17
1.17
1.24
0.058

The difference of χ2 test revealed a statistically significant decrease in model
misfit for both the unimputed data set (listwise deletion) and the imputed data sets
(Δχ2Unimputed [1] = 31.1, p < 0.0001; Δχ2Imputed Avg[1] = 14.003, p = 0.0002). Therefore,
Model E4 was retained, and the modification indices were examined (Table 68).
Table 68
Model E4 Maximum Modification Indices from Calibration Samples
Imputation Maximum Modification Index
Associated Parameter to Add
0
32.06
TH(1, 11); Covariance between Item 1 and 10 errors
1
439.59
LY(7, 1); Crossloading, Rational Number to Item 7
2
83.13
TE(12, 1); Covariance between Item 11 and 12 errors
3
310.83
TH(2, 6); Covariance between Item 2 and 6 errors
4
76.70
TE(6, 5); Covariance between Item 5 and 6 errors
5
37.32
TH(5, 8); Covariance between Item 8 and 17 errors

None of the potential modifications to the model were theoretically plausible
except for the error covariance between Items 5 and 6, which both measured algebra
content knowledge. Therefore, the goodness of fit statistics for the resultant model were
examined (Table 69).
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Table 69
Model E5 Goodness of Fit Indices from Calibration Samples, Covary Item 5 and 6 Errors
Imputation
χ2
CFI
GFI
RMSEA RMSEA 90% CI SRMR PGFI
0 (N = 478) 545.31
0.99
0.88
0.020
[0.000, 0.032]
0.073
0.65
1 (N = 577) 695.07
0.98
0.88
0.031
[0.021, 0.039]
0.076
0.64
2 (N = 553) 602.29
0.99
0.90
0.016
[0.000, 0.028]
0.065
0.66
3 (N = 558) 736.66
0.98
0.87
0.031
[0.021, 0.040]
0.074
0.64
4 (N = 566) 587.68
0.99
0.89
0.021
[0.0041, 0.031]
0.071
0.65
5 (N = 575) 655.41
0.99
0.89
0.021
[0.0054, 0.031]
0.069
0.65
Wtd. Avg.
655.59
0.99
0.89
0.024
[0.013, 0.035]
0.071
0.65
SEAvg
31.209 0.003 0.006
0.003
0.002
0.004
Note: df = 112

PCFI
0.731
0.713
0.726
0.721
0.723
0.723
0.721
0.002

ECVI
1.32
1.32
1.10
1.37
1.15
1.16
1.22
0.059

The difference of χ2 test revealed a statistically significant decrease in model
misfit for both the unimputed data set (listwise deletion) and the imputed data sets
(Δχ2Unimputed [1] = 15.88, p < 0.0001; Δχ2Imputed Avg[1] = 13.606, p = 0.0002). Therefore,
Model E5 was retained, and the modification indices were examined (Table 70).
Table 70
Model E5 Maximum Modification Indices from Calibration Samples
Imputation Maximum Modification Index
Associated Parameter to Add
0
32.97
TH(1, 11); Covariance between Item 1 and 10 errors
1
56.44
TD(4, 1); Covariance between Item 1 and 4 errors
2
95.82
TE(11, 1); Covariance between Item 10 and 12 errors
3
83.26
TE(5, 1); Covariance between Item 5 and 12 errors
4
63.65
TE(3, 2); Covariance between Item 13 and 14 errors
5
37.17
TE(11, 10); Covariance between Item 9 and 10 errors

The error covariances between Items 1 and 10, Items 1 and 4, Items 10 and 12,
and Items 5 and 12 were considered theoretically weak because the item pairs did not
measure the same content knowledge or underlying misconception. The error covariance
between Items 13 and 14 seemed theoretically plausible because both items measured
rational number content knowledge, and both underlying misconceptions were related
(i.e., absolute/relative comparison and rational number meaning misconceptions). The
error covariance between Items 9 and 10 seemed the strongest theoretically because both
items measured the same content area (geometry) and the same underlying misconception
(spatial reasoning). The goodness of fit indices for the resultant model were therefore
computed (Table 71).
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Table 71
Model E6 Goodness of Fit Indices from Calibration Samples, Covary Item 9 and 10 Errors
Imputation
χ2
CFI
GFI
RMSEA RMSEA 90% CI SRMR PGFI
0 (N = 478) 542.33
0.99
0.88
0.020
[0.000, 0.032]
0.072
0.64
1 (N = 577) 663.77
0.98
0.88
0.028
[0.018, 0.037]
0.074
0.64
2 (N = 553) 597.31
0.99
0.90
0.016
[0.000, 0.028]
0.065
0.65
3 (N = 558) 713.58
0.98
0.88
0.030
[0.020, 0.039]
0.073
0.64
4 (N = 566) 579.89
0.99
0.90
0.020
[0.0024, 0.031]
0.070
0.65
5 (N = 575) 630.88
0.99
0.90
0.020
[0.000, 0.030]
0.068
0.65
Wtd. Avg.
637.14
0.99
0.89
0.023
[0.013, 0.033]
0.070
0.65
SEAvg
26.757 0.003 0.005
0.003
0.002
0.003
Note: df = 111

PCFI
0.720
0.713
0.715
0.713
0.715
0.715
0.714
0.001

ECVI
1.31
1.26
1.10
1.35
1.13
1.13
1.19
0.053

The difference of χ2 test revealed a statistically significant decrease in model
misfit in the imputed data sets (Δχ2Imputed Avg[1] = 18.455, p < 0.0001). The reduction in
model misfit for the unimputed data, however, was only significant at the 91%
confidence level (Δχ2Unimputed [1] = 2.98, p = 0.084). I considered four criteria to
determine that the model should be retained: (1) The unimputed data model was nearly
significant and clearly no worse than the previous model, (2) The modification removed a
large amount of misfit compared to the 95% CI critical value of four in the imputed
model, (3) The expected cross validation values were smaller, so the addition of the
parameter did not likely overfit to the sample, and (4) Three GFI values reached the
recommended 0.90 cutoff despite non-normality. I therefore retained Model E6 and
examined its modification indices (Table 72).
Table 72
Model E6 Maximum Modification Indices from Calibration Samples
Imputation Maximum Modification Index
Associated Parameter to Add
0
45.00
TE(11, 1); Covariance between Item 10 and 12 errors
1
56.41
TD(4, 1); Covariance between Item 1 and 4 errors
2
284.54
TE(11, 1); Covariance between Item 10 and 12 errors
3
67.47
TD(4, 1); Covariance between Item 1 and 4 errors
4
62.24
TE(8, 6); Covariance between Item 6 and 8 errors
5
37.29
TH(5, 8); Covariance between Item 8 and 17 errors

The error covariances between Items 10 and 12, Items 1 and 4, and Items 8 and
17, were considered theoretically weak because the item pairs did not measure the same
content knowledge or underlying misconception. The error covariance between Items 6
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and 8 seemed theoretically plausible because both items measured algebra content
knowledge, so the parameter was added to the model, and the goodness of fit indices for
the resultant model were computed (Table 73).
Table 73
Model E7 Goodness of Fit Indices from Calibration Samples, Covary Item 6 and 8 Errors
Imputation
χ2
CFI
GFI
RMSEA RMSEA 90% CI SRMR PGFI
0 (N = 478)
527.60
0.99
0.88
0.020
[0.000, 0.032]
0.070
0.63
1 (N = 577)
648.02
0.98
0.89
0.028
[0.017, 0.037]
0.072
0.64
2 (N = 553)
595.06
0.99
0.90
0.016
[0.000, 0.028]
0.064
0.65
3 (N = 558)
697.44
0.98
0.88
0.031
[0.021, 0.040]
0.073
0.63
4 (N = 566)
540.98
0.99
0.90
0.019
[0.000, 0.030]
0.069
0.65
5 (N = 575)
618.79
0.99
0.90
0.020
[0.0027, 0.031]
0.067
0.64
Wtd. Avg.
620.06
0.99
0.89
0.023
[0.012, 0.033]
0.069
0.64
SEAvg
29.208
0.003 0.004
0.003
0.002
0.004
Note: df = 110

PCFI
0.709
0.705
0.715
0.702
0.715
0.704
0.708
0.003

ECVI
1.31
1.25
1.09
1.36
1.11
1.14
1.19
0.057

The difference of χ2 test revealed a statistically significant decrease in model
misfit for both the unimputed data set (listwise deletion) and the imputed data sets
(Δχ2Unimputed [1] = 14.73, p = 0.0001; Δχ2Imputed Avg[1] = 17.077, p < 0.0001). Therefore,
Model E7 was retained, and the modification indices were examined (Table 74).
Table 74
Model E7 Maximum Modification Indices from Calibration Samples
Imputation Maximum Modification Index
Associated Parameter to Add
0
58.10
TE(9, 6); Covariance between Item 6 and 16 errors
1
106.31
TE(6, 4); Covariance between Item 6 and 15 errors
2
167.49
TE(11, 1); Covariance between Item 10 and 12 errors
3
74.35
TE(5, 1); Covariance between Item 5 and 12 errors
4
64.56
TE(3, 2); Covariance between Item 13 and 14 errors
5
47.35
TH(5, 8); Covariance between Item 8 and 17 errors

The potential addition of the error covariances for Items 6 and 15, Items 10 and
12, Items 5 and 12, and Items 8 and 17 were discarded because each pair measured
different content knowledge and underlying misconceptions. Items 13 and 14 and Items 6
and 16, on the other hand, measured the same content knowledge. I differentiated
between the two error covariances by considering four characteristics: (1) The covariance
of Items 13 and 14 had significantly reduced model misfit in previous models, (2) The
underlying misconceptions for Items 13 and 14 were related (absolute/relative
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comparison and rational number meaning), (3) The MI for the error covariance of Items
13 and 14 was higher than for Items 6 and 16, and (4) The MI for the error covariance of
Items 6 and 16 came from the unimputed data set. Since three of the four characteristics
favored the addition of the error covariance for Items 13 and 14, this parameter was
added to the model, and the goodness of fit indices were computed (Table 75).
Table 75
Model E8 Goodness of Fit Indices from Calibration Samples, Covary Item 13 and 14 Errors
Imputation
χ2
CFI
GFI
RMSEA RMSEA 90% CI SRMR PGFI
0 (N = 478)
526.90
0.99
0.88
0.020
[0.000, 0.032]
0.070
0.63
1 (N = 577)
645.67
0.98
0.89
0.028
[0.018, 0.037]
0.072
0.63
2 (N = 553)
594.35
0.99
0.90
0.017
[0.000, 0.029]
0.064
0.64
3 (N = 558)
696.54
0.98
0.88
0.031
[0.021, 0.040]
0.073
0.62
4 (N = 566)
506.12
1.00
0.90
0.015
[0.000, 0.027]
0.067
0.64
5 (N = 575)
618.69
0.99
0.90
0.021
[0.0048, 0.031]
0.067
0.64
Wtd. Avg.
612.27
0.99
0.89
0.022
[0.011, 0.034]
0.069
0.63
SEAvg
35.220
0.004 0.004
0.003
0.002
0.004
Note: df = 109

PCFI
0.709
0.694
0.704
0.690
0.711
0.704
0.701
0.004

ECVI
1.31
1.25
1.10
1.36
1.05
1.15
1.18
0.062

The difference of χ2 test revealed a statistically significant decrease in model
misfit in the imputed data sets (Δχ2Imputed Avg[1] = 7.791, p = 0.005). The reduction in
model misfit, however, was non-significant for the unimputed data (Δχ2Unimputed [1] =
0.70, p = 0.403). To reconcile this difference of significance, I considered that, although
the imputed data showed a statistically significant change, only one of the data sets
(Imputation 4) accounted for the change across all five data sets. Consequently, I
discarded Model E8 and computed the goodness of fit indices for a re-adjusted Model E7
with its other theoretically reasonable MI, the error covariance of Items 6 and 16 (Table
76).
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Table 76
Model E8ii Goodness of Fit Indices from Calibration Samples, Covary Item 6 and 16 Errors
Imputation
χ2
CFI
GFI
RMSEA RMSEA 90% CI SRMR PGFI
0 (N = 478)
523.83
0.99
0.88
0.020
[0.000, 0.032]
0.070
0.63
1 (N = 577)
647.05
0.98
0.89
0.028
[0.018, 0.037]
0.072
0.63
2 (N = 553)
590.05
0.99
0.90
0.016
[0.000, 0.028]
0.064
0.64
3 (N = 558)
693.63
0.98
0.88
0.031
[0.021, 0.040]
0.073
0.62
4 (N = 566)
537.89
0.99
0.90
0.019
[0.000, 0.030]
0.069
0.64
5 (N = 575)
609.35
0.99
0.90
0.020
[0.0028, 0.031]
0.066
0.64
Wtd. Avg.
615.59
0.99
0.89
0.023
0.069
0.63
SEAvg
29.377
0.003 0.004
0.003
0.002
0.004
Note: df = 109

PCFI
0.709
0.694
0.704
0.690
0.704
0.704
0.699
0.003

ECVI
1.31
1.25
1.09
1.36
1.10
1.14
1.19
0.058

The difference of χ2 test revealed a statistically significant decrease in model
misfit in the imputed data sets (Δχ2Imputed Avg[1] = 4.466, p = 0.035). The reduction in
model misfit for the unimputed data, however, was only significant at the 93%
confidence level (Δχ2Unimputed [1] = 3.77, p = 0.035). Because these reductions were
generally small across the data sets, and the additional parameter was theoretically
marginal from the outset, I decided that Model E7 was the best calibration of Model E for
these data (Figure 30).

Figure 30. Final Structural Model E7.

Validation of Model E7. To examine the convergent validity of Model E7, the
goodness of fit statistics were computed based on the validation sample (Table 77).
184

Table 77
Model E7 Goodness of Fit Indices from Validation Samples
Imputation
χ2
CFI
GFI
RMSEA RMSEA 90% CI
0 (N = 449)
558.33
0.99
0.88
0.021
[0.000, 0.033]
1 (N = 556)
595.43
0.99
0.89
0.021
[0.0059, 0.032]
2 (N = 580)
670.25
0.98
0.89
0.028
[0.017, 0.037]
3 (N = 575)
727.03
0.98
0.89
0.029
[0.019, 0.038]
4 (N = 567)
635.27
0.99
0.90
0.023
[0.010, 0.033]
5 (N = 558)
652.34
0.98
0.89
0.027
[0.016, 0.036]
Wtd. Avg.
655.55
0.98
0.89
0.026
[0.020, 0.031]
SEAvg
24.189
0.003 0.002
0.002
Note: df = 110

SRMR
0.078
0.069
0.073
0.075
0.068
0.072
0.071
0.001

PGFI
0.63
0.64
0.64
0.64
0.64
0.64
0.64
0.000

PCFI
0.709
0.712
0.705
0.705
0.704
0.705
0.706
0.002

ECVI
1.40
1.15
1.23
1.25
1.14
1.22
1.20
0.025

The goodness of fit statistics were then compared to those from the calibration
sample using a t-test to compare the difference in the point estimates (Table 78).
Table 78
Model E7 Comparison of Calibration and Validation Sample Fit Indices
Imputation
χ2
CFI
GFI
RMSEA
SRMR

PGFI

PCFI

ECVI

Imputed Data Set t value

0.71

0.73

-0.17

-1.32

0.68

0.62

-1.05

-1.36

No statistic from the imputed data sets was significantly different for the
calibration and validation samples (i.e., all t values less than 1.96), indicating that Model
D3 fit the validation and calibration samples equally well. I, therefore, concluded that the
model had good convergent validity across samples.
Analysis of Model F
Calibration. Model F specified all four content area misconception factors as
covarying independent variables (Figure 24F). The goodness of fit statistics indicated an
excellent fit for the hypothesized model (Table 79).
Table 79
Model F Goodness of Fit Indices from Calibration Samples
CFI
GFI
RMSEA RMSEA 90% CI
Imputation
χ2
0 (N = 478)
602.38
0.99
0.87
0.025
[0.010, 0.036]
1 (N = 577)
734.17
0.97
0.87
0.033
[0.024, 0.041]
2 (N = 553)
667.59
0.99
0.90
0.018
[0.000, 0.029]
3 (N = 558)
722.26
0.98
0.87
0.030
[0.020, 0.039]
4 (N = 566)
632.29
0.98
0.88
0.025
[0.014, 0.035]
5 (N = 575)
694.49
0.99
0.89
0.024
[0.013, 0.034]
Wtd. Avg.
690.36
0.98
0.88
0.026
[0.017, 0.036]
SEAvg
20.683
0.004 0.007
0.003
Note: df = 113
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SRMR
0.075
0.075
0.066
0.073
0.073
0.071
0.072
0.002

PGFI
0.64
0.64
0.66
0.65
0.65
0.65
0.65
0.004

PCFI
0.762
0.747
0.726
0.732
0.724
0.723
0.730
0.005

ECVI
1.42
1.38
1.13
1.37
1.25
1.23
1.27
0.052

The maximum MIs from each data set were examined for potential parameters to
reduce model misfit (Table 77). The largest MI pointed to a crossloading between
rational number content and Item 7, an algebra item that measured additive/multiplicative
structure misconceptions. Such a parameter seemed theoretically weak, and the
magnitude of the MI (i.e., larger than the total χ2 of each model) suggested that the source
of the MI might be model instability rather than a substantive improvement in the model.
Table 80
Model F Maximum Modification Indices from Calibration Samples
Imputation Maximum Modification Index
Associated Parameter to Add
0
142.40
TD(13, 1); Covariance between Item 5 and 12 errors
1
283.01
TD(11, 4); Covariance between Item 10 and 15 errors
2
51.97
TD(13, 12); Covariance between Item 5 and 11 errors
3
8339.60
LX(15, 1); Crossloading, Rational Number to Item 7
4
69.78
TD(3, 2); Covariance between Item 13 and 14 errors
5
145.14
TD(13, 12); Covariance between Item 5 and 11 errors

The error covariances for Items 5 and 12, Items 5 and 11, and Items 10 and 15
were considered theoretically weak additions to the model because each pair of items
measured different content knowledge and different underlying misconceptions. The
error covariance for Item 13 and 14 was considered theoretically plausible because the
items measured the same content knowledge and related underlying misconceptions. So, I
added the parameter to the model and computed the goodness of fit statistics (Table 81).
Table 81
Model F2 Goodness of Fit Indices from Calibration Samples
CFI
GFI
RMSEA RMSEA 90% CI
Imputation
χ2
0 (N = 478) 601.99
0.99
0.87
0.025
[0.011, 0.036]
1 (N = 577) 731.23
0.97
0.87
0.033
[0.024, 0.041]
2 (N = 553) 666.89
0.99
0.90
0.018
[0.000, 0.030]
3 (N = 558) 721.38
0.98
0.87
0.031
[0.021, 0.040]
4 (N = 566) 598.51
0.98
0.89
0.023
[0.010, 0.033]
5 (N = 575) 694.45
0.99
0.89
0.025
[0.013, 0.034]
Wtd. Avg.
682.68
0.98
0.88
0.026
[0.016, 0.036]
SEAvg
26.607 0.004 0.007
0.003
Note: df = 112

SRMR
0.075
0.075
0.066
0.073
0.071
0.071
0.071
0.002

PGFI
0.64
0.64
0.66
0.64
0.65
0.65
0.65
0.004

PCFI
0.728
0.714
0.726
0.721
0.716
0.723
0.720
0.002

The difference of χ2 test revealed a statistically significant decrease in model
misfit in the imputed data sets (Δχ2Imputed Avg[1] = 8.000, p = 0.005). The reduction in
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ECVI
1.42
1.38
1.14
1.37
1.20
1.24
1.27
0.053

model misfit for the unimputed data, however, was not statistically significant
(Δχ2Unimputed [1] = 0.39, p > 0.5). Most of the significant reduction in the imputed data sets
occurred in the fourth data set while the rest of the data sets, including the unimputed
data set, reflected no change in model misfit. Furthermore, the expected cross-validation
statistic increased, which indicated that the new parameter may represent an overfitting of
the model to a data set. Based on these considerations, I discarded Model F2 and returned
to the original hypothesized model. Because none of the other MIs from the original
model were theoretically plausible, I concluded that the original hypothesized model was
the best calibration of Model F to these data (Figure 31).

Figure 31. Final Structural Model F.

Validation of Model F. To examine the convergent validity of Model F, the
goodness of fit statistics were computed based on the validation sample (Table 82).
Table 82
Model F Goodness of Fit Indices from Validation Samples
Imputation
χ2
CFI
GFI
RMSEA RMSEA 90% CI
0 (N = 449) 633.59
0.98
0.86
0.029
[0.017, 0.040]
1 (N = 556) 626.94
0.99
0.89
0.023
[0.0090, 0.033]
2 (N = 580) 718.86
0.97
0.87
0.034
[0.025, 0.042]
3 (N = 575) 781.93
0.97
0.87
0.032
[0.023, 0.041]
4 (N = 567) 628.65
0.99
0.90
0.022
[0.0075, 0.032]
5 (N = 558) 685.22
0.98
0.88
0.028
[0.017, 0.037]
Wtd. Avg.
687.67
0.98
0.88
0.028
[0.019, 0.036]
SEAvg
32.630 0.005 0.007
0.003
Note: df = 113

SRMR
0.083
0.071
0.078
0.078
0.068
0.074
0.074
0.002

PGFI
0.63
0.66
0.64
0.65
0.66
0.65
0.65
0.004

PCFI
0.718
0.734
0.714
0.725
0.726
0.724
0.725
0.004

The goodness of fit statistics were then compared to those from the calibration
sample using a t-test to compare the difference in the point estimates (Table 83).
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ECVI
1.58
1.18
1.39
1.36
1.13
1.26
1.26
0.056

Table 83
Model F Comparison of Calibration and Validation Sample Fit Indices
Imputation
χ2
CFI
GFI
RMSEA
Imputed Data Set t value

0.10

0.44

0.00

-0.67

SRMR

PGFI

PCFI

ECVI

-1.00

-0.50

1.10

0.19

No statistic from the imputed data sets was significantly different for the
calibration and validation samples (i.e., all t values less than 1.96), indicating that Model
F fit the validation and calibration samples equally well. I, therefore, concluded that the
model had good convergent validity across samples.
Summary of Structural Model Analysis
I originally hypothesized that either Models B or E would fit the data better than
the others. The analysis of student response patterns indicated the possibility of a high
degree of collinearity between the models: This collinearity resulted in every model
fitting very well according to a wide range of fit indices and low parsimony as evidenced
by parsimony indices higher than 0.5 (as recommended by Mulaik et al., 1989; Byrne,
2009). Table 84 summarizes the fit indices for the final calibration of each model.
Table 84
Summary of Fit Indices for Final Calibration of Each Model
Model
Statistic
χ2
CFI
GFI
RMSEA
A2
Wtd. Avg.
701.59
0.98
0.88
0.025
SEAvg
28.967 0.004 0.005
0.003
B3
Wtd. Avg.
677.24
0.99
0.89
0.024
SEAvg
21.237 0.003 0.003
0.003
C3Aiii
Wtd. Avg.
682.82
0.99
0.89
0.024
SEAvg
22.736 0.003 0.003
0.002
C3Bii
Wtd. Avg.
703.00
0.98
0.88
0.025
SEAvg
27.783 0.004 0.005
0.003
D3
Wtd. Avg.
677.24
0.99
0.89
0.024
SEAvg
21.237 0.003 0.003
0.003
E7
Wtd. Avg.
620.06
0.99
0.89
0.023
SEAvg
29.208 0.003 0.004
0.003
F
Wtd. Avg.
687.67
0.98
0.88
0.028
SEAvg
32.630 0.005 0.007
0.003

SRMR
0.072
0.002
0.070
0.002
0.071
0.002
0.072
0.002
0.070
0.002
0.069
0.002
0.074
0.002

PGFI
0.664
0.004
0.66
0.005
0.66
0.004
0.66
0.004
0.66
0.005
0.64
0.004
0.65
0.004

PCFI
0.741
0.003
0.734
0.005
0.732
0.004
0.741
0.003
0.734
0.005
0.708
0.003
0.725
0.004

ECVI
1.26
0.058
1.23
0.048
1.23
0.045
1.25
0.052
1.23
0.048
1.19
0.057
1.26
0.056

These indices, while all excellent fit indices, are statistically indistinguishable
across models. This result may be the result of a high degree of collinearity between
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content area misconceptions. The implications of this collinearity are discussed in
Chapter 5.
Impact of Contextual Factors on Item Misconception Responses
Implementation of Intervention
Observations of classes and teacher interviews were used to assess fidelity of
intervention implementation. Teachers from each school began at different times, usually
upon completion of prior units. The pretest, ATMI, and MAI were administered by each
teacher to their classes prior to the beginning of the treatment period. The treatment
lasted between 5 and 10 class periods, depending on the teacher. The sample classes were
observed in both the treatment and control conditions across all course types included in
the study (Table 85).
Table 85
Observation Statistics for Fidelity of Implementation Checks
Duration of Observations (Minutes)
Class
Number
Number of
Median
Mean (SE)
Max
Grouping
of Classes Observations Min
Total
53
42
20
20
27.14 (2.86)
90
Treatment
22
28
20
20
26.43 (3.68)
90
Control
28
14
20
20
28.57 (4.55)
60
Algebra 1
15
23
20
20
24.78 (3.44)
90
Geometry
17
8
20
20
30.00 (6.55)
60
Adv. Geometry
12
4
20
20
30.00 (10.00)
60
Algebra 2
4
4
20
20
37.50 (17.50)
90
Adv. Algebra 2
5
3
20
20
20.00 (0.00)
20
To maximize observation representativeness of treatment fidelity (i.e., concurrent
criterion validity), days, times, and schedules of classroom visits were unannounced.
These observations indicated that the intervention was not given to the control groups,
nor were the treatment lessons interrupted with control group lessons.
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Two Level Model
Two hierarchical analyses was conducted using HLM 6.08 (Raudenbush, Bryk, &
Congdon, 2009) to examine the impact of item, student, and class characteristics on the
emergence of errors due to mathematical misconceptions. The first analysis divided the
model variance into two levels, student and class. The outcome variable for this model
was the percent of misconception errors on the posttest. The second analysis divided th
model variance into three levels, item, student, and class. The outcome variable for this
model was a posttest misconception error indicator variable.
Descriptive statistics. Because of missing data in surveys, pretests, and posttests
not accounted for by multiple imputation, samples sizes were different than those
reported for other analyses. The observed sample sizes (Table 86) resulted in a statistical
power of approximately 0.80 to detect a population effect size δ = 0.40 and
approximately 0.75 for a population effect size δ = 0.30 for approximately 20 students
per class. In this sample, class sizes averaged approximately 18 students.
Table 86
Descriptive Statistics for Two-Level HLM Model
Variable
N
Student Level One
PostPercent
567
PrePercent
567
Enjoyment
567
Motivation
567
Self Confidence
567
Value
567
Knowledge of Cognition
567
Regulation of Cognition
567
Class Level 2
Class Mean Enjoyment
32
Class Mean Motivation
32
Class Mean Self Confidence
32
Class Mean Value
32
Class Mean Knowledge of Cognition
32
Class Mean Regulation of Cognition
32
Class Mean PrePercent
32
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Mean

SD

0.35
0.38
2.89
2.87
3.18
3.49
3.43
3.23

0.18
0.17
0.79
0.93
0.84
0.76
0.60
0.56

2.90
2.88
3.17
3.49
3.43
3.23
0.38

0.30
0.34
0.32
0.24
0.16
0.16
0.10

Unconditional null model. The unconditional ANOVA model (Equations 20 and
21) was examined first to determine the appropriateness of using a multilevel model to
represent the data. The ANOVA HLM model, also referred to as the null model, was used
to compute the intraclass correlation (ICC) and the overall mean for the dependent
variable, percentage of misconceptions on the posttest (PostMis).
Level 1
PostMis = β0 + rij

(20)

Level 2

(21)

β0 = γ00 + u0j

The variance for both levels (Table 87) was statistically significant at the 0.001
alpha level. The intraclass correlation was 0.229, meaning that 22.9% of the variance in
the model is attributable to classroom effects.
Table 87
Unconditional Two Level Model Fixed and Random Effects
Fixed Effects
Coefficient
0.356
Mean Posttest Misconceptions, γ00
Random Effects
Between Classes, u0j
Within Classes, R

Variance
Component
0.0073
0.0245

SE
0.017
df
31

T-Ratio
20.94
χ2
193.397

p Value
< 0.001

Using this null model as a baseline, the student model was developed to explain
the impact of as many student characteristics as possible that may have been confounded
by class effects (Ma, Ma, & Bradley, 2008).
Student Model. Using backward regression to develop the student model
(Equations 22 and 23), all student level variables were entered into the null model.
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Level 1

(

(22)

) (
) + β (Value

PostPercij = β 0 + β1 j Enjyij − Enjoy• j + β 2 j Motij − Mot• j

(
(RCog

+ β3 j Slf _ Conf ij − Slf _ Conf • j
+ β6 j

ij

)

(

4j

ij

)

)

(

− Value• j + β 5 j KCog ij − KCog • k

)

)

− RCog • j + β 7 j NAEP_Preij − NAEP_Pre • j + rij

Level 2

(23)

β0 = γ00 + u0j
β1 = γ10 + u1j
β2 = γ20 + u2j
β3 = γ30 + u3j
β4 = γ40 + u4j
β5 = γ50 + u5j
β6 = γ60 + u6j
β7 = γ70 + u7j
Only pretest percentage of misconceptions and mathematics self confidence had a
statistically significant effect on posttest percentage of misconceptions (Table 88).
Table 88
Student Characteristics Model Fixed and Random Effects
Fixed Effects
Coefficient
0.356
Mean Posttest Misconceptions, γ00
0.019
Enjoyment Slope, γ10
-0.006
Motivation Slope, γ20
-0.023
Self Confidence Slope, γ30
-0.001
Value Slope, γ40
-0.022
Knowledge of Cognition Slope, γ50
0.015
Regulation of Cognition Slope, γ60
0.484
PrePercent Slope, γ70
Random Effects
Mean Posttest Misconceptions, u0
Enjoyment Slope, u1
Motivation Slope, u2
Self Confidence Slope, u3
Value Slope, u4
Knowledge of Cognition Slope, u5
Regulation of Cognition Slope, u6
PrePercent Slope, u7
Level 1, R

Variance
Component
0.0077
0.0009
0.0002
0.0002
0.0007
0.0008
0.0022
0.0256
0.0171

*Significant p values
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SE
0.017
0.014
0.010
0.008
0.011
0.017
0.019
0.051

T-Ratio
21.34
1.35
-0.58
-2.71
-0.110
-1.302
0.778
9.462

p Value
< 0.001*
0.188
0.565
0.011*
0.914
0.203
0.443
< 0.001*

df
31
31
31
31
31
31
31
31

χ2
277.98
25.47
25.52
21.19
32.80
31.72
35.94
37.41

p Value
< 0.001*
> 0.500
> 0.500
> 0.500
0.379
0.430
0.248
0.198

The intercept of the student model represented a slightly different quantity than
the null model: In the null model, γ00 represented the overall average percentage of
misconceptions on the posttest; in the student model, γ00 represented the overall average
percentage of misconceptions on the posttest after controlling for all level 1 predictors.
So, γ00 represented the mean misconception percentage for a student who had an average
score on pretest misconceptions; enjoyment, value, motivation, and self confidence;
knowledge and regulation of cognition; and, unique student effects. The value of γ00
between the two models did not appear very different because only two of the fixed
effects were statistically non-zero. Because of the non-significant fixed effects of most
level 1 variables, only pretest misconception percentage and mathematics self confidence
were retained for the contextual model.
The significance of the random effects in Table 88 provided two additional
important pieces of information for the development of the contextual model. First, the
only fixed effect with significant between-class variance to explain was the mean
percentage of posttest misconceptions after controlling for all other level 1 variables. So,
neither of the retained fixed effects were permitted to vary freely in Model 2. Second, the
inclusion of the level 1 variables reduced the level 1 variance from 0.024 to 0.017, a 29%
reduction. The remaining level 1 variance could not be explained by the other level 1
variables, so Model 2 (contextual model) left the level 1 variance untouched.
Contextual Model. The contextual model (Equations 24 and 25) began with the
removal of all non-significant level 1 variables and non-significant level 2 random effects
from the student model. Because no significant level 2 variance remained to be explained
in the impact of the level 1 variables
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Level 1

(

(24)

)

(

)

PostPercij = β 0 + β 1 j Slf _ Conf ij − Slf _ Conf • j + β 2 j NAEP_Pre ij − NAEP_Pre • j + rij

(25)

Level 2

(
) (
)
(Mean _ SC − Mean _ SC ) + γ (Mean _ Val − Mean _ Val )
(Mean _ KCog − Mean _ KCog ) + γ (Mean _ RCog − Mean _ RCog )
(Mean _ Pre − Mean _ Pre ) + γ (Treatment ) + u

β 0 j = γ 00 + γ 01 Mean _ Enjoy j − Mean _ Enjoy • + γ 02 Mean _ Mot j − Mean _ Mot •
+ γ 03
+ γ 05
+ γ 07

•

j

04
•

j

j

•

•

j

06

•

j

08

0j

β1 = γ10
β2 = γ20
Table 89
Initial Contextual Model Fixed and Random Effects
Fixed Effects
Coefficient
For Intercept, β0
0.360
Mean Posttest Misconceptions, γ00
-0.163
Mean Enjoyment, γ01
-0.039
Mean Motivation, γ02
0.069
Mean Self Confidence, γ03
0.108
Mean Value, γ04
-0.0004
Mean Knowledge of Cognition, γ05
0.091
Mean Regulation of Cognition, γ06
0.841
Mean PrePercent, γ07
-0.020
Treatment, γ08
For Self Confidence Slope, β1
-0.020
Mean Self Confidence Slope, γ10
For PrePercent Slope, β2
0.492
Mean PrePercent Slope, γ20
Variance
Random Effect
Component
Mean Posttest Misconceptions, u0
0.0003
Level 1, R
0.0187

SE

T-Ratio

p Value

0.007
0.074
0.048
0.050
0.051
0.088
0.084
0.085
0.015

52.66
-2.19
-0.82
1.38
2.13
-0.01
1.07
9.91
-1.307

< 0.001*
0.038*
0.423
0.181
0.044*
> 0.500
0.295
< 0.001*
0.202

0.008

-2.57

0.011*

0.043

11.37

< 0.001*

df
24

χ2
41.30

p Value
< 0.001*

*Significant p value
The initial contextual model (Table 89) revealed significant effects for the class
mean mathematics enjoyment and value. The negative coefficient for enjoyment
indicated that higher classroom levels of enjoyment of mathematics resulted in lower
percentages of misconceptions on the posttest. Although the coefficient for value was
positive, its magnitude was small enough that I hypothesized that it might be due to the
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non-significant variable inclusion in the model. This hypothesis was therefore tested in
the final model. The unexplained between class variance was reduced 96% from 0.0077
to 0.0003, which resulted in a significant reduction in χ2 (Δχ2[7] = 236.68, p < 0.0001).
The signficant variables were retained for the final model.
Final Model. The final model (Equations 26 and 27) included only significant
variables for both student level 1 and class level 2.
(26)

Student Level 1

(

)

(

)

PostPercij = β 0 + β 1 j Slf _ Conf ij − Slf _ Conf • j + β 2 j NAEP_Pre ij − NAEP_Pre • j + rij
(27)

Class Level 2

(

)

(

β 0 j = γ 00 + γ 01 Mean _ Enjoy j − Mean _ Enjoy • + γ 02 Mean _ Val j − Mean _ Val •

(

)

)

+ γ 07 Mean _ Pre j − Mean _ Pre• + u0 j

β1 = γ10
β2 = γ20
Table 90
Final Contextual Model Fixed and Random Effects
Fixed Effects
For Intercept, β0
Class Mean Posttest Misconceptions, γ00
Class Mean Enjoyment, γ01
Class Mean Value, γ02
Class Mean Pretest Misconceptions, γ03
For Self Confidence Slope, β1
Grand Mean Self Confidence Slope, γ10
For PrePercent Slope, β2
Grand Mean PrePercent Slope, γ20
Random Effect
Mean Posttest Misconceptions, u0
Level 1, R

Coefficient

SE

T-Ratio

p Value

0.359
-0.129
0.132
0.833

0.007
0.041
0.053
0.079

48.639
-3.148
2.492
10.609

< 0.001
0.004
0.019
< 0.001

-0.020

0.008

-2.57

0.011

0.492
Variance
Component
0.007
0.019

0.043

11.36

< 0.001

df
29

χ2
221.60

p Value
< 0.001

The removal of non-significant variables from the contextual model (Table 90)
added a significant amount of variance to the model, (Δχ2[+5] = +180.30, p < 0.0001).
This result indicated that, although individual variables were non-significant, their
cumulative effect may have been significant. One reason for this result may have been
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the reduced statistical power to detect smaller effect sizes. The reduction in χ2 from the
student model, however, was still statistically significant (Δχ2[2] = 56.38, p < 0.0001).
The sign for class mean value remained positive, and the unexplained model variance
increased significantly. I hypothesized that these effects may have been due to the
removal of important cumulative effects of variables that were not significant by
themselves.
To test this possibility, the two way interactions among the class mean value and
class mean knowledge and regulation of cognition were computed by multiplying each
the class mean value scores by the class mean knowledge and regulation of cognition
scores (Pedhazur, 1997). To begin this investigation, the class mean value main effects
were removed from the model to avoid multicollinearity. The interaction effects were
then added to the class level 3 equation to produce a new model (Equations 28 and 29).
(28)

Student Level 1

(

)

(

)

PostPercij = β 0 + β 1 j Slf _ Conf ij − Slf _ Conf • j + β 2 j NAEP_Pre ij − NAEP_Pre • j + rij
(29)

Class Level 2

(

)

(

β 0 j = γ 00 + γ 01 Mean _ Enjoy j − Mean _ Enjoy • + γ 02 Mean _ Pre j − Mean _ Pre •

(

)

+ γ 03 Mn _ Val * KCog j − Mn _ Val * KCog • + u 0 j

β1 = γ10
β2 = γ20
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)

Table 91
Post Hoc Model of Interaction Effects of Class Value of Mathematics and Knowledge of Cognition
Fixed Effects
Coefficient
SE
T-Ratio
For Intercept, β0
0.359
0.007
50.075
Class Mean Posttest Misconceptions, γ00
-0.141
0.040
-3.546
Class Mean Enjoyment, γ01
0.848
0.077
10.952
Class Mean Pretest Misconceptions, γ02
0.031
0.011
2.920
Class Mean Value*Knowledge of Cognition
Interaction, γ03
For Self Confidence Slope, β1
-0.020
0.008
-2.57
Grand Mean Self Confidence Slope, γ10
For PrePercent Slope, β2
0.492
0.043
11.36
Grand Mean PrePercent Slope, γ20
Variance
Random Effect
Component
df
χ2
Mean Posttest Misconceptions, u0
0.0005
28
46.39073
Level 1, R
0.019

p Value
< 0.001
0.002
< 0.001
0.007
0.011
< 0.001
p Value
0.016

To interpret the interaction effect of mathematics value and knowledge of
cognition on posttest misconceptions using coefficient values from Table 91 and means
and standard deviations from Table 86, several predicted case values were examined, in
which
γ00 = Mean posttest misconception percentage, controlling for all other variables
in the model
γ01 = Impact of class ATMI enjoyment on posttest misconception percentage
γ02 = Impact of class pretest misconception percentage on student posttest
misconception percentage
γ03 = Impact of interaction between class ATMI value and class MAI knowledge
of cognition on student posttest misconception percentage
γ10 = Impact of self confidence on posttest misconception percentage
γ20 = Impact of pretest misconception percentage on posttest misconception
percentage
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1. A student who has an average mathematics self confidence (3.18) and a
pretest misconception percentage that is average for the class, in a
classroom with average knowledge of cognition (3.43), average classroom
pretest misconception (0.38), and is 1 standard deviation (0.24 units)
above the grand mean for value (3.49) is predicted by the post hoc model
to have a posttest misconception score equal to the mean, 0.359.
Table 92
Predicted Value 1 for Two Level HLM Model
Coefficient

Value

Number of Units
from Mean

Value
Added

γ00, Intercept
γ01, Impact of Class ATMI Enjoyment
γ02, Impact of Class Pretest Misconception
γ03, Impact of Class Value*Kcog
γ10, Average Impact of Student Self Confidence
γ20, Average Impact of Student Pretest Misconception

0.359
-0.141
0.848
0.031
-0.02
0.492

1
0
0
0.24*0 = 0
0
0

0.359
0
0
0
0
0

PostPercent
Note: Value Added = (Coefficient Value) • (Number of Units from Mean)

0.359

Although the class value level in this example was 0.24 units above the
grand mean, its interaction with knowledge of cognition negates its effect
on the predicted posttest misconception error percentage. The second
example shows an alternate effect of the interaction effect, when class
knowledge of cognition is higher than the mean but value is equal to the
mean.
2. A student who has an average mathematics self confidence (3.18) and a
pretest misconception percentage that is average for the class, in a
classroom with average mathematics value (3.49) and average classroom
pretest misconception (0.38) and who is 1 standard deviation (0.16 units)
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above the grand mean for knowledge of cognition (3.43) is predicted by
the post hoc model to have a posttest misconception score of 0.359.
Table 93
Predicted Value 2 for Two Level HLM Model
Coefficient

Value

Number of units
from average

Value
Added

γ00, Intercept
γ01, Impact of Class ATMI Enjoyment
γ02, Impact of Class Pretest Misconception
γ03, Impact of Class Value*Kcog
γ10, Average Impact of Student Self Confidence
γ20, Average Impact of Student Pretest Misconception

0.359
-0.141
0.848
0.031
-0.02
0.492

1
0
0
0*0.16 = 0
0
0

0.359
0
0
0
0
0

PostPercent
Note: Value Added = (Coefficient Value) • (Number of Units from Mean)

0.359

Just as in the first predicted value (Table 92), the interaction of class value
and knowledge of cognition eliminates the effect of knowledge of
cognition on the posttest misconception error percentage. The third
predicted value shows the effect of class value and knowledge of
cognition when neither variable is equal to its grand mean.
3. A student who has an average mathematics self confidence (3.18) and a
pretest misconception percentage that is average for the class, in a
classroom with average classroom pretest misconceptions (0.38) and is 1
standard deviation (0.16 units) above the grand mean for knowledge of
cognition (3.43) and 1 standard deviation (0.24 units) above the mean of
value is predicted by the post hoc model to have a posttest misconception
score of 0.360.
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Table 94
Predicted Value 3 for Two Level HLM Model
Coefficient

Value

Number of units
from average

Value
Added

γ00, Intercept
γ01, Impact of Class ATMI Enjoyment
γ02, Impact of Class Pretest Misconception
γ03, Impact of Class Value*Kcog
γ10, Average Impact of Student Self Confidence
γ20, Average Impact of Student Pretest Misconception

0.359
-0.141
0.848
0.031
-0.02
0.492

1
0
0
0.24*0.16 = 0.0384
0
0

0.359
0
0
0.0012
0
0

PostPercent
Note: Value Added = (Coefficient Value) • (Number of Units from Mean)

0.3602

Although both class value and knowledge of cognition are above their
grand means, their combined effect only increased the predicted
percentage of misconception errors by 1%. The fourth predicted value
shows the effect of student mathematics self confidence in a class with
low mathematics value but high knowledge of cognition.
4. A student who has a mathematics self confidence 1 standard deviation
(0.84 units) above the mean (3.18) and a pretest misconception percentage
that is average for the class, in a classroom with average pretest
misconceptions (0.38) and 1 standard deviation (0.24) below the mean of
value (3.49) and 1 standard deviation (0.16) above the mean of knowledge
of cognition is predicted by the post hoc model to have a posttest
misconception score equal to 0.341.
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Table 95
Predicted Value 4 for Two Level HLM Model
Coefficient

Value

Number of units
from average

Value
Added

γ00, Intercept
γ01, Impact of Class ATMI Enjoyment
γ02, Impact of Class Pretest Misconception
γ03, Impact of Class Value*Kcog
γ10, Average Impact of Student Self Confidence
γ20, Average Impact of Student Pretest Misconception

0.359
-0.141
0.848
0.031
-0.020
0.492

1
0
0
-0.24*0.16 = -0.0384
0.84
0

0.359
0
0
-0.0012
-0.0168
0

PostPercent
Note: Value Added = (Coefficient Value) • (Number of Units from Mean)

0.341

The effect of student self confidence was greater than the effect of the
value-knowledge of cognition interaction even though the coefficient had
a smaller magnitude because of the relative sizes of the standard deviation;
the student self confidence standard deviation was almost four times larger
than value and five times larger than for knowledge of cognition. The final
predicted value example for this model shows the effect of reversing the
relative class position for value and knowledge of cognition with respect
to their grand means.
5. A student who has a mathematics self confidence 1 standard deviation
(0.84 units) above the mean (3.18) and a pretest misconception percentage
that is average for the class, in a classroom with average pretest
misconceptions (0.38) and 1 standard deviation (0.24 units) above the
mean of value (3.49) and 1 standard deviation (0.16) below the mean of
knowledge of cognition is predicted by the post hoc model to have a
posttest misconception score equal to 0.341.
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Table 96
Predicted Value 5 for Two Level HLM Model
Coefficient

Value

Number of units
from average

Value
Added

γ00, Intercept
γ01, Impact of Class ATMI Enjoyment
γ02, Impact of Class Pretest Misconception
γ03, Impact of Class Value*Kcog
γ10, Average Impact of Student Self Confidence
γ20, Average Impact of Student Pretest Misconception

0.359
-0.141
0.848
0.031
-0.020
0.492

1
0
0
0.24*-0.16 = -0.0384
0.84
0

0.359
0
0
-0.0012
-0.0168
0

PostPercent
Note: Value Added = (Coefficient Value) • (Number of Units from Mean)

0.341

In the fourth example, class value was one standard deviation below while
knowledge of cognition was one standard deviation above their means. In
this example, their position from their grand means is reversed. This
change resulted in no change to the percentage of misconception errors
predicted by the model.
Three Level Bernoulli Model
The student level of the HLM model was then divided into two levels, item
characteristics and student characteristics. By doing so, the outcome variable become a
dichotomous variable representing a misconception error for each item for each student in
each class. The new model was then examined using a generalized HLM model (HGLM)
to measure the probability of misconception errors. The initial null model was examined
to determine the amount of variance at each level: item level 1, student level 2, and class
level 3.The contextual model was then used to evaluate the impact of each variable on the
outcome.
Descriptive Statistics. The observed sample sizes (Table 97) resulted in a
statistical power of approximately 0.80 to detect a population effect size δ = 0.40 and
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approximately 0.75 for a population effect size δ = 0.30 for approximately 20 students
per class. In this sample, class sizes averaged approximately 18 students.
Table 97
Descriptive Statistics for Three-Level HLM
Variable
Misconception
Discrimination
Difficulty
Moderate
Enjoyment
Motivation
Self Confidence
Value
Knowledge of Cognition
Regulation of Cognition
NAEP_Pretest Percent Misconception
Mean Enjoyment
Mean Motivation
Mean Self Confidence
Mean Value
Mean Knowledge of Cognition
Mean Regulation of Cognition
Mean Pretest Percent Misconception
Treatment

N
Mean
Item Level One
9673
0.35
9673
0.80
9673
0.01
9673
0.35
Student Level 2
515
2.91
515
2.90
515
3.19
515
3.51
515
3.43
515
3.23
515
0.38
Class Level 3
32
2.90
32
3.43
32
3.23
32
0.38
32
2.90
32
2.88
32
3.17
32
0.50

SD

Min

Max

0.48
0.20
0.51
0.48

0.00
0.44
-1.21
0.00

1.00
1.22
0.96
1.00

0.79
0.93
0.83
0.75
0.58
0.56
0.17

1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.18
1.11
0.00

5.00
5.00
5.00
5.00
4.94
4.74
0.76

0.30
0.16
0.16
0.10
0.30
0.34
0.32
0.51

2.35
3.01
2.92
0.14
2.35
2.15
2.41
0.00

3.52
3.65
3.50
0.53
3.52
3.63
3.96
1.00

Unconditional Null Model. The unconditional model (Equations 30, 31, and 32)
revealed a significant amount of variance at both the student Level 2 and class Level 3
(Table 98). Additionally, the level 1 variance was also statistically significant (SE =
0.014, t = 67.71)
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(30)

Item Level 1

Prob(Misconceptionijk = 1 | π jk ) = φ ijk
⎡ φ ijk ⎤
Log ⎢
⎥ = ηijk
⎣⎢1 − φ ijk ⎦⎥
η ijk = π 0 jk + e ijk

Student Level 2

(31)

π0jk = β0k + r0jk
(32)

Class Level 3

β0 = γ00 + u0k
Table 98
Unconditional Three Level Model Fixed and Random Coefficients
Fixed Effects
Logit Link:
Unit-Specific Model
-0.643**
Mean Item Misconception, γ000
Random Effects
Variance Component
df
Between Classes, u00
0.184**
31
Between Students, R0
0.299**
483
Between Items, E
0.945**
*Indicates |coeff/se| > 2.00; ** Indicates |coeff/se| > 3.00;

Logit Link:
Population Average Model
-0.590**
χ2
188.001
1117.002

p Value
< 0.001
< 0.001

The outcome variable for Level 1 is in logit units, or the natural logarithm of the
odds ratio, as shown in Equation 30. The coefficients, therefore, are also computed in
logit units. Using the logit unit, the relationship between the outcome variable and
independent variable coefficients have a linear relationship. Once the coefficient logit is
converted to a probability, its relationship to the outcome variable and other logit
coefficients is no longer linear. Therefore, to compute a predicted probability of
misconception error for an item, the predicted logit value must be computed first.
Conversion to a probability is the final step in predicting outcomes in the Bernoulli HLM
model. The process of converting from a logit to a probability requires two steps. First,
the logit is converted to an odds ratio using Equation 33.
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Odds = eLogit

(33)

Second, the inverse of the odds ratio is used to compute the probability using Equation
34.

1
⎛
⎞
Probability = ⎜
−Logit ⎟
⎝1+ e
⎠

(34)

The γ000 logit (unit specific model) of -0.643 (Table 93) corresponds to an odds
ratio of 0.526, or a probability of 0.35 for the appearance of a misconception on an item,
which corresponds to the mean for Item Misconception (see Table 97). The logit of the
population average model (-0.590) indicates that the expected appearance of
misconceptions in the population is slightly different from the observed sample
misconception probability, an odds ratio of 0.554 and a probability of 0.357. This
difference represents the expected effect of τ00, in this case pulling the mean value of the
unit specific model upward toward a probability of 0.50 (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002).
The total variance in the model equals the sum of the variance from all three
levels (Table 98), 0.184 + 0.299 + 0.945 = 1.428. The proportion of variance at the item
Level 1 is 0.184/1.428 = 0.129 = 12.9%.. The proportion of variance at the student Level
2 is 0.299/1.428 = 0.209 = 20.9%. The proportion of variance at the class Level 3 is
0.945/1.428 = 0.662 = 66.2%. In summary, the variance at each level was statistically
significant, and the class level 3 accounted for the majority of the variance in the
probability of misconception errors. To begin accounting for variance, the item level 1
model was calibrated.
Item level 1 model. The discrimination and difficulty IRT coefficients for each
NAEP item (see Table 10)were used as explanatory variables in the level 1 model.
Additionally, the reported level of complexity assigned by NAEP reviewers (see Table 8)
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was added as a dichotomous predictor of misconception errors on a particular item (Low
Complexity = 0; Moderate Complextiy = 1). Two models were examined before arriving
at the final item model (Equations 35, 36, and 37; Table 99).
Item Level 1

(35)

Prob(Misconceptionijk = 1 | π jk ) = φ ijk
⎡ φ ijk ⎤
Log ⎢
⎥ = ηijk
⎣⎢1 − φ ijk ⎦⎥

η ijk = π 0 jk + π 1 jk (Discrimina tion ) + π 2 jk (Difficulty ) + π 3 jk (Complexity ) + e ijk

Student Level 2

(36)

π0jk = β00k + r0jk
π1jk = β10k + r1jk
π2jk = β20k + r2jk
π3jk = β30k + r2jk
Class Level 3

(37)

β00k = γ000 + u00k
β10k = γ100 + u10k
β20k = γ200 + u20k
β30k = γ300 + u30k
The variance components for class level discrimination (U10), class level
complexity (U30), and student level complexity (R3) were statistically non-significant, so
they were fixed in the final item model. The addition of the discrimination, difficulty, and
complexity variables reduced the item level variance from 0.945 to 0.881, a 6.8%
reduction.
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Table 99
Item Model of Mathematics Misconception Errors
Unit Specific Model
Unconditional
Final
Fixed Effects
Modelb
Model
Intercept, γ000
-0.643**
-0.233***
Discrimination, γ100
―**
-1.206***
Difficulty, γ200
―**
-0.682***
Complexity, γ300
―**
-0.080***
Variance Components
Unconditional Modelb
0.184***
Intercept U00, τ(β)11
―**
Class Discrimination U10, τ(β)22
―**
Class Difficulty, U20, τ(β)33
―**
Class Complexity, U30, τ(β)44
0.299***
Std Intercept, R0, τ(π)11
―**
Std Discrimination, R1, τ(π)22
―**
Std Difficulty, R2, τ(π)33
―**
Std Complexity, R3, τ(π)44
Item, E, σ2
0.945a**
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001, a|coeff /SE| > 3.00
b
dfStudent = 483, dfClass = 31

Population Average Model
Unconditional
Final
Modelb
Model
-0.590
-0.130***
―*
-0.957***
―*
-0.565***
―*
-0.094***
Final Model
0.195***
―**
0.056***
―**
1.044***
2.480***
0.385***
―**
0.881a**

Using equations 33 and 34, the logits for the final item model were converted into
predicted probabilities of misconception errors for different item characteristics. The
intercept logit value predicts that the probability of a misconception error for a nondiscriminating item (i.e., item characteristic curve = horizontal line) of average difficulty
(i.e., Difficulty = 0) and low complexity is 0.558 in the sample and 0.532 in the
population (Table 100). If the difficulty of a non-discriminating item increases difficulty
by one standard deviation (0.62), then the probability of a misconception error increases
to 0.658 for the sample and 0.618 for the population (Table 100).
If an item has average discrimination (0.825, mean of discrimination values from
Table 10), then the predicted probability of a misconception error reduces to 0.318 in the
sample and 0.341 in the population. If the discrimination of an item has a value one
standard deviation above the average discrimination (0.8 + 0.2 = 1), then the predicted
probability of a misconception error reduces to 0.230 in the sample and 0.277 in the
population (Table 100). If a non-discriminating item with an average difficulty level
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increases from low to moderate complexity, the probability of a misconception error
inceases to 0.578 for the sample and 0.556 for the population (Table 100).
Table 100
Selected Predicted Values for Final Item Model
Unit Specific Model
Fixed Effects
INTERCEPT, γ000
Discrimination, γ100
Difficulty, γ200
Complexity, γ300

Population Average Model

Logit

Odds

Probability

Logit

Odds

Probability

-0.234
-1.206
-0.682
-0.080

1.263
0.299
1.978
1.083

0.558
0.230
0.664
0.520

-0.130
-0.957
-0.565
-0.094

1.139
0.384
1.759
1.099

0.532
0.277
0.638
0.523

-0.731
-0.314
-1.696
-0.588
-0.107

0.481
1.368
0.183
1.801
0.898

0.325
0.578
0.155
0.643
0.473

-0.636
-0.224
-1.018
-0.424
-0.153

0.530
1.251
0.361
1.528
0.859

0.346
0.556
0.265
0.604
0.462

Combined Effects
Int + Mean Discrimination
Int + Complexity
Int + 2SD Above Mean Discrimination
Int + 1SD Above Mean Difficulty
Int + 1SD Below Mean Difficulty

The probabilities and odds ratios for each logit value in Table 100 were computed
using Equations 33 and 34. Combined effects were computed through a process of three
steps. First, standard deviations of discrimination and difficulty were taken from Table
97. Second, the relevant number of standard deviations values were multiplied by the
logit coefficient and added to the intercept logit. Third, the resulting logit sum was
converted to an odds ratio and probability using Equations 33 and 34.
These predicted probability values reflect a statistically significant impact of item
characteristics on the probability of a misconception error. The remaining variance of the
item level was still statistically significant after the addition of all available variables,
indicating that a future examination of other item characteristics may be beneficial to
understanding item characteristic influences on misconception errors. The final item
model was used as the starting point for calibration of the student model.
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Student level 2 model. Student characteristics were added to level 2 (student level)
of the final item model to examine the impact of student characteristics on the probability
of a misconception error and on the impact of item characteristics on the probability of a
misconception error. Only statistically significant effects were retained in the final model
(Table 101) with the exception of the self confidence impact on the difficulty slope. Self
confidence was retained because removing it from the model resulted in the loss of a
significant coefficient for motivation, which was statistically significant in all
intermediate models.
Table 101
Final Student Model Fixed and Random Coefficients
Fixed Effects
Logit Link:
Unit-Specific Model
-0.237***
Intercept, γ000
Discrimination Slope, γ100
-1.221***
Pretest Slope, γ110
-3.389***
Difficulty Slope, γ200
-0.689***
Motivation Slope, γ210
-0.199***
Self Confidence Slope, γ220
-0.163***
Pretest Slope, γ230
-0.799***
Complexity Slope, γ300
-0.080***
Variance
Random Effects
Component
df
Class Intercept, u00
0.214***
31
Class Difficulty Slope
0.058***
31
Std Intercept, R0
1.075***
483
Std Discrimination Slope, R1
2.265***
513
0.348***
480
Std Difficulty Slope, R2
Item Intercept, E
0.887***
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001, a|coeff /SE| > 3.00

Logit Link:
Population Average Model
-0.165***
-1.027***
-2.961***
-0.583***
-0.182***
-0.151***
-0.525***
-0.095***
χ2
221.117
053.032
622.784
686.892
649.958

p Value
< 0.001
< 0.008
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001

As with the Item Model, predicted values are presented to clarify the meaning of
coefficients computed as logits (Table 102). The process for computing these predicted
probabilities was the same as for the Item Model (i.e., use Equations 33 and 34 to convert
logits to probability). The fixed effect intercept, γ000, represents a predicted probability of
a misconception error on an item with no discrimination, average difficulty, and low
complexity of 0.559 for the sample and 0.541 in the population. The fixed effect for
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discrimination, γ100, means that the impact of a change of one logit unit in discrimination
(for an item with average difficulty and low complexity) corresponds to a probability of
misconception error of 0.228 for the sample and 0.264.
Table 102
Selected Predicted Values for Final Student Model
Unit Specific Model
Fixed Effects
Intercept, γ000
Discrimination Slope, γ100
Pretest Slope, γ110
Difficulty Slope, γ200
Motivation Slope, γ210
Self Confidence Slope, γ220
Pretest Slope, γ230
Complexity Slope, γ300
Combined Effects
Int + Mean Discrimination +
Mean Difficulty + Low
Complexity + Mean Pretest
Int + Mean Discrimination +
Mean Difficulty + Low
Complexity + 1SD Above Mean
Pretest
Int + Mean Discrimination +
1SD Below Mean Difficulty +
1SD Above Mean Motivation +
1SD Above Mean Pretest
Int + Mean Discrimination +
1SD Above Mean Difficulty +
1SD Below Mean Motivation +
1SD Above Mean Pretest

Population Average Model

Logit
0.237
-1.221
3.389
0.689
-0.199
0.163
-0.799
0.08

Odds
1.267
0.295
29.636
1.992
0.820
1.177
0.450
1.083

Probability
0.559
0.228
0.967
0.666
0.450
0.541
0.310
0.520

Logit
0.165
-1.027
2.961
0.583
-0.182
0.151
-0.525
0.095

Odds
1.179
0.358
19.317
1.791
0.834
1.163
0.592
1.100

Probability
0.541
0.264
0.951
0.642
0.455
0.538
0.372
0.524

η̂

Probability
0.290

η̂

-0.894

Odds
0.409

-0.862

Odds
0.422

Probability
0.297

-0.279

0.757

0.431

-0.254

0.776

0.437

-0.174

0.840

0.457

-0.152

0.859

0.462

0.677

1.968

0.663

0.613

1.846

0.649

The combined effects in Table 102 were computed by adding the relevant student logits
to the item logits, then combining the item logits to produce the predicted logit for
misconception errors ( η̂ ). These combined logits were then converted to probabilities
using Equations 33 and 34. If a student with more pretest misconceptions (1 SD = 0.17)
than the mean (0.38) completed an item with average discrimination (0.8), average
difficulty (0), and low complexity, the probability of a misconception error increases to
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0.431 in the sample and 0.437 in the population. If a student with more misconceptions (1
SD = 0.17) and more motivation (1 SD = 0.93) than the mean (0.38, 2.9 respectively)
completed an easy item (1 SD below difficulty mean = -0.5), the probability of a
misconception error was 0.457 in the sample and 0.462 in the population. If a student
with more misconceptions (1SD = 0.17) and less motivation (1 SD = 0.93) than the mean
(0.38, 2.9 respectively) completed a difficult item (1 SD above difficulty mean = 0.502)
with mean discrimination (0.8), the probability of a misconception error increases to
0.663 in the sample and 0.649 in the population.
Two student level slopes demonstrated statistically significant variance at Level 3
(class), the intercept U000 and motivation slope U200. The final student model was used
as the initial model for calibrating class level variables.
Class level 3 model. Class characteristics were added as predictors to the two
level 3 equations with statistically significant, the intercept (mean probability of
misconception error) and the difficulty slope (impact of item difficulty on the probability
of misconception error).
The addition of these class parameters produced the final model (Table 103),
which reduced the class variance from 0.214 to 0.002, a 98.7% reduction. This reduction
reflected a statistically significant reduction in level 3 model misfit (Δχ2 = 188.482, Δdf =
8, p < 0.001).
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Table 103
Final Class Model Fixed and Random Coefficients
Fixed Effects
Intercept, γ000
Class Enjoyment, γ001
Class Motivation, γ002
Class Self Confidence, γ003
Class Value, γ004
Class Knowledge of Cognition, γ005
Class Regulation of Cognition, γ006
Class Pretest, γ007
Treatment, γ008
Discrimination Slope, γ100
Pretest Slope, γ110
Difficulty Slope, γ200
Class Enjoyment, γ201
Class Motivation, γ202
Class Self Confidence, γ203
Class Value, γ204
Class Knowledge of Cognition, γ205
Class Regulation of Cognition, γ206
Class Pretest, γ207
Treatment, γ208
Motivation Slope, γ210
Self Confidence Slope, γ220
Pretest Slope, γ230
Complexity Slope, γ300

Logit Link:
Unit-Specific Model
-0.268***
-0.885***
-0.109***
-0.234***
-0.649***
-0.118***
-0.349***
-4.676***
-0.051***
-1.215***
-3.379***
-0.814***
-1.384***
-0.338***
-0.961***
-0.118***
-0.138***
-0.350***
-0.536***
-0.231b***
-0.199***
-0.162***
-0.792***
-0.080***

Variance
Random Effects
Component
df
Class Intercept, u00
-0.002b***
23
Class Difficulty Slope, u20
0.008***
23
Std Intercept, R0
1.044***
483
Std Discrimination Slope, R1
1.494***
513
0.597***
480
Std Difficulty Slope, R2
Item Intercept, E
0.943a**
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001, a|coeff /SE| > 3.00, bp ≤ 0.10

Logit Link:
Population Average Model
-0.200b***
-0.867***
-0.079***
-0.246***
0.597***
-0.164***
-0.307***
-4.423***
-0.055***
-1.067***
-3.100***
-0.730***
-1.319***
-0.290***
-0.894***
-0.158***
-0.090***
-0.363***
-0.257***
-0.208b***
-0.187***
-0.154***
-0.583***
-0.097***
χ2
032.635
035.125
621.070
683.774
650.180

p Value
< 0.088
< 0.050
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001

The treatment condition was not a statistically significant predictor of the
intercept (mean probability of misconception error), but it was a statistically significant
predictor of the difficulty slope at the 90% confidence level for both the sample and
population models. The coefficients from Table 103 were used to compute the predicted
probability for a misconception error under various item, student, and class conditions
(Table 104).
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Table 104
Selected Predicted Values for Final Class Model
Unit Specific Model
Fixed Effects
Intercept, γ000
Class Enjoyment, γ001
Class Motivation, γ002
Class Self Confidence, γ003
Class Value, γ004
Class Knowledge of
Cognition, γ005
Class Regulation of
Cognition, γ006
Class Pretest, γ007
Treatment, γ008
Discrimination Slope, γ100
Pretest Slope, γ110
Difficulty Slope, γ200
Class Enjoyment, γ201
Class Motivation, γ202
Class Self Confidence,
γ203
Class Value, γ204
Class Knowledge of
Cognition, γ205
Class Regulation of
Cognition, γ206
Class Pretest, γ207
Treatment, γ208
Motivation Slope, γ210
Self Confidence Slope, γ220
Pretest Slope, γ230
Complexity Slope, γ300

Population Average Model

Logit
0.268
-0.885
-0.109
0.234
0.649
0.118

Odds
1.307
0.413
0.897
1.264
1.914
1.125

Probability
0.567
0.292
0.473
0.558
0.657
0.529

Logit
0.200
-0.867
-0.079
0.246
0.597
0.164

Odds
1.221
0.420
0.924
1.279
1.817
1.178

Probability
0.550
0.296
0.480
0.561
0.645
0.541

0.349

1.418

0.586

0.307

1.359

0.576

4.676
-0.051
-1.215
3.379
0.814
-1.384
0.338
0.961

107.340
0.950
0.297
29.341
2.257
0.251
1.402
2.614

0.991
0.487
0.229
0.967
0.693
0.200
0.584
0.723

4.423
-0.055
-1.067
3.100
0.730
-1.319
0.290
0.894

83.346
0.946
0.344
22.198
2.075
0.267
1.336
2.445

0.988
0.486
0.256
0.957
0.675
0.211
0.572
0.710

0.118
0.138

1.125
1.148

0.529
0.534

0.158
0.090

1.171
1.094

0.539
0.522

0.35

1.419

0.587

0.363

1.438

0.590

-0.536
-0.231
-0.199
0.162
-0.792
0.08

0.585
0.794
0.820
1.176
0.453
1.083

0.369
0.443
0.450
0.540
0.312
0.520

-0.257
-0.208
-0.187
0.154
-0.583
0.097

0.773
0.812
0.829
1.166
0.558
1.102

0.436
0.448
0.453
0.538
0.358
0.524
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Table 104 (Continued)
Predicted Values for Final Class Model
Unit Specific Model
Combined Effects
Int + Mean Discrimination +
Mean Difficulty + Low
Complexity + Mean Class
Enjoyment, Self Confidence,
Motivation + Class Mean
Pretest + Std Mean Pretest +
Std Mean Motivation +
Control
Int + Mean Discrimination +
Mean Difficulty + Low
Complexity + Mean Self
Confidence, Motivation +
Class Mean Pretest + Std
Mean Pretest + Std Mean
Motivation + 1SD Above
Mean Class Enjoyment +
Control
Int + Mean Discrimination +
Mean Difficulty + Low
Complexity + 1SD Above
Class Mean Self Confidence,
Enjoyment, Motivation +
Class Mean Pretest + Std
Mean Pretest + Std Mean
Motivation + Control
Int + Mean Discrimination +
Mean Difficulty + Low
Complexity + Class Mean
Self Confidence, Enjoyment,
Motivation, Pretest + Std
Mean Pretest, Motivation +
Treatment

η̂

Population Average Model

η̂

-0.281

Odds
0.755

Probability
0.430

-0.274

Odds
0.760

Probability
0.432

-0.762

0.467

0.318

-0.740

0.477

0.323

-0.201

0.818

0.450

-0.200

0.819

0.450

-0.401

0.670

0.401

-0.382

0.682

0.406

The computation of probabilities from the fixed effects in Table 104 proceeded as
in the item and student models, using Equations 33 and 34. The combined effects,
however,required a consideration of the effects of class variables on student variables
before combining student effects with item effects to produce the predicted value.
The first combined effect predicted the probability of a misconception error on an
item of mean discrimination, mean difficulty, and low complexity for a student with
mean pretest misconceptions and motivation in a control class with mean self confidence,
enjoyment and motivation. Because all student and class level variables were centered
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(group and grand centered respectively), the student and class mean values produced a
zero effect on the predicted probability. The intercept logit for this combined effect was
0.268. The discrimination impact was -1.215 (the coefficient logit) • 0.8 (the average
discrimination) = -0.972, the value added to the intercept logit. The difficulty impact was
0.814, the coefficient logit • 0.52, 1 SD above average difficulty = 0.4233, the value
added to the intercept logit. Complexity was coded as a dichotomous variable in which
low complexity was coded as 0. Therefore, the predicted logit, η̂ , for this situation was
0.268 + -0.972 + 0.4233 = -0.281. The associated probability of misconception error
(using Equations 33 and 34) was 0.430 in the sample. The same computational process
was used for the population average model and subsequent combined effect examples.
The second and third combined effects from Table 104 represent the probability
of a misconception error on a hard item (1 SD above mean Difficulty = 0.52) of mean
discrimination (0.8) and low complexity (see Table 97 for difficulty and discrimination
values). For combined effect 2, a student who had an average pretest misconception score
in a control class with average pretest misconception, class enjoyment, motivation, value,
and self confidence scores was predicted by the model to have a probability of a
misconception error of 0.430 in the sample and 0.432 in the population. For the same
student (Combined Effect 3), if the class enjoyment level increased by one standard
deviation (0.3 units), the probability of a misconception error reduced to 0.318 in the
sample and 0.323 in the population (Table 104).
The fourth combined effect examines the relationship of self confidence with
misconception error probabilities. A student with pretest misconception score equal to the
mean, on a hard item of average discrimination and low complexity, in a control class
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with average enjoyment, motivation, value, and pretest mean misconceptions but one
standard deviation above the mean for self confidence had a misconception error
probability of 0.450 for both the sample and population (Table 104).
The treatment condition had an indirect effect on the probability of a
misconception error by impacting the item difficulty slope. A student with a mean pretest
misconception score and motivation in a treatment class with average enjoyment, self
confidence, value, and pretest misconception was predicted to have a probability of
misconception error of 0.401 in the sample and 0.406 in the population on an item of
average discrimination and difficulty and low complexity (Table 104).
Summary of Results
Three analyses were conducted to examine the nature of mathematical
misconceptions. Document analysis of student responses was used to distinguish between
errors due to factors other than misconceptions and errors representing misconceptions.
The coding from this analysis was used for the subsequent quantitative analyses.
The quantitative analyses included two separate investigations. First, the
relationship of misconceptions in each content area was examined using structural
equation modeling. Six models were compared, all of which returned high goodness of fit
indices and parsimony indices greater than 0.5. All models were calibrated using
modification indices to reduce the chi-squared value. The final model for all six
hypotheses validated well across a randomly chosen sample.
Second, the impact of item, student, and class characteristics on misconception
errors was investigated through a three level hierarchical generalized linear model. In this
model, the item and student variance was statistically non-significant, but the between
class variance was significant. Only class knowledge of cognition was a significant
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predictor of misconception errors on a particular task. Based on these analyses, the item
and student levels were combined into a single student level, in which the new outcome
variable was the percentage of misconception errors for each student on the posttest. In
this new model, student and class variance was statistically significant. Student
mathematics self confidence and student percentage of misconceptions on the pretest
were significant predictors of posttest misconception percentages. These two student
variables explained 29% of student variance. Class enjoyment of mathematics, value of
mathematics, and pretest misconception percentage were statistically significant class
predictors of student posttest misconception percentage. The treatment condition of the
class was not a statistically significant predictor. The removal of non-significant class
predictor variables resulted in a significant amount of unexplained variance being
returned to the model, so interaction effects were added to the model. The interaction of
class value of mathematics and class knowledge of cognition was a statistically
significant predictor of student posttest misconceptions.
These analyses offer information about the nature of misconceptions in
mathematics that may lead to better assessment of misconceptions and interventions to
address misconceptions. The following chapter discusses the implications of these results.
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CHAPTER 5
DISCUSSION
This chapter presents a discussion of the results provided Chapter 4. Three
analyses were conducted to investigate the nature of misconceptions in mathematics: (1)
analysis of student response patterns on the mathematics knowledge test (NAEP items);
(2) comparison of hypothesized structural models representing the relationships among
content area misconceptions; and, (3) examination of the impact of item, student, and
class characteristics on misconception errors. Item characteristics were measured using
Item Response Theory on the NAEP mathematics knowledge test. Student characteristics
included attitudes toward mathematics (ATMI Enjoyment, Motivation, Self Confidence,
and Value scales), metacognitive awareness (MAI Knowledge of Cognition and
Regulation of Cognition scales), and pre- and post-test misconception and percent correct
scores. Class characteristics consisted of aggregated scores for each student characteristic
along with indicator variables for treatment condition and type of mathematics class.
Through these three analyses, seven key findings emerged.
1. Content area is not the most effective way to classify mathematics
misconceptions; instead, five underlying misconceptions affect all four content
areas.
2. Mathematics misconception errors often appear as procedural errors.
3. A classroom environment that fosters enjoyment of mathematics and value of
mathematics are associated with reduced misconception errors.
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4. Higher mathematics self confidence and motivation to learn mathematics is
associated with reduced misconception errors.
5. Probability misconceptions do not have a causal effect on rational numbers,
algebra, or geometry misconceptions.
6. Rational number misconceptions do not have a causal effect on probability,
algebra, or geometry misconceptions.
7. Probability instruction may not affect misconceptions directly, but it may help
students develop skills needed to bypass misconceptions when solving difficult
problems.
Analysis 1: Misconception Error Analysis
Two key findings. The first analysis of the present study presented patterns of
student responses on the mathematics knowledge test composed of NAEP items. This
document analysis validated hypotheses about how misconceptions would result in error
choices for eight of the 17 items. Misconception error choices for the other nine items
were adjusted to align with observed student responses (as shown in Table 18) before
proceeding with the quantitative analyses. The observed patterns of misconception errors
revealed an important aspect of mathematics misconceptions, Key Finding 1: On a wide
array of mathematical problems, a very small number of fundamental misconceptions
(five) appeared to account for a large proportion of the observed errors (70.49%). All five
of these core misconceptions (i.e., Absolute/Relative Comparison,
Additive/Multiplicative Structure, Spatial Reasoning, Variable Meaning, and Rational
Number Meaning Misconceptions) appeared in multiple mathematics content areas.
Another conclusion emerged from the analysis of student response patterns, Key
Finding 2: Misconception error explanations relied on procedural knowledge isolated
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from conceptual knowledge (as described in Figure 10). Previous studies (e.g., Agnoli &
Krantz, 1989; Kahneman & Tversky, 1972; Falk, 1992) have also indicated that reliance
on judgmental heuristics may be an important factor in the development of mathematics
misconceptions.
Our task as mathematics educators is to distinguish between those
circumstances in which judgmental heuristics can adversely affect
stochastic thinking and those in which the heurisitcs are useful and
desirable. And we are obliged to point out the differences to our students.
It is not that there is “something wrong” with the way our students think.
It is just that they (and we) tend to carry useful heuristics beyond their
relevant domain (Shaughnessy & Bergman, 1993, p. 184).
The analysis of the present study indicates that connecting procedural knowledge
to conceptual knowledge may help teachers and students make these distinctions. Hiebert
and Grouws (2007) described two observable features for a classroom that focuses on
developing conceptual understanding: (1) Teaching focuses explicitly to connections
between facts, procedures, and ideas, and (2) Students are allowed to struggle with
important mathematical concepts. Development of these two features in a classroom may
help teachers identify the reasoning behind errors that emerge from misconceptions.
Detecting mathematics misconceptions. NAEP released items were compiled “as
is,” without any changes for the mathematics knowledge test (Appendix M). By doing so,
the NAEP-established item content and concurrent criterion validity could be transferred
to the present study (Daro et al., 2007). The compiled instrument also exhibited
acceptable internal consistency and test-retest reliability. Despite these qualities, the
instrument failed to adequately differentiate between misconceptions.
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The ambiguity in student explanations for several items indicated that the validity
of the items did not necessarily extend to measuring misconceptions. For example, the
question of whether content area or type of underlying misconception category is a better
way to organize mathematical misconceptions cannot be answered by the present study
— some item responses indicated multiple types of misconceptions (e.g., Item 7, Choice
D; Item 17, Choice C). Such a question might be answerable using a multi-trait, multimethod structural equation model, but a model of this type, based on the present
instrument would most likely require several cross-loadings that would make the model
structurally unstable (i.e., no amount of iterations can yield a solution), such as was seen
in Models A, B, and C of the structural analysis. Therefore, I recommend that such a
study begin by altering the present instrument to focus directly on observed
misconception responses. For example, in Item 17, the uniformity heuristic sometimes
represented an absolute/relative comparison misconception, an additive/multiplicative
structure misconception, a rational number meaning misconception, or a combination of
these misconception types. To distinguish misconceptions more readily, it may be
necessary to include explanations with possible answers. For example, instead of simply
offering the choice “three,” a revised item might offer “one because the numerator is one
(absolute/relative comparison misconception), “three because the denominator is three”
(rational number meaning misconception), and “three because R and S have equal faces”
(additive/multiplicative structure misconception via the uniformity heuristic). Without
such differentiation, misconception content validity for closed-response items will be
difficult to establish. A study to develop and validate such a misconception instrument
may be a necessary first step to replicating and advancing the present investigation.
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Analysis 2: Content Area Misconceptions
Two key findings. The second analysis of the present study compared six
hypothesized relationships between misconceptions in probability, rational numbers,
algebra, and geometry as shown in Figure 1. Multiple studies found during the literature
review (e.g., Agnoli & Krantz, 1989; Falk, 1992; Freudenthal, 1970, 1973, 1983; Schield,
2006; Shaughnessy & Bergman, 1993; Warren, 2000; Watson & Shaughnessy, 2004)
suggested that misconceptions in probability and rational numbers may hold a causal
predictive position relative to those of algebra and geometry. They did not, however,
suggest which might be the primary causal factor or if both acted together as causal
indicators. The results of the present study suggested Key Findings 5 and 6: Probability
misconceptions do not have a causal effect on rational numbers, algebra, or geometry
misonceptions; Rational number misconceptions do not have a causal effect on
probability, algebra, or geometry misconceptions. These results also reinforced Key
Finding 1: Content area is not the most effective way to classify mathematics
misconceptions.Interpretation of this analysis focused on issues of model stability and
comparisons of the final models using the goodness of fit indices.
Model stability. Model C (Figure 24) exhibited instability throughout the
structural model analysis. Instability refers to the iterative process of SEM being unable
to determine a best fitting solution. In the case of Model C, Lisrel 8.72 identified the
fitted covariance matrix as “not positive definite,” meaning that the determinant of the
solution matrix was either less than or equal to zero. This error indicates an unstable
model for two reasons. (1) If the determinant of the fitted matrix equals zero, then the
matrix is not invertible: The minimization function requires that the fitted matrix be
inverted to find a solution. (2) A negative determinant allows the matrix to be inverted
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mathematically, but the determinant is negative in a symmetric matrix only when
elements on the diagonal are negative (Wothke, 1993). These diagonal elements represent
variance (Byrne, 1998), so negative values present serious problems for interpretation
and fitting the estimated matrix to the observed matrix. Wothke (1993) described two
reasons for non-positive definite matrices, collinearity and overparameterization. In both
cases, removal of unnecessary or redundant parameters can allow the analysis to proceed.
In the case of Model C, both rational number and probability misconceptions could not
predict both algebra and geometry misconceptions simulateously without creating a nonpositive definite fitted covariance matrix. The structural portion of Model C was
therefore adjusted to discover the source of the error, which turned out to be the
crossloadings from both independent variables (rational number and probability) to both
dependent variables (algebra and geometry). Removal of either the crossloadings or
direct effects eliminated the non-positive definite matrix problem. I proceeded to ask
whether non-positive definite matrices would have occurred across imputations in
Models A and B if the models had specified additional structural parameters. The dotted
line regression weights in Figure 32 represent each additional parameter added to the
models.

Figure 32. Post Hoc Hypothesized Structural Parameters for Models A and B (Figure 24)
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By adding the dotted line regression pathways in Figure 33 one at a time and
together, both models resulted in non-positive definite matrices that prevented the
analysis from computing an admissible solution. The consistent pattern of nonconvergence across three different models led to the conclusion that the addition of too
many structural parameters created unstable models when both rational number and
probability misconceptions act as predictors of both algebra and geometry
misconceptions. One interpretation of this model behavior may be that rational number
misconceptions and probability misconception may impact algebra and geometry
misconceptions through the other or directly, but they do not appear to act as both direct
causes and moderators simultaneously.
Goodness of fit statistics. Each competing model in the calibration sample
demonstrated excellent goodness of fit statistics with the exception of the GFI, and the
GFI statistic was consistently moderate across all models. The dichotomous nature of the
data meant that non-normality necessarily existed in the measurements, which has been
reported to influence the value of GFI (Hu & Bentler, 1995). None of the models
demonstrated superiority over the others (see Table 84).
Conclusions. Based on these analyses, none of the models represented the
relationship between misconceptions across content areas better than the others. Key
Finding 5 and 6 emerged from these results: Probability misconceptions do not have a
causal effect on rational numbers, algebra, or geometry misconceptions; and, Rational
number misconceptions do not have a causal effect on probability, algebra, or geometry
misconceptions.
Multicollinearity between content area misconceptions may account for the lack
of causal relationships. If multicollinearity were present, it could have caused the
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different causal models to be statistically indistinguishable. To test for multicollinearity
between content area misconceptions, pooled Pearson correlations between factor scores
were computed across the five imputed data sets (Table 105).
Table 105
Pooled Intercorrelations Between Content Area Misconception Scores
Subscale
1
2
3
4
1. Algebra
―
.31**
.36**
.35**
2. Geometry
―
.27**
.23**
3. Rational Number
―
.32**
4. Probability
―
Note: N = 1133; ** p < 0.001

All correlation coefficients in Table 105 were statistically significant, ranging
from 0.23 to 0.37. These values mean that 5% to 13% of the variance between any two
variables can be accounted for by multicollinearity. Taken together, these correlations
confirmed that mutlicollinearity was a significant factor in the model analysis.
By considering the qualitative analysis of student response patterns along with the
present structural model analysis, the source of the multicollinearity can be traced. In the
qualitative analysis, students sometimes responded to a misconception item because of
different misconceptions (e.g., Item 4, Response B and Item 1, Response E). In other
items, students chose one distractor because of one type of misconception, but chose
another response because of a different misconception (e.g., Item 17). Because of this
lack of discrimination within some misconception responses, examining a theoretical
model of the underlying misconceptions (i.e., the meaning of rational numbers,
additive/multiplicative structures, spatial reasoning, absolute/relative comparison, and the
meaning of variables) was not possible with any degree of reliability. The results of the
present study may strengthen the notion that there exists a core set of misconceptions that
span content areas; indeed, the lack of difference among content area based models
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indicates that these underlying misconception structures that influence reasoning in all
four content areas may be more important than the content area to understanding how
mathematical misconceptions develop and how they can be better addressed.
To test this hypothesis, a second order factor was added to Model F (Figure 31). I
hypothesized two potential outcomes for this new model. If the model demonstrated
significant improvement over the other models, then this first outcome would mean that
content area factors may model misconceptions well, but a higher order, fundamental
mathematics misconceptions would account for the linearity between them. If, on the
other hand, the new model did not demonstrate significant differences with the other
models, then content area factors may not be the best way to model mathematical
misconceptions.

Figure 33. Possible Second Order Factor Model to Explain Content Area Misconception Multicollinearity.
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The addition of this second order factor required checking that the new level was
over-identified. With 10 data moments, 3 regression weights, 1 variance, and 4 residuals,
the second order construct was overidentified with 10 – (3+1+4) = 2 degrees of freedom.
Overall, the model had 115 degrees of freedom.
The resulting goodness of fit statistics indicated that this model behaved no
differently than Models A-F (Table 106).
Table 106
Goodness of Fit Indices for Second Order Post Hoc Hypothesized Model
CFI
GFI
RMSEA RMSEA 90% CI SRMR PGFI
χ2
604.17
0.99
0.87
0.024
[0.009, 0.035]
0.075
0.66

PCFI
0.751

ECVI
1.41

This structural comparison supported the hypothesis that the multicollinearity between
content area misconceptions cannot be explained by the addition of a single factor.
Previous studies (e.g., Agnoli, 1987; Agnoli & Krantz, 1989; Battista, 2007; Clements &
Battista, 1992; De Bock et al., 2002; Falk, 1992; Kahneman & Tversky, 1973a, 1973b,
1982; Küchemann, 1978; Lamon, 1999; Shaughnessy & Bergman, 1993; Van Dooren et
al., 2003; Warren, 2000; Watson & Shaughnessy, 2004) have indicated at least five
potential cross-content misconceptions that may explain the multicollinearity found in the
present study, reinforcing Key Finding 1. Figure 34 portrays a possible structure for these
underlying misconceptions and how they affect misconceptions in each content area.
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Figure 34. Hypothetical Structure for Underlying Mathematical Misconceptions.

The solid-line regression weights in Figure 34 represent relationships observed in
the qualitative analysis of student responses. The dotted-line regression weights represent
potential relationships between underlying and content area misconceptions that were not
observed in the qualitative analysis. Whether their absence was due to the lack of a
relationship or simply an artifact of the assessment instrument is not entirely clear — the
dotted lines are not necessarily weaker relationships. For example, the meaning of
rational number misconceptions very likely impacts geometry misconceptions relating to
similarity concepts, but no items in the assessment instrument measured similarity
concepts.
Additionally, the relationship between the underlying misconceptions is not clear
at this time. There may well be a causal structure between these factors; some may also
be completely uncorrelated with others. Future studies may wish to measure these
relationships.
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Implications for curriculum development. The NCTM (2000) Principles and
Standards for School Mathematics offered a conceptual framework to organize the
emphasis of each content strand from Pre-K to Grade 12 (Figure 9). The structural
analysis of the present study suggests that such an organizational structure may be unable
to conceptualize fundamental concepts to learning mathematics that often result in
misconceptions when ignored. A modified scheme adds an extra dimension to the NCTM
framework (Figure 35).

Figure 35. NCTM (2000) Modified Content Emphases Including Fundamental Mathematics Concepts

Figure 35 depicts these fundamental mathematics concepts as progressive stages
of learning throughout a child’s education. As a child progresses through grade school,
the learning of these concepts can follow two paths. (1) If left unchecked, these concepts
develop into misunderstandings about ideas, and misconceptions may develop. These
misconceptions may compound as new learning barriers are encountered. When learning
is focused primarily on developing procedural knowledge, the resultant rules, heuristics,
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and formulas developed in isolation from conceptual knowledge lead to instrumental
understanding and misunderstanding about the meaning of important mathematical ideas
(as shown in Figure 10). (2) If misconceptions are addressed through an intervention that
reinforces the meaning of mathematics ideas and the connections between ideas, then the
learning barriers in Figure 35 may bolster rather than hinder the development of student
understanding (Resnick, 1983).
Textbooks may also improve their effect on student mathematics learning by
integrating the barriers of Figure 35 throughout lesson sequences. Consider the example
of a linear function definition presented by an algebra textbook. In Chapter 1, this
problem was described as focusing primarily on a prescription for recognizing linear
functions. The textbook description also connected the meaning of lines with the shape of
the graph (i.e., spatial reasoning). The textbook did not, however, address the meaning of
the variables x, y, or f(x). It also failed to address the meaning of the quantities m and b.
Furthermore, no comparison was made of the similarities and differences in m and b from
x and y. A discussion of the meaning of m can be used to address the differences between
additive and multiplicative structures as described by Warren (2000).
The potential changes to mathematics curricula supported by the present study
may add a layer of complexity to the way mathematics content is organized. This
complexity may have a direct impact on the ability of educators to provide materials to
help address the barriers students encounter when learning mathematics.
Analysis 3: Factors Influencing Misconception Errors
Three key findings. The final analysis of the present study examined the impact of
item, student, and class characteristics on misconception errors. The results of this
analysis led to Key Findings 3, 4, and 7: A classroom environment that fosters enjoyment
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of mathematics or value of mathematics helps reduce student misconception errors;
Higher mathematics self confidence reduces misconception errors; and, Probability
instruction may not affect misconceptions directly, but it may help students develop skills
needed to bypass misconceptions when solving difficult problems.
The two level model revealed significant predictors of misconceptions for both
student and class characteristics. Student mathematics self confidence (ATMI self
confidence scale) and pretest misconception error percentages (NAEP instrument)
accounted for 29% of the student variance in posttest misconception error percentages
(NAEP instrument). Class enjoyment of mathematics (ATMI enjoyment scale) and the
class value of mathematics (ATMI value scale) also had a statistically significant effect
on posttest misconception errors. The between-class variance in the unconditional model
(see Table 89) was 0.0073 (p < 0.001). The contextual model that included the
statistically significant class variables (see Table 92) reduced the between class variance
to 0.0005 (p = 0.016). This reduction represented a 93.15% reduction. The three level
model also accounted for 98% of the class level variance. Such large reductions in
variance indicates that a large percentage of class effects on misconceptions may lie in
the factors measured by the ATMI scales. If true, then educators can begin focusing on
improvement of these factors within a class to reduce misconceptions.
Implications for teaching mathematics. Traditional mathematics instruction has
relied primarily on teacher-centered epistemologies (Stigler & Hiebert, 1999). This
investigation began with the assumption that student-centered instructional approaches
have a more positive effect on student mathematics learning than traditional, teachercentered strategies. The present study supported this assumption and extended it to
addressing misconceptions. Higher mathematics self confidence, value, and enjoyment
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were associated with a decline in misconceptions; the development of a positive learning
environment may therefore be a critical component to helping students traverse the
learning barriers in Figure 35.
Maher and Tetrault (2001) described four epistemological components critical to
developing such a positive learning environment: mastery, voice, authority, and
positionality. First, mastery involves struggle and engagement with a body of knowledge.
Instead of merely absorbing information, students grapple with difficulties of
understanding. Rather than the final product as end goal, mastery refers to the continual
process of working and re-working information into knowledge. Second, the fashioning
of one’s voice in mathematics means to bring one's personal experiences, questions, and
perspectives to the mathematics being studied. Third, the concept of authority refers to
the source of mathematical knowledge in a classroom. Maher and Tetrault (2001) and
Shrewsbury (1993) described a climate of shared mathematical authority: Students and
teachers share the knowledge and understanding of important mathematical ideas in such
an environment. Authority refers to the relationship between students and teachers
collectively with mathematical knowledge. Fourth, positionality refers to the
relationships between an individual and mathematical knowledge along with the
interactions of these within- and between-student relationships.
As teachers seek to help students turn the barriers of Figure 35 into opportunities
to reinforce fundamental mathematics concepts, the development of a student-centered
environment may be a foundational component for any strategy. Previous studies (e.g.,
Slavin & Karweit, 1982; Slavin & Lake, 2008; Slavin et al., 2009) have found that
student-centered teaching approaches provide benefits to student achievement. If these
environments are to offer the most benefit to avoiding and addressing misconceptions,
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then students must be given opportunities to struggle with important mathematical ideas
and their connections (Hiebert & Grouws, 2007; Kieran, 1989, 1992, 2007).
An ontological perspective from the present study also offers insight for helping
students overcome the learning barriers in Figure 35. The examination of student
misconception error explanations revealed a consistent pattern: Misconception errors
occurred when students relied on procedures isolated from meaning and mathematical
structure. This pattern suggests that mathematics is best understood as an organized
structure of meanings and connections rather than procedures.
Teachers should strive to organize the mathematics so that
fundamental ideas form an integrated whole. Big ideas encountered in a
variety of contexts should be established carefully, with important
elements such as terminology, definitions, notation, concepts, and skills
emerging in the process (NCTM, 2000, p. 14)
In combination with the epistemological implications described above, the present
study found that student-centered, concept-focused mathematics classrooms may be the
most effective learning environment for turning fundamental mathematics barriers into
opportunities to learn.
Final Thoughts: Pedagogy and Mathematics Misconceptions
Traditional mathematics pedagogy may be even more detrimental to student
learning than described by Welch (1978), Stigler and Hiebert (1997), and Manoucheri
and Goodman (2001). In addition to losing the opportunity to struggle with important
mathematics, traditional pedagogy also removes students from a position in which they
can value or enjoy mathematics, individually or collectively (Shrewsbury, 1993).
Traditional pedagogy positions students to receive and react to goals set out by the
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teacher rather than allowing them part of the leadership process that helps them develop
metacognitive knowledge and skills (Maher & Tetrault, 2001; Shrewsbury, 1993).
Conceptual instruction, on the other hand, guides students to developing their own
understanding of the meaning of important mathematical ideas and the connections
between these ideas through authentic intellectual struggle (Rousseau, 1976; Stone,
Alfeld, & Pearson, 2008). The findings of the present study suggest that conceptually
focused instruction may position students to grapple with complex, abstract mathematical
in a way that helps develop relational understanding of relevant mathematical structures,
thereby reducing misconceptions or turning misconceptions into learning experiences.
When targeting misconceptions, attending to the underlying structure of
misconceptions that appear in all four content areas may be more effective than targeting
the observable errors resulting from those misconceptions. Future investigations of
mathematics misconceptions may best begin by developing a more refined instruments
for identifying and categorizing misconceptions and potential causal structures
The present study explored the use of probability instruction as an intervention to target
fundamental mathematics misconceptions. The treatment condition had a statistically
significant impact on the effect of item difficulty on misconception error probabilities,
and several other important statistically significant factors were also identified. None of
the hypothesized structures of content area misconceptions could be identified as a better
fit to the data. This outcome led to the discovery of a high degree of multicollinearity
between content area misconceptions, which supported the notion of an underlying
mathematics misconception structure. Preliminary analysis of a second-level underlying
structure showed promise for this approach to understanding mathematical
misconeptions. This finding offers a radically different perspective on the nature of
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mathematics and mathematics learning. Furthermore, only five foundational concepts
appeared to be fundamental to learning mathematics. Attending to these five foundational
concepts may allow mathematics teaching in any single area to fundamentally impact the
learning of other mathematics areas. Ignoring this small set of foundational concepts may
allow the development of a formidable obstruction at a level that can inhibit and perhaps
derail the mathematics future of students. Such an astounding notion may indicate that
finding ways to identify and address these foundational concepts and their connections to
a particular mathematics area should be one of the primary, critical tasks for mathematics
educators.
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APPENDIX A
Algebra Lesson 1: Statistical Structure
Situation:
This lesson is the first of a probability unit designed for high school algebra classes.
In this lesson, students will examine the structure of descriptive statistics and the
normal distribution at an introductory level.
This lesson is designed for a 90 minute block period class.
Objectives
1. Students will describe the structure of data analysis.
2. Students will interpret mean, median, mode, variance, and standard deviation.
3. Students will construct normal distribution data displays.
4. Students will interpret the normal distribution data display.
Connections
In this lesson, probability is introduced as an extension of data analysis and the need
to make inferences about a population. The opener begins this sequence by having
students explore the notion of equality as it relates to rational numbers, a foundational
concept to probability. In the 2nd lesson of this unit, the topics discussed in the present
lesson will be reviewed further.
Materials
1) Measuring tapes to measure height in inches
2) LCD Projector
3) Microsoft PowerPoint (And Clicker, if available)
4) PowerPoint Presentation
5) Student Lesson Worksheet
KY Core Content 4.1 Standards
MA-HS-1.1.1: Students will compare real numbers using order relations (less than,
greater than, equal to) and represent problems using real numbers.
MA-HS-4.1.1: Students will analyze and make inferences from a set of data with no
more than two variables, and will analyze problems for the use and
misuse of data representations.
MA-HS-4.1.2: Students will construct data displays for data with no more than two
variables.
MA-HS-4.2.1: Students will describe and compare data distributions and make
inferences from the data based on the shapes of graphs, measures of
center (mean, median, mode) and measures of spread (range, standard
deviation).
MA-HS-4.2.2: Students will know the characteristics of the Gaussian normal
distribution (bell-shaped curve).
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Procedures
1) Opener – Think, Pair, Share (@ 10 minutes overall)
a. Draw a picture to explain why 1/5 is equal to 0.2
i. Give 3-5 minutes to draw pictures. (Teacher takes roll and posts)
ii. Pair up and discuss answers (@ 1-2 minutes)
iii. Share out in pairs (2 minutes)
b. Discuss sample answers on PowerPoint slide. (@ 2 minute)
i. Two possible pictures are given.
2) Guided Notes (75 minutes) – Pass out Student Lesson Worksheet.
a. Structure of Statistics: “The Statistical Pyramid” (Which is actually a
ziggurat)
i. The purpose of statistics is to say something about a population
(Inference).
1. Can’t measure a population directly because of
constraining factors (e.g., time, money, ability to identify
all subjects of population)
2. Instead, we have to estimate population “parameters” from
samples.
ii. Sample statistics are the foundation of all data analysis.
1. Not particularly interesting by themselves (e.g., I can easily
measure the attitudes of students in a classroom about a
topic, but what I really want to measure is the attitude held
by all teenagers in the U. S.)
2. Descriptive Statistics: We either describe sample behavior
by the center or its spread. The center statistics are mean,
median, and mode. The spread statistics are variance,
standard deviation, and range.
3. The frequency with which we observe particular values in a
sample is sometimes called either the “sample” distribution
or “data” distribution. (We’ll typically use “data”
distribution to distinguish it from the “sampling”
distribution)
iii. Population parameters are also described by center and spread
1. Center is typically the mean (although sometimes the
median is used)
2. Spread is variance and standard deviation.
3. The frequency with which we observe particular values in a
population is the “population distribution”
iv. In between the population and data distributions is the pyramid
staircase, the sampling distribution.
1. What is a sampling distribution? We take a sample of N
subjects, and compute a mean. The mean becomes a data
point in the sampling distribution. We repeat this process a
certain number of times, each time placing the sample
mean into the sampling distribution set. When we have an
“infinite” number of samples (of equal size), we have the
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sampling distribution. (The frequency with which mean
values are observed in repeated sampling)
2. The sampling distribution also has a center and a spread.
The center is the mean (which is actually a mean of means)
and standard deviation. The standard deviation of a
sampling distribution is usually referred to as “standard
error.”
b. Symbols commonly used in data analysis:
i. These symbols are organized by which distribution they belong to:
1. In the sample,
(a) x = observation data
(b) x = sample mean
(c) s2 = sample variance
(d) s = sample standard deviation
2. In the sampling distribution,
(a) μ x = sampling distribution mean (Mean of Means)
(b) σ x or SE = standard error
3. In the population distribution,
(a) μ = population mean
(b) σ2 = population variance
(c) σ = population standard deviation
4. Some general symbols used commonly:
(a) Δ = Change (Looks like a triangle, but it’s actually
a Greek Capital Delta)
(b) Σ = Sum (Greek Capital Sigma)
(c) df = Degrees of Freedom
c. Describing data by the center
i. Why would we want to do this? The center value can sometimes be
a good representation of the values in the data set. Much easier to
use one number instead of a thousand.
ii. Graphing the data on a dotplot (a number line with each repeated
point stacked)
iii. Using the sample data set, go through computing the mean,
median, and mode. Place a mark on the dotplot to show the mean,
median, and mode.
iv. Which center best represents this data set? In this case, the mean
does a better job of representing the set (the 50 is high, but not
high enough to be an outlier, and the median doesn’t account for
its high value).
v. How to decide which center to use:
1. Mean: Most commonly used center. Used when data are
distributed “normally” (bell shaped curve).
2. Median: Used when data set contains outliers.
3. Mode: Used when all the data cluster around a single value.
d. Degrees of Freedom (df)
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i. Defined as the number of independent observations in a population
represented by a sample.
ii. What do we mean by independent observations?
1. Consider a sample of 4 people who are measured on some
“score.” The sample mean x = 20, which means the sum of
the scores was 80.
2. We automatically estimate the population mean μ to also be
20.
3. So, when we go to the next sample of 4 people from the
population, the first three people’s scores can be whatever
they want (i.e., “free”)
4. However, the fourth observation must make up the
difference to get the sum to be 80 so that the population
mean is still 20. We therefore say that it is “fixed” to track
the population mean.
5. So, we say that every time we estimate a population
parameter, we lose a degree of freedom. So, df = n – 1
(usually).
iii. Degrees of freedom are important. Most statistical calculations
assume that one observation doesn’t influence another (i.e.,
“independent”)
iv. So, when we talk about samples, we think about sample size. But,
when we talk about populations, we think about degrees of
freedom.
e. Divide students into groups of 6 (or allow them to group themselves).
i. Measure heights in inches.
ii. Have students compute the mean and subtract the mean from each
X.
iii. Have students add the second column. (If they don’t get 0, then
there are either rounding errors or computation errors)
iv. If we are interested in finding an average distance from the mean,
why is this sum a problem? Because it means that regardless of the
distances in the set, the average will always appear to be 0.
v. Why is the sum always 0? Difficult to tell from the table, so let’s
look at a sample set of data and a number line. Notice that the
negative distances (observations below the mean) cancel out the
positive distances (observations above the mean). Check your data
set and see if it’s true for yours as well!
vi. Computing the average distance from the mean can be thought of
like calculating the distance between any other two points
1. Use Pythagorean Theorem
2. Notice that a + b ≠ c (and can’t for any triangle)
3. But a2 + b2 does equal c2. When we talk about a2, b2, or c2,
we are talking about area of squares.
4. Benefit of using squares: (1) Can be used to compute
distance (point out that the Pythagorean Theorem re-
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worked is the distance formula); (2) Eliminates the 0 sum
problem.
5. How does it eliminate 0 sum problem? The square of any
number is positive (positive • positive = positive; negative
• negative = positive).
vii. Have students return to their height activity.
1. Plot points on number line
2. Draw in mean distances
3. Draw the squares.
4. Fill in the third column by squaring each mean distance.
5. Find the sum of the third column and divide by 5 (Divide
by 5 and not 6 because we want average distance in
population, not sample, so use df instead of n).
6. Go through sample data and allow students to follow their
work with the sample.
viii. What does that get us?
1. Average square area for the mean distances is the
“variance”
2
(
X −X)
∑
2
2. It’s formula is: Variance = σ =
n −1
3. It should be interpreted as the average amount of “noise”
around the mean. It is the amount of data not represented
by the mean.
4. The side length of the variance square is the “standard
deviation.”
5. It’s formula is:

∑ (X − X )

2

Standard Deviation = σ = σ =
2

n −1
ix. Don’t worry about memorizing formulas! Graphing calculator
computes these values easily.
1. Stat Edit Edit takes students to the lists to type in
their data (have them use their data set while you go
through steps)
2. 2nd Quit returns them to the main calculator screen.
3. Stat Calc 1 Variable Stats provides:
(a) Mean
(b) Sum of X
(c) Sum of X2
(d) Population Standard Deviation
(e) Sample Standard Deviation
(f) Sample Size
(g) Minimum X
(h) Q1 (25th percentile)
(i) Median (50th percentile)
(j) Q3 (75th percentile)
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(k) Maximum X
x. Normal Distribution
1. The normal distribution is a frequency distribution that
corresponds to the probability of seeing a range of values in
the population. Simplest, most common way of getting to
population inference from a sample.
2. Probability patterns are non-linear. (Rule of 3/Linear
Proportions will not work to find unknowns).
3. Look at Normal Distribution equation. No need to
memorize the formula. Just notice that this distribution is
based on mean, variance, and standard deviation.
xi. 68-95-99 rule
1. 68% of population falls between -σ and +σ. 95% of
population falls between -2σ and +2σ. 99% of population
falls between -3σ and 3σ WHEN DATA ARE NORMAL.
2. These percentages are approximations.
3. Finding critical values: add/subtract σ to/from mean.
4. Making inferences with normal data.
xii. Plotting normal curves
1. Graphing calculator command: Y = Normalpdf(X, mean,
st. dev.)
2. Set Window.
(a) XMin: A little lower than -3σ.
(b) XMax: A little higher than 3σ.
(c) XScl: Your choice. I tend to prefer σ.
(d) YMin: 0
(e) YMax: Your choice. I would think not higher than
0.3
(f) YScl: Your choice. 0.1 is usually pretty good
(g) XRes: Keep at 1.
3. Effect of standard deviation on curve height/width.
(a) Higher SD = Shorter, wider graph
(b) Lower SD = Taller, narrower graph
4. Effect of mean on curve. Shifts position.
3) Closure (5 minutes)
a. Give a couple of minutes for individual work.
b. Report out with whole class.
c. Sample Solution:
A news report posts that a political candidate has a 41% approval rating while
her opponent has a 38% approval rating (SD = 3%). How does the normal
distribution indicate that neither opponent is actually winning?
The majority of the normal distributions for each candidate overlap:
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Assessment
1) Opener: Students connect rational number representations to notion of equality
(1.1.1)
2) Guided Notes and In-Class Simulation (Teacher observes and questions while
students work individually; Questioning during whole class discussion) (4.1.1,
4.1.2, 4.2.1, 4.2.2)
3) Students will do more practice in Lesson 2 with normal distribution (4.1.1, 4.1.2,
4.2.1, 4.2.2)
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APPENDIX B
Algebra Lesson 1 Student Worksheet
1.

The structure of statistics

2. Some symbols and their meaning:
Symbol
Δ
Σ
df
μ
σ2
σ

μx
σx
x

x
s2
s
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Meaning

3. Describing data by the center
Sample Data Set: 50, 10,1, 7, 1, 25, 20
a) Make a dotplot of the data.
b) Compute the Mean. Mark it on the dotplot above.
c) Compute the Median. Mark it on the dotplot above.
d) Compute the Mode. Mark it on the dotplot above.
e) Which center best represents this sample data set? Why?
4. What does the term “Degrees of Freedom” mean?
a. How is it usually computed?
b. Why is it important?
5. A) Collect the height of six people in the class (in inches).
ഥ
X‐

X (Height)
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
ഥ=


Σ(X ‐ ݔҧ ) =

B) What happened when you tried to calculate the average distance to the mean?
C) Why do you think this happened?
6. How is distance between 2 points calculated?
P2

P1

290

7. What is the benefit of using square areas for distance?
8. Plot your student height data and mean on the number line provided on the next
page.
9. Compute the squares of the mean distances in the third column of the table in
Problem 3; then draw the squares on the number line.
10. Find the sum of the squares from column 3 in problem 3.
a. Divide the sum by 5. Why 5 and not 6?
b. What side length will produce a square of that size?

11. The area of the average squared distance is referred to as…
Formula:
Meaning:
12. The side length of the average square is the…
Another name for this length is…
Formula:
Meaning:
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13. Graphing Calculator Operations
Description
STAT

2nd

Buttons

ENTER

STAT

Purpose

ENTER
QUIT

QUIT

2nd

MODE
x:

STAT

Calc

1‐Var Stats

ENTER

STAT

∑x:
∑x2:
Sx:
σx:
n:
minX:
Q1:
Med:
Q3:
maxX:

14. What is the normal distribution? (Read
http://davidmlane.com/hyperstat/normal_distribution.html )

15. Identify the mean, variance, and standard deviation in the mathematical formula:
− ( X − μ )2

Height ~ N (μ , σ ) =

e

2σ2

σ 2π

Density

16. What is the 68 – 95 – 99 rule?

X

17. How do you compute the values for the X axis?
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18. Complete the following for your example data.
a. Approximately 68% of the population will fall between _____ and _____
inches.
b. Approximately 95% of the population will fall between _____ and _____
inches.
c. Approximately 99% of the population will fall between _____ and _____
inches.
d. Approximately 84% of the population will be shorter than _____ inches.
e. Approximately 0.5% of the population will be taller than _____ inches.
f. Approximately 16% of the population will be shorter than _____ inches.
g. Approximately 99.5% of the population will be taller than _____ inches.
19. Plotting Normal Distributions
a. What is the command sequence for graphing a normal distribution on a
graphing calculator?
b. How do you determine the Window to set for a Normal Distribution?
i. XMin:
ii. XMax:
iii. XScl:
iv. YMin:
v. YMax:
vi. YScl:
vii. XRes:
c. Plot two normal distributions on the same graph. Graph A: ~N(25, 2);
Graph B: ~N(25, 5).
d. What is the effect of the mean on the graph of a normal distribution?
e. What is the effect of a larger standard deviation on the normal
distribution?
f. What is the effect of a smaller standard deviation on the normal
distribution?
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APPENDIX C
Algebra Lesson 2: Randomness Lesson Plan
Situation:
This lesson is the second of a probability unit designed for high school algebra
classes. In this lesson, students will examine randomness and sampling techniques
used in experimentation. In subsequent lessons, students will examine counting
principles and probability patterns of random variables.
This lesson is designed for a 90 minute block period class.
Objectives
1) Students will distinguish between patterns and randomness.
2) Students will predict ending positions of a random walk.
3) Students will distinguish between types of sampling patterns.
Connections
In the first lesson, students learned how to create normal distribution curves from
means and standard deviations. In this lesson, students will explore patterns within
random data and discover that the random data will follow a normal pattern. In the
next lessons, students will build concepts of counting and probability on the
foundation of randomness and normality.
Materials
6) Coins for flipping at Station 1: Determining Random Patterns and Station 2: Ant
Walk
7) Computer with Internet for Station 3
a. Go to Cliff Hanger applet or type in http://mste.illinois.edu/activity/cliff/.
b. Note: The Cliff Hanger applet has sound; while sound is optional, it will make
the station far livelier. ☺
8) LCD Projector
9) Microsoft PowerPoint (And Clicker, if available)
10) PowerPoint Presentation
11) Student Lesson Worksheet
KY Core Content 4.1 Standards
MA-HS-4.1.1: Students will analyze and make inferences from a set of data with no
more than two variables, and will analyze problems for the use and
misuse of data representations.
MA-HS-4.1.2: Students will construct data displays for data with no more than two
variables.
MA-HS-4.2.1: Students will describe and compare data distributions and make
inferences from the data based on the shapes of graphs, measures of
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center (mean, median, mode) and measures of spread (range, standard
deviation).
MA-HS-4.2.2: Students will know the characteristics of the Gaussian normal
distribution (bell-shaped curve).
MA-HS-4.3.1: Students will recognize potential for bias resulting from the misuse of
sampling methods (e.g., non-random sampling, polling only a specific
group of people, using limited or extremely small sample sizes) and
explain why these samples can lead to inaccurate inferences.
MA-HS-4.3.2: Students will design simple experiments or investigations to collect
data to answer questions of interest.

Procedures (88 minutes overall)
4) Opener – Think, Pair, Share (@ 8 minutes overall)
a. Give 2-3 minutes to complete the work. (Teacher takes roll and posts)
b. Pair up and discuss answers. (@ 2 minutes)
c. Share out in pairs. (@ 2 minutes)
d. Discuss sample answers on PowerPoint slide. (@ 2 minute)
i. Review computation of critical values for normal distribution.
ii. Review Probability Percentages and meaning of Percentile: 98th
percentile does not mean that Ben got 98% of the questions
correct; it means that he scored better than 98% of the other
students who took the test.
5) Pass out Student Lesson Worksheet. Have students read about Randomness and
Sampling in their textbook and answer as many questions on Page 1 as they can
on their own. (5 minutes)
6) Whole Class discussion of Page 1 Questions. (15 minutes)
a. What is randomness?
i. Every outcome has an equal chance of being selected.
b. Why is it important?
i. Random patterns appear in the world in many places: atomic and
molecular movement, lottery, decision under uncertainty
c. Simple Random Sampling
i. Every individual in a population has an equal and independent
chance of being selected for the study. The sample is obtained
through selection by chance, a table of random numbers, or
computer-generated random numbers.
d. Systematic Random Sampling
i. Based on the number needed in the sample, every nth person in the
target population is selected for the sample.
ii. Used most often for product quality testing (e.g., every nth
product)
iii. If the order to be sampled is random, then no bias increase.
e. Stratified Random Sampling
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i. This (method) is used when the proportion of subgroups (strata)
are known in the population; selection is random but from each of
these strata.
ii. Used in political polling, voting (e.g., political districts form the
strata)
iii. Especially useful when one or a few groups constitute a large
portion of the population — in this type of case, the stratified
sample can reduce bias, rather than increase it.
f. Convenience Sampling
i. Sampling is done on the basis of availability and ease of data
collection rather than in terms of suitability based on research
objectives/questions.
ii. Researchers (especially medical and social researchers) rely on
willing participants (volunteers). This situation adds bias to the
data — volunteers may share common traits that become overrepresented in the sample.
iii. Randomly assigning volunteers to treatment/control group reduces
this added bias.
7) Station Work (15 minutes at each station; 45 minutes total)
a. Station 1: Distinguishing Randomness within sequences
b. Station 2: Random Walk of Ants
c. Station 3: Random Walk with Tourist at the Grand Canyon (“Cliff
Hanger”)
8) Return to normal seats. (@ 10 minutes)
a. Compile frequency of outcomes for ant walk.
b. Build a histogram of class data.
c. If we did 100 trials, would the histogram change? Why or why not?
d. If each trial consisted of 20 steps, would the histogram change? Explain.
Note: PowerPoint Slide has histogram from two Monte Carlo samples.
9) Closure (5 minutes)
What was the most surprising thing you learned today? Why did it surprise you?
a. Write your own answer
b. Discuss with a partner
c. Share out with class
Assessment
4) Opener: Review of Normal Distribution (4.1.1, 4.2.1, 4.2.2)
5) Student Work Stations/Lesson Worksheet (4.1.2, 4.3.1, 4.3.2)
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APPENDIX D
Algebra Lesson 2 Station Prompts
Station 1: Determining Random Patterns
1) A teacher asked Clare and Susan each to toss a coin a large number of times
and to record every time whether the coin landed Heads or Tails. For each
‘Heads,’ a 1 is recorded and for each ‘Tails,’ a 0 is recorded. Here are the two
sets of results:

a) Now one girl did it properly, by tossing the coin. The other girl cheated and just
made it up. Which girl cheated? How can you tell?
b) Now try it yourself with a partner. One person flips the coin while the other
records the outcome. Switch off every 10 flips. Flip the coin 100 times. Record
the results below.
Flips
Flips 1-10
Flips 11-20
Flips 21-30
Flips 31-40
Flips 41-50
Flips 51-60
Flips 61-70
Flips 71-80
Flips 81-90
Flips 91-100

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

c) Does your simulation make you change your decision in Part A? Why or why
not?
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Station 2: Ants and Random Movement
Problem Statement:
If a wandering ant starts at a lamp post and takes steps of equal length along the
street, how far will it be from the lamp post after a certain number, say N, steps?
Though this question is seemingly trivial, it poses one of the most basic problems
in statistical science.
It is easiest to visualize random motion (random walk) along one line, that is, in one
dimension.
•
•
•

Call x the position of the ant on a one-dimensional line.
Locate the origin, that is x = 0, at the lamp post.
Then let each ``step'' of the ant — right or left along the line — be of equal length.

-7

-6

-5

-4

-3

-2

-1

x=0

+1

+2

+3

+4

+5

+6

+7

+8

1) How far from the origin do you expect the wandering ant to end up after 10 steps?
2) After 10 steps is the ant more likely to be to the right or to the left of its starting
point?
3) If another ant takes 10 steps from the starting point, then another ant, then another
ant, what do you expect their average final position to be after 10 steps?
Simulation
•

Choose the direction of the step the ant will take by flipping a coin:
(+1) If it is a head, the ant steps right and x increases by one.
(–1) If it is a tail, the ant steps left and x decreases by one.

4) What is the likelihood of getting a head or tail? What is the implication for the ant’s
steps?
5) Flip a penny ten times and move your ``ant'' accordingly. Record the data in the
table below. (Starting Position = 0, the lamp post)
Flip
Result
Ending Position

1

2

3

4

5

6) Did the ending result surprise you? Why or why not?
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6

7

8

9

10

7) Do the repeated trials for the ant walk represent random trials? Why or why not?
Whole Class work on Station 2 Ants
a. Compile the class data and construct a histogram.
Final Position of x

Frequency

‐7
‐6
‐5
‐4
‐3
‐2
‐1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Now that you've had a chance to experiment, answer the following:
1) What would you say about the value of the average position of many random
walkers?

2) If we conducted the same experiment with 100 trials of 10 steps, would the
histogram be different? Why or why not?

3) If each trial had the ant walk 20 steps instead of 10, would the histogram be
different from 100 trials of 10 steps? Explain.
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Station 3: Cliff Hanger
Go to the Cliff Hanger applet at http://mste.illinois.edu/activity/cliff/.
Problem Statement:
A long day hiking through the Grand Canyon has discombobulated this tourist.
Unsure of which way he is randomly stumbling, 1/3 of his steps are towards the edge
of the cliff, while 2/3 of his steps are towards safety. From where he stands, one step
forward will send him tumbling down. What is the probability that he can escape
unharmed?
1) Build a factor tree for the possible ending points for the tourist’s next 4 steps. (E =
Toward Edge; S = Toward Safety). For each outcome, compute the ending
position for that position. If the tourist falls off the cliff, then that branch of the
factor tree ends — you will not fill in every oval.
2) Compute the probability of moving toward safety or toward the edge for each step
as shown in the diagram.
3) Based on your factor tree, what is the likelihood that the tourist will be safe?

4) Play five rounds of the cliff hanger game. Record the results below.
Game
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Outcome (Win or Lose)

5) Do the repeated trials for the cliff hanger represent random trials? Why or why
not?
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Appendix E

Record the probability of moving toward safety or toward the edge with each step.
Note: These are conditional probabilities — each step is contingent on not having already fallen!
Step 1:
P(Safety) =

If traveler takes Step 2:
P(Safety) =

If traveler takes Step 3:
P(Safety) = ________
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If traveler takes Step 4:
P(Safety) = _______

APPENDIX E
Algebra Lesson 3/Geometry Lesson 1: Counting Principles
Situation:
This lesson is the third of a probability unit designed for high school algebra classes.
In this lesson, students will examine number properties important to probability. In
the opener, students compare rational number quantities. In the main lesson, students
learn to count possible outcomes using the Fundamental Counting Principle and
factorial structures. Prior to this lesson, students have examined statistical structures,
normal distribution, and notions of randomness. This unit will continue with
exploration of probability and probability distributions.
This lesson is designed for a 90 minute block period class.
Objectives
4) Students will count outcomes using the Fundamental Counting Principle.
5) Students will count outcomes using factor trees.
6) Students will count outcomes using permutations.
7) Students will count outcomes using combinations.
Connections
Students have completed their first algebra unit. The opener for this lesson connects
algebra, geometry, and rational numbers (meaning of rational numbers linked to
central angle measurement and numerical notations). The main lesson lays a
foundation for the rest of the probability unit.
Materials
12) LCD Projector
13) Microsoft PowerPoint (And Clicker, if available)
14) PowerPoint Presentation
15) Student Lesson Worksheet
16) Student Practice Worksheet
17) Student Practice Worksheet Key
KY Core Content 4.1 Standards
MA-HS-1.1.1: Students will compare real numbers using order relations (less than,
greater than, equal to) and represent problems using real numbers.
MA-HS-4.4.2: Students will recognize and identify the differences between
combinations and permutations and use them to count discrete
quantities.

Procedures (88 minutes overall)
10) Opener – Think, Pair, Share (@ 8 minutes overall)
a. Give @ 2 minutes to complete the work. (Teacher takes roll and posts)
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b. Pair up and discuss answers (@ 2 minutes)
c. Share out in pairs (@ 2 minutes)
d. Discuss sample answers on PowerPoint slide. (@ 2 minute)
i. Illustration connects angle degrees to rational number comparison
ii. Before showing the number line, discuss why 99 is the smallest
common denominator and what common denominators mean.
11) Pass out Student Lesson Worksheet. Have students read about Counting
Principles in their textbook and answer as many as they can on their own. (5 – 10
minutes)
12) Move students into groups to discuss their answers. (5 minutes)
13) Students return to their normal seats for whole class discussion. (30 minutes)
a. Events
i. Independent Events
ii. Dependent Events
b. Counting Independent Outcomes: Three tosses of a coin
i. Factor Trees:
1. Why are some of the outcomes in red? Because these
flips would not be necessary to determine a winner in a
“Best 2 out of 3” game.
2. How many outcomes to 3 tosses of a coin? How do you
know? 8, They can be counted on the last row of the factor
tree.
ii. Table Arrangement:
1. How do these outcomes match the factor tree? Each
column on the table matches a level of the factor tree.
2. Which do you think is easier to read? Why? Answers
will vary.
3. What does it mean to be systematic? Why is it
important? Counting/Arranging in a pre-determined
order; important to ensure all outcomes are counted.
iii. Fundamental Counting Principle
1. Definition
2. Discuss Notation from slide (| | = magnitude; ∩ =
intersection). Why multiply? Each outcome for the second
event applies to every outcome for the first event.
When would you not multiply? When a situation calls for
the union of two sets instead of the intersection: Each
outcome for B does not apply to every outcome for A.
3. Why do you suppose the Fundamental Counting
Principle extends to more than 2 events? Each
subsequent outcome applies to every outcome for each
previous event.
4. How do we count 3 flips of a coin? 2 outcomes for the
first flip, 2 outcomes for the second flip, and 2 outcomes for
the third flip = 2•2•2 = 8 outcomes
5. Disadvantage? Doesn’t list the outcomes as well as count
them; however, more useful for large number of outcomes
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(e.g., roll 3 dice: 6•6•6 = 216 outcome, impractical to list
them all)
c. Counting Dependent Events
i. A classroom of 30 students arrives on the first day.
ii. Since I don’t know any of the students I assign seats randomly.
iii. Count the number of outcomes for each of the first five students:
30•29•28•27•26…
iv. At this point, ask the students to describe the pattern. n! or 30!
d. Permutations
i. To introduce permutations, consider the following situation with
the students: “The office calls and needs me to choose 3 people to
help with a project.” How many ways to choose? 30•29•28
ii. Developing a formula:
1. All possibilities = 30!
2. To count only the first 3, we have to remove 27!
3. To remove these numbers mathematically, divide n! by (nr)!
iii. Permutations are used when each new arrangement should be
counted as a different outcome, or we say, “Order Matters.”
iv. Look at example of choosing a President, Vice President, and
Secretary. Why does order matter in this situation?
v. Show how to compute permutation on graphing calculator.
e. Combinations
i. New situation: team of 3 instead of 3 different positions.
ii. Why doesn’t order matter in this situation? Because every
arrangement of 3 people is now the same team: ABC, ACB, BAC,
BCA, CAB, CBA
iii. Show that 6 outcomes = 3!
iv. Levels of restrictiveness (Most outcomes to the least):
Factorials Permutations Combinations
v. Develop combination formula from permutation formula: To
eliminate r! arrangements, have to divide. Why? Multiplicative
Structure.
vi. Discuss calculator functions and answer to example: number of
teams of 3 out of 9 people.
⎛n⎞
vii. Discuss notation: nCr = ⎜⎜ ⎟⎟
⎝r⎠
⎛ 4⎞ ⎛ 4⎞ ⎛ 4⎞ ⎛ 4⎞ ⎛ 4⎞
viii. Have students calculate ⎜⎜ ⎟⎟ ⎜⎜ ⎟⎟ ⎜⎜ ⎟⎟ ⎜⎜ ⎟⎟ ⎜⎜ ⎟⎟
⎝ 0⎠ ⎝1⎠ ⎝ 2⎠ ⎝ 3⎠ ⎝ 4⎠
⎛n⎞
⎛n⎞
ix. Why do ⎜⎜ ⎟⎟ and ⎜⎜ ⎟⎟ always = 1?
⎝n⎠
⎝0⎠
x. Show Pascal’s triangle. The rth term of the nth row = nCr.
Emphasize that both must be counted from 0.
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xi. Example 1: Twelve skiers compete in the final round of the
Olympic freestyle skiing competition. How many different top
three winners are possible? (Gold, Silver, Bronze).
1. What are the events? A skier finishing.
2. Are these events independent or dependent? Dependent
3. Should the number of possible outcomes be counted
with permutations or combinations? How do you know?
Permutations because ABC is different than BCA.
4. Solve: 12P3 = 1320
xii. Example 1: Twelve skiers compete in the final round of the
Olympic freestyle skiing competition. How many different top
three winners are possible? (Gold, Silver, Bronze).
1. What are the events? A skier finishing.
2. Are these events independent or dependent? Dependent
3. Should the number of possible outcomes be counted
with permutations or combinations? How do you know?
Permutations because ABC is different than BCA.
4. Solve: 12P3 = 1320

Omelets $7.95
(Each ingredient below adds an
additional $0.50)
Vegetarian
Meat
Green
Ham
Pepper
Red Pepper
Bacon
Onion
Sausage
Mushroom
Steak
Tomato
Cheese

1.
2.
3.

4.
5.

Example 2: A restaurant serves omelets that can be ordered with
any of the ingredients shown. (a) Suppose you want exactly 2
vegetarian ingredients and 1 meat ingredient in your omelet. How
many different types of omelets can you order? (b) Suppose you
can afford at most 3 ingredients in your omelet. How many
different types of omelets can you order?
What are the events? Ingredients chosen.
Are these events independent or dependent? Dependent
Should the number of possible outcomes be counted with
permutations or combinations? How do you know? Combinations
because Tomato and Cheese is the same as Cheese and Tomato.
Solve (a): Vegetarian: 6C2 = 15; Meat: 4C1 = 4; Vegetarian AND Meat =
15 • 4 = 60
Solve (b): 10C3 = 120

14) Pass out Student Practice Worksheet. Students work individually or with partners
as desired. (15 minutes)
15) Discuss Counting Worksheet: Divide class into 3 groups. Each group discusses
one question and presents their solution to the class. (5 minutes for group time; 15
minutes for reporting out)
16) Closure: 3-2-1
a. What are 3 things that you found interesting today?
b. What are 2 things that you learned?
c. What is 1 thing you still have a question about?
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Assessment
1) Opener: Students compare rational number values (1.1.1)
2) Guided Notes and Example Problems (Teacher observes and questions while
students work individually; Questioning during whole class discussion) (4.4.2)
3) Counting Worksheet (4.4.2): Students work individually and collaboratively to
analyze whether a situation involves independent or dependent events,
Fundamental Counting Principle or Factorials, and permutations or combinations.
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APPENDIX F
Algebra Lesson 3/Geometry Lesson 1 Task Rotation Prompts
1. You are going to set up a stereo system by purchasing separate components. In your
price range you find 5 different receivers, 8 different compact disc players, and 12
different speaker systems.
a) What are the three events?
b) Are these events independent or dependent? How did you decide?
c) If you want one of each of these components, how many different stereo systems
are possible?
d) Draw a picture to illustrate why multiplication is appropriate for counting the
number of outcomes.

2. A deck of cards with no wilds is used for a hand of 5 card draw in a game with 6
players. Use the illustration below to demonstrate how to count the number of
possible games that could be dealt.

307

3. In 1920, an Egyptologist discovered a StarGate, a means of travelling to planets all
over the galaxy instantaneously. In 1994, Dr. Daniel Jackson discovered that the gate
required seven symbols: Six points in space to identify the target planet and the point
of origin.

The dialing device (DHD) has 39 symbols. Each time a planet is “dialed,” seven
symbols must be entered.
a) Does this situation suggest a permutation or combination? How can you
tell?
b) How many planets could possibly be reached from a single DHD?

c) The point of origin is always the 7th symbol. How does this information
change your answer to (b)?
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APPENDIX G
Algebra Lesson 4/Geometry Lesson 2: Event Probability
Situation:
This lesson is the fourth of a probability unit designed for high school algebra classes.
In this lesson, students will rotate between stations to explore probability concepts.
This lesson is designed for a 90 minute block period class.
Objectives
1) Students will differentiate between theoretical and experimental probability.
2) Students will evaluate problems using probability principles.
3) Students will explain how the law of large numbers applies to simulation.
4) Students will run a Monte Carlo simulation and interpret the outcome.
5) Students will use area and length ratios to compare probabilities.
Connections
In the previous lesson, students learned to count outcomes and differentiate between
independent and dependent counting. This lesson extends the counting structures for
each type of situation to probability.
Materials
18) Dice (For Stations 2 and 4)
19) LCD Projector
20) 2 Computers for Student Use (1 with Internet)
21) Microsoft PowerPoint (And Clicker, if available)
22) PowerPoint Presentation
23) Student Lesson Worksheet
KY Core Content 4.1 Standards
MA-HS-4.1.2: Students will construct data displays for data with no more than two
variables.
MA-HS-4.4.1: Students will determine theoretical and experimental (from given
data) probabilities, make predictions and draw inferences from
probabilities, compare theoretical and experimental probabilities, and
determine probabilities involving replacement and non-replacement.
MA-HS-4.4.3: Students will represent probabilities in multiple ways, such as
fractions, decimals, percentages and geometric area models.
MA-HS-4.4.4: Students will explain how the law of large numbers can be applied in
simple examples.

Procedures

0) Before class, Set up Stations:
a. Station 1: Computer with Applet: Spinners.
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b. Station 2: Dice for Happy Meal Simulation
c. Station 3: Computer with Microsoft Excel; Print out directions for
creating a Monte Carlo Simulation
d. Station 4: Dice for Craps Simulation
1) Opener (4 minutes overall)
a. Give @ 2 minutes to complete the work. (Teacher takes roll and posts)
b. Discuss sample answers on PowerPoint slide. (2 minutes)
2) Pass out Student Lesson Worksheet. Have students read about Probability in their
textbook and answer as many as they can on their own. (5 minutes)
3) Move students into groups to discuss their answers. (5 minutes)
4) Students return to their normal seats for whole class discussion. (10 minutes)
y Fundamental Concepts of Probability
◦ “Probability” means the likelihood of an event occurring.
◦ Expressed as a part-whole ratio
y Success and Failure
◦ Success
y The outcome of interest.
y Changes for each new situation.
◦ Failure: Everything other than success
◦ S = Number of Successful Outcomes
◦ F = Number of Failure Outcomes
y Theoretical Probability
◦ Probability based on assumption that all outcomes are equally likely
◦ Examples:
◦ Tossing a Coin: P(H) = 0.5 = 50% = 1/2
◦ Rolling a Single Die: P(3) = 0.167 = 16.7% = 1/6
◦ Rolling 2 Dice: P(3) = 0.056 = 5.6% = 2/36 = 1/18
◦ “3” from (1 and 2) or (2 and 1); 36 total outcomes
y Experimental Probability
y Probability Based on Observations, Data, or Simulation.
y Examples from a random sample of 10 observations:
◦ Coin Toss:
◦ P(H) =
◦ 1 Die:
P(3) =
◦ 2 Dice:
P(3) =
y Odds
◦ Odds of Success: Ratio of Success : Failure
◦ Odds of Failure: Ratio of Failure : Success
y Example
◦ A baseball player has 126 hits in 410 at-bats this season.
y What is the probability that he gets a hit in his next at-bat?
y Is this a theoretical or experimental probability?
y What are his odds of success?
310

5) Station work (15 minutes each; 60 minutes total)
6) Closure: (5 minutes)
a. You are the teacher in a class that just completed today’s lesson.
b. Write down three details you think are important for students to know
from this lesson.
c. Share out in class.
Assessment
1) Opener: Review of Fundamental Counting Principle
2) Student Worksheet (4.1.2, 4.4.1, 4.4.3, 4.4.4): Students work individually and
collaboratively to explore fundamental probability concepts, probability ratios,
and Monte Carlo simulations. Exploratory problems include multiple
representations of probability (i.e., fractions, percentages, decimals).
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APPENDIX H
Algebra Lesson 4 Station Prompts
Station 1: Spinners.
1) Refer to Applet: “Spinners.”
a) What is the probability of the spinner landing on Purple? Green? Red?
Orange? Yellow?
b) Are these probabilities theoretical or experimental? How do you know?
c) Click on the “Record Results” button. Record your data in the table below.
i. Spin the dial 10 times.
ii. Spin the dial 10 more times.
iii. In the box that says “Spins,” type in “10.” Spin 8 more times.
iv. In the box that says “Spins,” type in “50.” Spin 8 more times.

d) Click on the “Change Spinner” button. Change the values of each color as
follows:
Purple: 2
Green: 3
Red: 1
Orange: 1
Yellow: 4
Click “Apply.”
Draw a picture of the new spinner
i. How are the new numbers related to probability?

ii. Repeat the experiment above with your new spinner.

e) How do your two experiments demonstrate the Law of Large Numbers?
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Station 2: Happy Meal Simulation
2) A blogger posted the following comment about the McDonald’s Happy Meal
prize:
My daughter loves the current McDonald's happy meal prize. It's a Kids Bop CD, and it rocks!
There are 6 different ones, and they are definitely doing the job, as we are pursuing to collect all
6! I feel like it's really worth it. Some of the prizes end up in the trash (when the kids aren't
looking), but these will be around for a while. I am a fan of anything that makes the car trips
easier:).

Suppose that the prizes are randomly placed in bags. Run a simulation to
determine how many Happy Meals are likely to need to be bought to get all 6
Kids Bop CD’s. Let each roll of a die represent the purchase of a different Kids
Bop CD.

a) Roll the dice until you roll all 6 numbers. Use tick marks to record the
outcome for each roll in the table below.
Outcome
No. of Rolls
Probability Ratio
Percentage

CD 1

CD 2

CD 3

CD 4

CD 5

b) How many rolls did it take you to buy all 6 CD’s?

c) What does the law of large numbers indicate about the relationship of your
experimental probability to the theoretical probability?
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CD 6

Station 3: Monte Carlo Simulation
3) What is a Monte Carlo simulation?
4) In Meiosis, chromosomes from father and mother join to create a new gene. A
scientist is studying 3 genes, each with a dominant and recessive trait. Using a
factor tree, she determined that 8 traits were possible: A cereal company is putting
8 different prizes in their boxes. Run a Monte Carlo simulation to determine how
many boxes you’ll have to buy to get all 8 prizes.
a) Double Click the Microsoft Excel Template on the desktop,
“G2_Station_3_Monte_Carlo_Simulation.xltx”
b) Use the factor tree on the “Introduction” page to determine the gene labels
for the 8 traits:
C
Trait 1: _______
B
c
Trait 2: _______
A
Trait 3: _______
C
b
c
Trait 4: _______
Trait 5: _______
C
B
Trait 6: _______
c
a
Trait 7: _______
C
b
c
Trait 8: _______
c) What is the theoretical probability for each trait?
d) Go to the “Monte Carlo” page. Type in “=RandBetween(1,8)” into cell A2
and hit Enter.
e) Click and hold the button at the bottom right corner of cell A2 as shown to
the left; drag the pointer down to A10.
i. What do you suppose each cell represents?
ii. Has the scientist encountered all 8 traits yet? How can you tell?

iii. Does the experimental probability represent the theoretical
probability? How do you know?

f) Click and hold the button at the bottom right corner of cell A10. Drag to
cell A25.
i. Has the scientist encountered all 8 traits yet?
ii. Does the experimental probability represent the theoretical
probability? How do you know?
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g) Click and hold the button at the bottom right corner of cell A25. Drag to
cell A150. Does the experimental probability represent the theoretical
probability now? How can you tell?

h) Click and hold the button at the bottom right corner of cell A150. Drag to
cell A350. Does the experimental probability represent the theoretical
probability now? How can you tell?

i) Click and hold the button at the bottom right corner of cell A350. Drag to
cell A500. Does the experimental probability represent the theoretical
probability now? How can you tell?

j) Click and hold the button at the bottom right corner of cell A500. Drag to
cell A1000. Does the experimental probability represent the theoretical
probability now? How can you tell?

k) Based on this simulation, what sample size is needed to ensure that the
sample data will represent the population distribution? How did you
decide?

l) Explain the relationship of the Histograms A, B, C, and D to the
simulation data? To each other?

m) What are 2 advantages of a Monte Carlo simulation over other simulations
(e.g., dice, spinners, coins)? 2 disadvantages?
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APPENDIX I
Geometry Lesson 2 Station Prompts
Station 1: Geometric Probability.
1) Refer to Applet: “Probability as a ratio of line segments.”

a) If segment AB represents the entire set outcome, what is the probability of
AC, P(AC)?
b) What is the relationship of P(BC) to P(AC)? How does this relationship
relate to the Segment Addition Property?

c) What is the probability that P(BC) ≥ 0.80? How did you decide?
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2) Refer to Applet: “Probability as a Ratio of Concentric Rings.”

a) What is the relationship of the radii of the three rings?
b) Which measurement represents the area of the outer ring? Why?
c) Which measurement represents the area of the middle ring? Why?
d) Which measurement represents the area of the bulls eye? How is this
region different from the other two?
e) What is the probability of a randomly thrown dart landing in the outer
ring? How do you know?
f) What is the probability of a randomly thrown dart landing in the middle
ring? How do you know?
g) What is the probability of a randomly thrown dart landing in the bulls eye?
How do you know?
h) Why don’t the probability measurements change as the circle moves?
i) Why aren’t the probabilities of each region equal?
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Station 2: Happy Meal Simulation
3) A blogger posted the following comment about the McDonald’s Happy Meal
prize:
My daughter loves the current McDonald's happy meal prize. It's a Kids Bop CD, and it rocks!
There are 6 different ones, and they are definitely doing the job, as we are pursuing to collect all
6! I feel like it's really worth it. Some of the prizes end up in the trash (when the kids aren't
looking), but these will be around for a while. I am a fan of anything that makes the car trips
easier:).

Suppose that the prizes are randomly placed in bags. Run a simulation to
determine how many Happy Meals are likely to need to be bought to get all 6
Kids Bop CD’s. Let each roll of a die represent the purchase of a different Kids
Bop CD.

d) Roll the dice until you roll all 6 numbers. Use tick marks to record the
outcome for each roll in the table below.
Outcome
No. of Rolls
Probability Ratio
Percentage

CD 1

CD 2

CD 3

CD 4

CD 5

CD 6

e) How many rolls did it take you to buy all 6 CD’s?
f) What does the law of large numbers indicate about the relationship of your
experimental probability to the theoretical probability?
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Station 3: Monte Carlo Simulation
4) What is a Monte Carlo simulation?
5) In Meiosis, chromosomes from father and mother join to create a new gene. A
scientist is studying 3 genes, each with a dominant and recessive trait. Using a
factor tree, she determined that 8 traits were possible: A cereal company is putting
8 different prizes in their boxes. Run a Monte Carlo simulation to determine how
many boxes you’ll have to buy to get all 8 prizes.
a) Double Click the Microsoft Excel Template on the desktop,
“G2_Station_3_Monte_Carlo_Simulation.xltx”
b) Use the factor tree on the “Introduction” page to determine the gene labels
for the 8 traits:
C
Trait 1: _______
B
c
Trait 2: _______
A
Trait 3: _______
C
b
c
Trait 4: _______
Trait 5: _______
C
B
Trait 6: _______
c
a
Trait 7: _______
C
b
c
Trait 8: _______
c) What is the theoretical probability for each trait?
d) Go to the “Monte Carlo” page. Type in “=RandBetween(1,8)” into cell A2
and hit Enter.
e) Click and hold the button at the bottom right corner of cell A2 as shown to
the left; drag the pointer down to A10.
i. What do you suppose each cell represents?
ii. Has the scientist encountered all 8 traits yet? How can you tell?

iii. Does the experimental probability represent the theoretical
probability? How do you know?

f) Click and hold the button at the bottom right corner of cell A10. Drag to
cell A25.
i. Has the scientist encountered all 8 traits yet?
ii. Does the experimental probability represent the theoretical
probability? How do you know?
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g) Click and hold the button at the bottom right corner of cell A25. Drag to
cell A150. Does the experimental probability represent the theoretical
probability now? How can you tell?
h) Click and hold the button at the bottom right corner of cell A150. Drag to
cell A350. Does the experimental probability represent the theoretical
probability now? How can you tell?
i) Click and hold the button at the bottom right corner of cell A350. Drag to
cell A500. Does the experimental probability represent the theoretical
probability now? How can you tell?
j) Click and hold the button at the bottom right corner of cell A500. Drag to
cell A1000. Does the experimental probability represent the theoretical
probability now? How can you tell?
k) Based on this simulation, what sample size is needed to ensure that the
sample data will represent the population distribution? How did you
decide?
l) Explain the relationship of the Histograms A, B, C, and D to the
simulation data? To each other?
m) What are 2 advantages of a Monte Carlo simulation over other simulations
(e.g., dice, spinners, coins)? 2 disadvantages?

320

Station 4: Craps
In the game of craps, two common bets are pass line bets and don’t pass line bets.
Pass Line Bet - You win if the first roll is a natural (7, 11) and lose if it is craps (2, 3,
12). If a point is rolled (4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10) it must be repeated before a 7 is thrown in order
to win. If 7 is rolled before the point you lose.
Don't Pass Line Bet - This is the reversed Pass Line bet. If the first roll of a dice is a
natural (7, 11) you lose and if it is a 2 or a 3 you win. A dice roll of 12 means you have a
tie or push with the casino. If the roll is a point (4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10) a 7 must come out
before that point is repeated to make you a winner. If the point is rolled again before the
7 you lose.

1) Develop the probability distribution for rolling two die.
a) List all possible dice sums in the table below.
Die 1

1

2

Die 2 Outcome
1
2
3
4
5
6
1
2
3
4
5
6

Die 1

Die 2
1
2
3
4
5
6
1
2
3
4
5
6

3

4

Outcome

Die 1

5

6

Die 2
1
2
3
4
5
6
1
2
3
4
5
6

Outcome

b) What is the total number of outcomes for rolling two die?
c) Record the probability of each outcome for rolling two dice.
Sum

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Probability

d) Create a histogram below of the data in the table.
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9

10

11

12

2) What does this distribution tell you about the most likely outcomes for rolling two
dice?
3) Would you prefer to bet on a Pass Bet or No Pass Bet? How did you decide?
4) Play 10 rounds of craps, using the type of bet you chose. Record the results
below.
Roll
Outcome
Win or Lose?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
5) The Law of large numbers states that as sample size increases, its ability to
represent the population also increases. How do you think the law of large number
relate to your simulation of craps?
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APPENDIX J
Algebra Lesson 5/Geometry Lesson 3: Probability Distributions
Situation:
This lesson is the final lesson of a probability unit designed for high school algebra
and geometry classes.
This lesson is designed for a 90 minute block period class.
Objectives
1) Students will compare two different experiments with equal probability using the
Law of Large Numbers.
2) Students will make inferences about populations using binomial and geometric
distribution patterns.
Connections
In the previous lesson, students examined probability as part-whole relationships and
single and multiple events. They also explored the impact of the law of large numbers
on the relationship between theoretical and experimental probability. In this lesson,
students will examine probability distributions as an extension of event probabilities.
Materials
1) Microsoft PowerPoint (And Clicker, if available)
2) PowerPoint Presentation
3) Student Lesson Worksheet
4) Task Rotation Worksheet
KY Core Content 4.1 Standards
MA-HS-4.1.1: Students will analyze and make inferences from a set of data with no
more than two variables, and will analyze problems for the use and
misuse of data representations.
MA-HS-4.1.2: Students will construct data displays for data with no more than two
variables.
MA-HS-4.2.1: Students will describe and compare data distributions and make
inferences from the data based on the shapes of graphs, measures of
center (mean, median, mode) and measures of spread (range, standard
deviation).
MA-HS-4.4.4: Students will explain how the law of large numbers can be applied in
simple examples.
MA-HS-5.1.3: Students will demonstrate how equations and graphs are models of the
relationship between two real-world quantities (e.g., the relationship
between degrees Celsius and degrees Fahrenheit)
Procedures
1) Opener (6 minutes): The theoretical probability for an event is ½. Which of the
two ratios is more likely in a set of repeated trials? 4/8 or 400/800.
a. Give students @ 2 minutes to complete. (Teacher takes roll and posts)
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b. In pairs, have students share their thoughts about the ratio likelihoods. (2
minutes)
c. Report out and discuss with whole class (The slide “Law of Large
Numbers” is a discussion of opener solution; 2 minutes)
2) Introduce Probability Distributions (28 minutes total)
a. Fundamental Ideas (3 minutes)
i. Definition
ii. Two types: Discrete or Continuous
iii. Based on Random Data and Patterns that emerge from repeated
trials.
b. Uniform Distribution (5 minutes)
i. Uses
ii. Examples
iii. Shape of the distribution
iv. Interpretation
c. Binomial Distribution (10 minutes)
i. Uses
ii. Examples
iii. Shape of the distribution
iv. Interpretation
v. Example Problem
d. Geometric Distribution (10 minutes)
i. Uses
ii. Examples
iii. Shape of the distribution
iv. Interpretation
v. Example problem
3) Problem Set (50 minutes). Pass out Student Problem Set Worksheet.
a. Do each question one at a time.
b. Allow students to work approximately 10 minutes individually.
c. Have students get with a partner and discuss (10 minutes). Use different
partners for each question.
d. Report out and discuss with whole class. (5 minutes).
e. Repeat for 2nd question.
4) Closure (5 minutes)
a. Give a couple of minutes for individual work.
b. Report out with whole class.
Assessment
1) Opener assesses how well students can apply Law of Large Numbers to various
situations (4.1.1, 4.4.4)
2) Problem Set Question 1 (Blood Type) assesses how well students can apply
binomial distribution inference to a particular situation. (4.1.2, 4.2.1)
3) Task Rotation Question 2 (Daughter) assesses how well students can apply the
geometric distribution to a particular situation. Additionally, students are asked to
interpret the probability histogram. (4.1.2, 4.2.1, 5.1.3)
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APPENDIX K
Algebra Lesson 5 Student Worksheet
1. Blood type is inherited. Suppose a father carries the genotype AO (phenotype = Type
A) while the mother carries the genotype BO (phenotype = type B). They have 4
children.
a) Fill in the Punnett Square:

b) Type O blood is considered the “Universal Donor.” What is the probability
that X = 2 of the children will have Type O blood?
i. Why is this situation binomial?
ii. What does X represent?
iii. n = ?
iv. p = ?
v. Use the graphing calculator to calculate the full probability distribution
of X. Then calculate the probability distribution of X on Minitab.
Number of Type O Children:

X=?

X=?

Probability
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X=?

X=?

X=?

Sum of
Probabilities

c) Draw the probability histogram:
0.5

Probability

0.4

0.3

0.2

0.1

0.0

Number of Children with Type O Blood

d) What is the probability that 2 children from this family will have Type O
Blood?
2. A couple decided to start a family, and both wanted a daughter. Their first child was a
boy, so they decided to continue having children until they got a daughter. After
having four boys, the couple’s fifth child was a daughter.
a) In what way is this situation geometric?
b) After the fourth child’s gender was known, the mother proclaimed, “What are
the chances?!” What was the probability that it would take 5 children before a
girl was born?
c) Draw a probability histogram for the geometric distribution out to 5 children.
0.5

Probability

0.4

0.3

0.2

0.1

0.0

Number of Children until First Girl

d) Does this graph mean that it is less likely that the 2nd child is a girl than the
1st? Why or why not? If not, what does it mean?
e) Develop an equation to represent the geometric probability of achieving the
first success on the fifth try.
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APPENDIX L
Geometry Lesson 3 Student Worksheet
The useful life of a radial tire is normally
distributed with a mean of 80,000 miles and a
standard deviation of 5000 miles. The
company makes 10,000 tires a month.
a. About how many tires from a
month’s production will last between
75,000 and 85,000 miles?
b. About how many tires from a
month’s production will last more
than 90,000 miles?
c. What is the probability that if you
buy a radial tire at random, it will
last between 70,000 and 85,000 miles?
d. As a consumer, what are two things
you can do to maximize the life of
your tires?

In 1998, Ben took both the SAT and the ACT.
On the mathematics section of the SAT, he
earned a score of 624. On the mathematics
section of the ACTG, he earned a score of 31.
For the SAT, the mean was 512 and the
standard deviation was 112. For the ACT, the
mean was 21 and the standard deviation was 5.
•

Explain how you can know that Ben
performed better on the ACT than he did
on the SAT.

Sketch three normal curves on the same scale
with the following properties (you can use the
graphing calculator):
a. Mean is 50 and standard deviation is 2.
b. Mean is 50 and standard deviation is
10.
c. Mean is 50 and standard deviation is
20.

Mario and Luigi are calculating the
probability of getting a 4 and then a 2 if they
roll a die twice. With a partner, decide which
solution is correct and why.

Mario:
P(4, then 2) Independent Events, so the
probability is:
1 1
•
6 6
1
=
36
= 2.78% chance of rolling a 4, then a 2.

If you owned a business and the data represents
your profits each month over the past year,
which curve would you prefer? Why?

Luigi:
P(4, then 2) Dependent Events, so the
probability is:
1 1
•
6 5
1
=
30

= 3.33% chance of rolling a 4, then a 2.
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APPENDIX M
NAEP Mathematics Knowledge Instrument
I. Multiple Choice Answers
1) A B C D E

2) A

B

C

D

E

3) A

B

4) A

B

C

D

E

5) A

B

C

D

E

6) A

B

C

D

E

7) A

B

C

D

E

8) A

B

C

D

E

9) A

B

10) A

B

C

D

11) A

B

C

D

Explanations

E
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12) A

B

C

D

E

13) A

B

C

D

E

14) A

B

C

D

E

15) A

B

C

D

E

16) A

B

C

D

E

17) A

B

C

D

E
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I.

Multiple Choice. For Questions 1-15, please mark the response that you think
best answers the question. Please explain how you decided your answer.

1) A person is going to pick one marble without looking. For which dish is there the
greatest probability of picking a black marble?
A

B

C

D

E

Please explain your answer.

2) The table below shows the gender and color of 7 puppies. If a puppy selected at
random from the group is brown, what is the probability it is a male?
Male
1
1

Black
Brown
A)

1
4

B)

2
7

C)

Female
2
3

1
3

D)

1
2

E)

2
3

Please explain your answer.

3) A package of candies contained only 10 red candies, 10 blue candies, and 10 green
candies. Bill shook up the package, opened it, and started taking out one candy at a
time and eating it. The first 2 candies he took out and ate were blue. Bill thinks the
probability of getting a blue candy on his third try is
a) Is Bill correct or incorrect?

10
1
or .
30 3

A) Yes, he is correct.

b) Please explain how you
decided.
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B) No, he is not
correct.

4) If Rose spins a spinner like the one below 300 times, about how many times should
she expect it to land on the space with a circle?

A) 75

B) 90

C) 100

D) 120

E) 150

Please explain how you decided.

5) The temperature in degrees Celsius can be found by subtracting 32 from the
temperature in degrees Fahrenheit and multiplying the result by

5
. If the temperature
9

of a furnace is 393 degrees Fahrenheit, what is it in degrees Celsius, to the nearest
degree?
A) 650

B) 1805

C) 40

D) 201

E) 72

Please explain how you decided.

6) In the equation y = 4x, if the value of x is increased by 2, what is the effect on the
value of y?
A) It is 8 more than the original amount. B) It is 6 more than the original amount.
C) It is 2 more than the original amount. D) It is 16 times the original amount.
E) It is 8 times the original amount.
Please explain how you decided.
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7) A plumber charges customers $48 for each hour worked plus an additional $9 for
travel. If h represents the number of hours worked, which of the following
expressions could be used to calculate the plumber's total charge in dollars?
A) h + 48 + 9

B) 48 • 9 • h

C) 9h + 48

D) h + (48 • 9)

E) 48h + 9
Please explain how you decided.

8) At the school carnival, Carmen sold 3 times as many hot dogs as Shawn. The two of
them sold 152 hot dogs altogether. How many hot dogs did Carmen sell?
A) 21

B) 38

C) 51

D)114

Please explain how you decided.

9) Sara was asked to draw a parallelogram. She drew the figure below.

Is Sara's figure a parallelogram?
A) Yes

B) No

Please explain how you decided.

10) What is the area of the shaded figure?
A) 9 square centimeters
B) 11 square centimeters
C) 13 square centimeters
D) 14 square centimeters
Please explain how you decided.
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E) 148

11) A scale drawing of a rectangular room is 5 inches by 3 inches. If 1 inch on this scale
drawing represents 3 feet, what are the dimensions of the room?
A) 5 feet by 3 feet

B) 5 feet by 9 feet

C) 15 feet by 3 feet

D) 15 feet by 5 feet

E) 15 feet by 9 feet
Please explain how you decided.

12) The cost to mail a first-class letter is 33 cents for the first ounce. Each additional
ounce costs 22 cents. (Fractions of an ounce are rounded up to the next whole
ounce.)
How much would it cost to mail a letter that weighs 2.7 ounces?
A) 55 cents

B) 66 cents

C) 77 cents

D) 88 cents

E) 99 cents

Please explain how you decided.

13) If you were to redraw the diagram using a scale of

3
inch = 10 feet, what would be
4

the length of the side that is 48 feet?

A) 3.0 in

B) 3.6 in

C) 5.6 in

Please explain how you decided.
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D) 7.5 in

E) 12.0 in

14) In which of the following are the three fractions arranged from least to greatest?

2 1 5
7 2 9

A) , ,

B)

1 2 5
, ,
2 7 9

C)

1 5 2
, ,
2 9 7

D)

5 1 2
, ,
9 2 7

E)

5 2 1
, ,
9 7 2

E)

7
10

Please explain how you decided.

15) What fraction of the figure below is shaded?

A)

1
4

B)

3
10

C)

1
3

D)

3
7

Please explain how you decided.

16) Angela makes and sells special-occasion greeting cards. The table below shows the
relationship between the number of cards sold and her profit. Based on the data in
the table, which of the following equations shows how the number of cards sold and
profit (in dollars) are related?
Mon. Tues. Wed. Thurs. Fri.
Number Sold, n 4
Profit, p
A) p = 2n

0

5

2

3

$2.00 $0.00 $2.50 $1.00
B) p = 0.5n

C) p = n – 2

Please explain how you decided.
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Sat.
6

$1.50 $3.00

D) p = 6 – n

E) p = n + 1

17) Each of the 6 faces of a certain cube is labeled either R or S. When the cube is
1
tossed, the probability of the cube landing with an R face up is .How many faces
3
are labeled R?
A) Five

B) Four

C) Three
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D) Two

E) One

APPENDIX N
Attitudes Toward Mathematics Inventory (Tapia & Marsh, 2004)
This inventory consists of statements about your attitude toward mathematics. There are
no correct or incorrect responses. Read each item carefully. Please think about how you
feel about each item. Circle the letter that most closely corresponds to how the
statements best describes your feelings. Use the following response scale to respond to
each item. Your responses are confidential.
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
10)
11)
12)
13)
14)
15)
16)
17)
18)
19)
20)
21)
22)
23)
24)
25)
26)
27)
28)
29)
30)
31)
32)
33)
34)
35)
36)
37)
38)
39)
40)

Mathematics is a very worthwhile and necessary subject.
I want to develop my mathematical skills.
I get a great deal of satisfaction out of solving a mathematics problem.
Mathematics helps develop the mind and teaches a person to think.
Mathematics is important in everyday life.
Mathematics is one of the most important subjects for people to study.
High school math courses would be very helpful no matter what I decide to study.
I can think of many ways that I use math outside of school.
Mathematics is one of my most dreaded subjects.
My mind goes blank and I am unable to think clearly when working with
mathematics.
Studying mathematics makes me feel nervous.
Mathematics makes me feel uncomfortable.
I am always under a terrible strain in a math class.
When I hear the word mathematics, I have a feeling of dislike.
It makes me nervous to even think about having to do a mathematics problem.
Mathematics does not scare me at all.
I have a lot of self-confidence when it comes to mathematics
I am able to solve mathematics problems without too much difficulty
I expect to do fairly well in any math class I take.
I am always confused in my mathematics class.
I feel a sense of insecurity when attempting mathematics.
I learn mathematics easily.
I am confident that I could learn advanced mathematics.
I have usually enjoyed studying mathematics in school.
Mathematics is dull and boring.
I like to solve new problems in mathematics
I would prefer to do an assignment in math than to write an essay.
I would like to avoid using mathematics in college.
I really like mathematics.
I am happier in a math class than in any other class.
Mathematics is a very interesting subject.
I am willing to take more than the required amount of mathematics.
I plan to take as much mathematics as I can during my education.
The challenge of math appeals to me.
I think studying advanced mathematics is useful.
I believe studying math helps me with problem solving in other areas.
I am comfortable expressing my own ideas on how to look for solutions to a difficult
problem in math.
I am comfortable answering questions in math class.
A strong math background could help me in my professional life.
I believe I am good at solving math problems.
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Use these codes:
A-Strongly Disagree
B-Disagree
C-Neutral
D-Agree
E-Strongly Agree
A B C D
A B C D
A B C D
A B C D
A B C D
A B C D
A B C D
A B C D
A B C D
A B C D

E
E
E
E
E
E
E
E
E
E

A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A

B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B

C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C

D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D

E
E
E
E
E
E
E
E
E
E
E
E
E
E
E
E
E
E
E
E
E
E
E
E
E
E
E

A
A
A

B
B
B

C
C
C

D
D
D

E
E
E

APPENDIX O
Metacognitive Awareness Inventory (Schraw & Dennison, 1994)
We would like you to respond to the following questions by indicating how true or false
each statement is about you. There are no correct or incorrect responses. Read each item
carefully. Please think about how you feel about each item. Circle the letter that most
closely corresponds to how the statements best describes your feelings. Use the following
response scale to respond to each item. Your responses are confidential.
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
10)
11)
12)
13)
14)
15)
16)
17)
18)
19)
20)
21)
22)
23)
24)
25)
26)
27)
28)
29)
30)
31)
32)
33)
34)
35)
36)
37)
38)
39)
40)
41)
42)

I ask myself periodically if I am meeting my goals.
I consider several alternatives to a problem before I answer.
I try to use strategies that have worked in the past.
I pace myself while learning in order to have enough time.
I understand my intellectual strengths and weaknesses.
I think about what I really need to learn before I begin a task.
I know how well I did once I finish a test.
I set specific goals before I begin a task.
I slow down when I encounter important information.
I know what kind of information is most important to learn.
I ask myself if I have considered all options when solving a problem.
I am good at organizing information.
I consciously focus my attention on important information.
I have a specific purpose for each strategy I use.
I learn best when I know something about the topic.
I know what the teacher expects me to learn.
I am good at remembering information.
I use different learning strategies depending on the situation.
I ask myself if there was an easier way to do things after I finish a task.
I have control over how well I learn.
I periodically review to help me understand important relationships.
I ask myself questions about the material before I begin.
I think of several ways to solve a problem and choose the best one.
I summarize what I've learned after I finish.
I ask others for help when I don't understand something.
I can motivate myself to learn when I need to.
I am aware of what strategies I use when I study.
I find myself analyzing the usefulness of strategies while I study.
I use my intellectual strengths to compensate for my weaknesses.
I focus on the meaning and significance of new information.
I create my own examples to make information more meaningful.
I am a good judge of how well I understand something.
I find myself using helpful learning strategies automatically.
I find myself pausing regularly to check my comprehension.
I know when each strategy I use will be most effective.
I ask myself how well I accomplished my goals once I'm finished.
I draw pictures or diagrams to help me understand while learning.
I ask myself if I have considered all options after I solve a problem.
I try to translate new information into my own words.
I change strategies when I fail to understand.
I use the organizational structure of the text to help me learn.
I read instructions carefully before I begin a task.
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Use these codes:
A-Always False
B-Sometimes False
C-Neutral
D-Sometimes True
E-Always True
A B C D
A B C D
A B C D
A B C D
A B C D
A B C D
A B C D

E
E
E
E
E
E
E

A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A

E
E
E
E
E
E
E
E
E
E
E
E
E
E
E
E
E
E
E
E
E
E
E
E
E
E
E
E
E
E
E
E
E
E

B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B

C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C

D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D

We would like you to respond to the following questions by indicating how true or false
each statement is about you. There are no correct or incorrect responses. Read each item
carefully. Please think about how you feel about each item. Circle the letter that most
closely corresponds to how the statements best describes your feelings. Use the following
response scale to respond to each item. Your responses are confidential.
43)
44)
45)
46)
47)
48)
49)
50)
51)
52)

I ask myself if what I'm reading is related to what I already know.
I re-evaluate my assumptions when I get confused.
I organize my time to best accomplish my goals.
I learn more when I am interested in the topic.
I try to break studying down into smaller steps.
I focus on overall meaning rather than specifics.
I ask myself questions about how well I am doing while I am learning something new.
I ask myself if I learned as much as I could have once I finish a task.
I stop and go back over new information that is not clear.
I stop and reread when I get confused.
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Use these codes:
A-Always False
B-Sometimes False
C-Neutral
D-Sometimes True
E-Always True
A B C D
A B C D
A B C D
A B C D
A B C D
A B C D
A B C D
A B C D
A B C D
A B C D

E
E
E
E
E
E
E
E
E
E
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for teacher knowledge: A lens for examining research. In R. N. Ronau (Chair),
Knowledge for Teaching Mathematics, A Structured Inquiry. Symposium
conducted at the annual meeting of the American Educational Research
Association, San Diego, CA.
Ronau, R. N., Rakes, C. R., Wagener, L., & Dougherty, B. (2009, February). A
comprehensive framework for teacher knowledge: Reaching the goals of
mathematics teacher preparation. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the
Association of Mathematics Teacher Educators, Orlando, FL.
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McGatha, M. B., Bush, W. S., & Rakes, C. R. (2009, February). Formative assessment
for middle-school mathematics teachers. Paper presented at the annual meeting of
the American Mathematics Teacher Educators, Orlando, FL.
Regional
Rakes, C. R. (2009, November). Using virtual manipulatives to enhance students’
understanding. Paper presented at the regional meeting of the National Council of
Teachers of Mathematics, Nashville, TN.
State/Local
Rakes, C. R. (2009, April). Effective strategies for teaching algebra: A meta-analysis
using hierarchical linear modeling. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the
Tri-University Spring Research Conference, Louisville, KY.
Rakes, C. R., & Brown, E. T. (2009, January). Virtual manipulatives in mathematics.
Session presented at the quarterly meeting of the Greater Louisville Council of
Teachers of Mathematics, Louisville, KY.
Rakes, C. R., & Walters, M. (2003, July). Mathematics in Career and Technical
Education. Paper presented at the Kentucky Department of Education Career and
Technical Education Summer Conference, Louisville, KY.
GRANTS
Research Teams

Geometry Assessments for Secondary Teachers (GAST; 2008 – Present). PI: Dr. William
S. Bush. Co-PI: Dr. Robert Ronau. An NSF-funded project; $3,000,000 for 3
years. In this project, my role includes examination of geometry textbooks,
assisting with in-class videotaping for pilot study, development of assessment
instrument blueprint, and writing items for the assessment instrument.
Teacher Recruitment Effectiveness (2009 – Present). PI: Dr. Jeffrey C. Valentine. A
project funded by the U. S. Department of Education ($90,000). In this project,
our team is examining the characteristics of teachers collected at the time of hire
in an urban, metropolitan school district and determining which characteristics are
predictive of future success as measured by student achievement scores on the
state-mandated assessment.
Internal Funds

University of Louisville Graduate Research Association Travel Grant, November 2009,
awarded $420.
University of Louisville Graduate Research Association Travel Grant, April 2009,
awarded $300.
University of Louisville Graduate Research Association Travel Grant, February 2009,
awarded $300.
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COLLEGE TEACHING EXPERIENCE
Mathematics Courses

College Algebra, MT 150 (Fall 2009; Spring 2009; Spring 2010). Jefferson Community
& Technical College.
Elementary Algebra, MT 085 (Spring 2002). Maysville Community College/Central
Kentucky Technical College.
Intermediate Algebra, MT 075 (2002, Spring). Maysville Community College/Central
Kentucky Technical College.
Methods Courses

Methods for Teaching Mathematics, P – 5, EDTP 313 (2008, Fall). University of
Louisville. Co-taught with Dr. E. Todd Brown.
Methods for Teaching Mathematics, P – 5, EDTP 604 (2008, Fall). University of
Louisville. Co-taught with Dr. E. Todd Brown.
Teaching Mathematics with Technology, EDAP 397 (Fall 2009; Fall 2008). University of
Louisville. Co-taught with Dr. Charles Thompson.
Research Courses

Evaluation and Measurement, ECPY 540 (Fall 2009). University of Louisville. Co-taught
with Dr. Jill Adelson.
Hierarchical Linear Modeling, EDAP/ECPY 694 (Spring 2009; Spring 2010). University
of Louisville. Co-taught with Dr. Robert Ronau and Dr. Thomas Tretter (Spring
2009) and with Dr. Jill Adelson (Spring 2010).
Introduction to Statistics, ST 291 (Fall 2009; Spring 2009; Spring 2010). Jefferson
Community & Technical College.
Structural Equation Modeling, EDAP/ECPY 694 (Fall 2009; Fall 2008). University of
Louisville. Co-taught with Dr. Robert Ronau and Dr. Thomas Tretter.
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WORKSHOPS AND INSERVICE TEACHER TRAINING
Rakes, C. R. (2010, March). Integrating technology into mathematics education to
enhance equity. College of Teaching and Learning, University of Louisville, KY.
Rakes, C. R. (2009, August). Implementing a probability unit focused on developing
conceptual understanding. Bryan Station High School, Fayette County Public
Schools, Lexington, KY.
Rakes, C. R. (2009, November). Using vocabulary keyword strategies to enhance
conceptual understanding. Bryan Station High School, Fayette County Public
Schools, Lexington, KY.
Rakes, C. R. (2009, November). Targeting multiple learning styles through task
rotation. Bryan Station High School, Fayette County Public Schools, Lexington,
KY.
CONSULTING ACTIVITIES

Bryan Station High School. (2009). Consultant for development of mathematics
department professional development program. Lexington, KY: Fayette County
Public Schools.
Henry County High School. (2008 – 2009). Consultant for creation of database for
student tardy management. New Castle, KY: Henry County Public Schools.
Henry County High School. (2006 – 2008). Consultant for unit planning database
creation and management. New Castle, KY: Henry County Public Schools.
Henry County High School. (2005 – 2008). Consultant for management of multimedia
checkout system. New Castle, KY: Henry County Public Schools.
Henry County High School. (2005 – 2008). Kentucky Teacher Internship Program
resource teacher. New Castle, KY: Henry County Public Schools.
Eastside Technical Center. (2003 – 2004). Kentucky Teacher Internship Program
resource teacher. Lexington, KY: Fayette County Public Schools.
Eastside Technical Center. (2002 – 2004). Consultant on Kentucky Department of
Education Career and Technical Education Program Assessments. Lexington,
KY: Fayette County Public Schools.
Eastside Technical Center. (2000 – 2004). Consultant for Microsoft Access database
creation and management. Lexington, KY: Fayette County Public Schools.
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PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

American Educational Research Association (Member, 2008 – Present)
• Reviewer for National Conference Submissions (2009, 2010)
• Graduate Student Liaison for University of Louisville (2008 – Present)
• Student Reviewer for Journal of Teacher Education under Dr. Robert N. Ronau
(2009)
Association for Advancement of Computing in Education (Member, 2008 – Present)
• Reviewer for Contemporary Issues in Technology and Teacher Education (CITE)
Journal, 2009 - Present
• Reviewer for Society for Technology and Teacher Education (SITE) annual conference
(2010)
• Student Reviewer for Annual SITE conference under Dr. Robert N. Ronau (2007)
• Student Reviewer for Contemporary Issues in Technology and Teacher Education
(CITE) Journal under Dr. Robert N. Ronau (2007)
Association of Mathematics Teacher Educators (Member, 2008 – Present)
• Reviewer for National Conference (2010)
National Council of Teachers of Mathematics (Member, 2000 – Present)
• Reviewer for Journal of Research of Mathematics Education (2009 – Present)
• Reviewer for Mathematics Teacher (2008 – Present)
Psychology of Mathematics Education, International and North American Chapter
(Member, 2009 – Present)
United Nations Association of the United States of America (Member, 2006 – Present)
SERVICE

University of Louisville (2008 – 2010)
• College of Education and Human Development Technology Committee (Graduate
Student Member)
•

Department of Educational & Counseling Psychology Search Committee,
Graduate Student Member (Psychometrician Position)

•

University Graduate Student Council
o Teaching & Learning Representative
o Grievance Sub-Committee Member

•

Tri-University Spring Research Conference Program Chair. (2009, Spring).
Regional Research Conference sponsored by the University of Louisville,
University of Kentucky, and University of Cincinnati.
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•

Tri-University Spring Research Conference Technology Committee Member.
(2009, Spring). Regional Research Conference sponsored by the University of
Louisville, University of Kentucky, and University of Cincinnati.

HONORS AND AWARDS

Graduate Dean’s Citation Award, May 2010
University of Louisville Graduate Assistantship, 2009-2010
University of Louisville Graduate School Fellowship, 2008 – 2009
Golden Key International Honour Society, 2006 – Present
Eastside Technical Center: Outstanding Service Award, 2004
Kentucky SkillsUSA VICA: Outstanding Advisor of the Year, 2003
Who’s Who among America’s High School Teachers: Henry County High School, 2005
and 2007; Eastside Technical Center, 2002
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